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The dissertation investigates the possibility of a naturalist approach
to moral education. The two initial chapters deal with questions of free-
dom and moral relativity, respectively. Freedom is held to be a necessary
condition of any moral theory; if one cannot help doing what in fact one
does, no sense can be made of obligation and responsibility, and there would
be no purpose in discussing moral education. Although it is granted that
the causal principle holds, viz., that every event has a cause, determinism
is held to be compatible with a concept of freedom. The concept of freedom
is subsequently developed in terms of (1) genuine alternatives available to
the agent, (2) the reasons given for choice, and (3) the translation of
choice into intentionality or action. In regard to moral relativity, it is
argued that the facts of cultural diversity, contrary to the prevailing cli-
mate of opinion, fail to support a thesis of cultural relativity. Conse-
quently, a normative theory of moral education can be generated and justified
without the onus of either authoritarian control or laissez-faire subjectivity.
The final two chapters focus on anti-naturalist attempts to discredit
naturalism, and on the relation of naturalism to moral education. Account
is taken of the anti-naturalist critique of naturalism, beginning with the
publication of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica , 1903, and concluding with
current expositors of emotivism and prescriptivism. Emotivists and
Vi
prescriptivists, it is held, presuppose the existence of a logical gap be-
tween description and evaluation, between "is" and "ought," a presupposition
which, in turn, is used to discredit a misleading, if not spurious, account
of naturalism—an account first expounded in Principia Ethica. Moreover,
it is argued that anti—naturalists have been seduced by what they believe
to be the unique function of ethical discourse, without thereby yielding
an adequate account of ethical and moral life, or of the critical demands
laid upon the agent in making moral decisions. The naturalist rejoinder
argues four points concerning morality: (1) that there is no basis for a
logical distinction between description and evaluation, (2) that contingent
features fecundate the meaning of evaluative and moral judgments, (3) that
morality has a content to be identified in the benefit or goodness perceived
in holding a given moral point of view, and (4) that judgments of moral
principle, like all judgments, are grounded in the agent's perception of
relations, bearings and consequences in confronting concrete problem situa-
tions. In the concluding chapter, a naturalist moral theory is related to
moral education. Morality is envisaged as arising out of the experience of
the child, manifested in the strategies employed in attacking moral problems,
and in the child's perception of the benefit or goodness attendant on choice
and action. The dissemination of moral principles in the classroom is
therefore held to be unwarranted. Finally, democracy, defined as a community
of shared common interests, is detected as the principal institutional back-
ground for moral education. It is held that democratic principles best
complement human nature, perceived as inseparable from a social environment,
vii
and best guarantee freedom, the necessary condition of morality. Conse-
quently, moral education is grounded in the perspective which acknowledges
the conjoint efforts of men in confronting environmental and social prob-
lems
.
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1CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
In this chapter an attempt will be made to unpack the concept of
freedom. The substantive claim is that freedom is a necessary condition
for any ethical theory; only the free agent can be held morally respon-
sible for his choices and actions. Those who would deny moral responsi-
bility argue that, if determinism holds, if one cannot help doing what
in fact one does, no sense can be made of obligation and responsibility.
For the grounds of his argument, the determinist cites the causal princi-
ple, viz., that every event has a cause. Without the assumption of this
principle, discontinuity in nature would have to be sanctioned, prediction
and explanation compromised. Accordingly, if it can be demonstrated that
internal and external restraints mediate choice and action, freedom be-
comes a chimera and responsibility a concept devoid of content. In edu-
cational terms, it is argued that, if determinism holds, such manipulative
means as indoctrination and conditioning gain support as principal teach-
ing techniques. The student is thus regarded as a moral proselyte, in-
capable of independent motivation and development, and moral education is
thereby grounded in the external imposition of principles of conduct.
The position taken throughout this chapter denies that the causal princi-
ple implies the consequences envisaged by the determinist and that it is
possible to adduce a concept of freedom which is compatible with the causal
principle without doing violence to common usage. In the fourth
chapter,
2implications of the concept of freedom for moral education will be
examined in detail.
Determinism and the Possibility of Moral Education
Because writers espouse varying degrees of determinism, there is
probably no completely adequate definition of the position. In this paper
only the so-called ’hard’ determinists will be considered. Among those in
sympathy with this position, Brandt holds that determinism is the view
that "any event could be predicted if all the laws of nature were known,
and enough were known about previous states of nature to permit use of the
laws for prediction .’’ 1 Broad maintains that, for any event e to be com-
pletely determined, means that "e has zero range of indeterminism for
every dimension of every determinable characteristic of which it is a mani-
festation ." 2 Hospers simply defines determinism as the position which
holds that "every event has a cause ." 3 Suppose we follow Hospers' defini-
tion. What does it mean to say that "every event has a cause?" It at
least means there can be no discontinuity in nature, every state-of-af fairs
falls within some causal condition in such a way that it ideally could be
predicted. Applied to man, it would mean that each individual constitutes
a state-of-affairs subject to causal laws. Not only would each individual
be subject to the external restraints of the environment, but, if we allow
that there are mental states, these will be subject to internal restraints
as well.
As for the word "cause", it is sufficiently ambiguous as
to require
Historically, Hume's critique of the Aristoteliansome elucidation.
3notion of cause as "necessary connection" made possible an empirical
analysis of the problem. But Hume’s own definition of "cause" as "con-
stant conjunction" was itself ambiguous. Not all constantly conjoined
events are said to be causally related, e.g., the procession of the
seasons or the alternation of traffic lights. Nor does it seem that
"constant conjunction" does justice to all causal events, e.g., the re-
lation of the moon to ocean tides. In an effort to remedy the defects
in Hume’s analysis, Mill defended cause as "sufficient condition." Mill
reasoned that, although there are necessary conditions for events to
occur, "cause" could not be defined as "necessary condition." For ex-
ample, a necessary condition for combustion is the presence of oxygen,
but it is not sufficient for the event to occur. Only when oxygen is
accompanied by other necessary conditions, a combustible material and a
proper temperature, does combustion occur. Mill concludes:
The cause, then philosophically speaking, is the sum total
of the conditions, positive and negative taken together;
the whole of the contingencies of every description, which^
being realized, the consequent (event) invariably follows.
In rendering "cause" as "sufficient condition," it is not to be supposed
that, in practice, one will be able to ascertain the sufficient conditions
for all events or even very many of them. The sufficient condition for
my car starting in the morning may involve hundreds of necessary
condi-
tions. Therefore, in line with ordinary usage, it makes sense
to speak
of proximate conditions as causal conditions, e.g., turning
the key m
the ignition. Yet, as Mill says, he is trying to give
a philosophically
4adequate definition of 'cause"; he is not concerned with the programs re-
quired to ascertain various sufficient conditions.
Following Mill's lead, if "cause" is taken to be "sufficient condi-
tion," the determinist can state his position according to a formal causal
principle:
For every event in the universe, there is a set of condi-
tions (the necessary conditions) such that, whenever
these conditions obtain, the event invariably occurs
.
5
According to the determinist, if the causal principle holds, it portends
important consequences for man. As an event, the individual must be sub-
ject to determinism, there can be no question of physical and mental con-
duct being exempt from the causal nexus. One may not be aware of the
antecedent conditions for choice and action, but no matter how complex
they may be, their presence is a necessary consequence of the causal prin-
ciple. And the proximate conditions themselves will have their antece-
dents. One's character and personality will involve causal chains and
clusters reaching back to infancy and beyond. As Hospers says, it is all
a matter of luck when a child turns out "all right," but when he does not,
when the adult character is flawed, it is no less than "the twentieth-
century version of the family curse, the curse on the House of Atreus
.
The child beater of today was mauled by his parents; they in turn by
theirs. In the light of the causal principle, the determinist charges
that such terms as "freedom," "choice," "approbation" and "disapproba-
tion" are vacuous. Not only is moral indignation over heinous
crime it-
self determined, but it rests on the faulty assumption the
agent could
5have acted otherwise, that he was responsible for his act. Moreover,
the distinction between the moral and legal derivation of law rests on
arbitrary grounds; no matter how the law is held to be derived, punish-
ment can only be justified for utilitarian purposes.
But the question remains: Does every event have a cause? How could
such a claim be justified? Many determinists point to the spectacular
success of science in defense of their position. The areas of unexplained
phenomena are dwindling, causal laws are continually being developed for
physical and psychological processes. An extrapolation from the history
of science would indicate that all events are lawful. Yet, if we appeal
to the success of induction to justify induction, we are confronted with
the empiricist's dilemma, we are liable to the charge of committing the
fallacy of begging the question. Whether the future will be like the
past cannot rest on an appeal to induction. Furthermore, most scientists
today would agree with Schrodinger that "the exact laws which we observe
are 'statistical laws '." 7 What holds consistently are statistical
proba-
bilities rather than exact causal relations. Consequently, there
would
be no logical contradiction in a denial of any law of science.
Still it
is argued that, just as we observe uniformities in nature giving rise
to
the laws of science, so the causal principle is an
inductive generaliza-
tion based on these uniformities and their attendant
laws. To be sure,
the causal principle is more general and inclusive,
but the method
derivation is exactly the same as any other law.
Mill seems to argue this
way for he says that "we should never have
had the notion of causation
6(in the philosophical meaning of the term) as a condition of all phenomena
unless many cases of causation, or, in other words, many partial unifor-
mities of sequence, had previously become familiar
.
8 However, it is dif-
ficult to see how Mill can escape his own indictment of universal causal-
ity:
Doubtless (it may be said) most phenomena are connected
as effects with some antecedent or cause.... If, then,
the processes which bring these cases within the same
category with the rest require that we should assume
the universality of the very law which they do not at
first sight appear to exemplify, is not this a petitio
principii ? Can we prove a proposition by an argument
which takes it for granted ? 8
Still the determinist persists. At best, sense might be made of free-
dom, if determinism holds. Comparatively unimportant decisions, such as
on which side of the street one walks, might be cited by the indeterminist
as obvious examples of caprice. Only a philosophical purist would hold
out for determinism in such cases. The determinist answers that, even
if these cases are granted, these are not the ones the indeterminist wishes
to reserve for freedom. Instead, it is those decisions of great magnitude
which capture the imaginations of indeterminists , those with consequences
altering the course of a person’s life. Confronted with life or death
situations, we certainly do not want to think of our choices as being
merely arbitrary, unrelated to our character and our previous experiences
and choices. We wish to say, "far from being a whim or blind fancy, this
is m£ choice; it was made with deliberate effort; it reflects me as a
unique personality." As Broad says, the indeterminists (or
libertarians
7as he calls them)
,
...would like to say that the putting forth of a certain
amount of effort in a certain direction at a certain time
is completely determined, but is determined in a unique
and peculiar way. It is literally determined the agent
or self
,
considered as a substance or continuant, and not
by a total cause which contains as factors events in and
dispositions of the agent . 10
If this position can be maintained, the determinist might agree with the
indeterminist, he might grant that "freedom" makes sense if it refers to
the uniqueness of self-identity. It is not antecedent events, but a
special "substance or continuant" that makes the choice. Supposedly, by
assigning meaning to such phrases as "my choice," this move would allow
for both determinism and freedom. Can this argument stand up to scrutiny?
Not only is the question of self-identity problematic, but, even if it
were resolved, it is not clear why the self should not be regarded as an
event. However unique it otherwise may be, it would seem a bold move to
preclude the self from the class comprising events. Unless the determin-
ist can adduce further justification, he would probably be better off dis-
avowing a concept of freedom.
Since the causal principle cannot be supported by induction without
begging the question, and since it evidently is not an analytically true
proposition, viz., one which cannot be denied without contradiction, is
there any justification for holding it? "I see no prima facie objection
to there being events that are not completely determined," says Broad ,
11
and, although it appears prima facie as though most events are caused,
this may not hold true in the case of human deliberation and action.
8Perhaps the determinist ' s most plausible recourse would be to treat the
causal principle, not as a proposition having truth value, but as what
some have called a leading principle. 12 For instance, in deference to
the beliefs of the patient, the doctor may excuse the patient's recovery
as being indeed a miracle. As a doctor qua doctor, of course, he believes
nothing of the kind. He will continue to search for an explanation of
the alleged miracle. In other words, the causal principle is assumed as
a leading principle in the course of being a proficient doctor. Similarly,
the determinist might attempt to justify the causal principle in terms of
the consequences of holding the principle, i.e., in terms of its success
in dealing with the world. In this case, the causal principle would not
be held to be true or false, because no evidence would be allowed to count
for or against it. Confronted with a phenomenon for which no cause is
evident, the determinist can simply demur until such a time as it is pos-
sible to assign an explanation. He can then point to science and medi-
cine, not as evidence for an inductive generalization, but that their very
existence presupposes the causal principle. Insofar as description, ex-
planation and prediction constitute viable activity, they presuppose
universal causality.
A Concept of Freedom
The Availability of Genuine Alternatives is a Necessary Condition
of Freedom . Viewed as a leading principle, the causal principle
makes a
great deal more sense. No proof is required; by employing
it we are led
to find more and more causal relations. Does it then
imply that we would
9be better off giving up our ideas of freedom and responsibility? Skinner
seems to suggest this in his latest book, and it has been argued by others
that the thought of freedom is merely a human conceit. In his assessment
of unconscious motivation, Hospers writes:
To be sure, the domination by the unconscious in the case of
"normal” individuals is somewhat more benevolent than the
tyranny and despotism exercised in neurotic cases, and there-
fore the former have evoked less comment; but the principle
remains in all cases the same: the unconscious is the master
of every fate and the captain of every soul . 13
Without giving up the causal principle, there appear to be locutions
which do allow for freedom. Consider the assertion:
The middleclass child has more freedom than the ghetto child,
because he has more alternatives open to him.
This seems to be a straightforward paradigm in conformity with common
usage. Much social legislation in recent years has such assertions as its
rationale. We say of the ghetto child that he fails because his environ-
ment fails; the alternatives open to him are few, while those available
often lead to virulent solutions of pressing problems. Nor would it appear
that the causal principle has been violated. It is in fact a presupposi-
tion of the kind of explanation given for the general disparity between
the lives of middleclass and ghetto children. Where cases seem to belie
the general tendency, other causal factors are cited, those unique to par-
ticular lives but not to be found in the general groups. It is commonl>
felt that, as available alternatives become more nearly equal, a conver-
gence of choice will occur within a more definitive range. Whether or
not
this is an adequate prognosis and cure for present-day social
ills is not
10
really so much the point; rather, it is the fact that such an appraisal
often given, and to this extent it is congruous with a use of "freedom"
compatible with the causal principle. Insofar as assertions like the
above are made, it makes sense partially to define "freedom" in terms of
the alternatives open to the agent.
Consider another example. Suppose I am invited to a cocktail party.
Upon my arrival, the hostess offers me a choice among certain drinks.
Suppose that I find none of the proffered alternatives to be particularly
attractive. Nevertheless, I do make a choice, the least offensive from
my point of view. According to the causal principle, my disposition to
choose and the choice made are causally related to antecedent dispositions,
choices and experiences. True, I am not completely satisfied with my
choice, and, if I am churlish and obstinate, I will voice my dissatisfac-
tion to the hostess. She, in turn, being properly concerned, may endeavor
to provide a drink to which I am partial, i.e., a new alternative. But
this new alternative has an added feature— its availability has increased
my freedom of choice. Now that my taste dispostion has been abetted, my
ill-humor mollified, I will surely choose the new alternative. The origi-
nal alternatives reduced my freedom quantitatively by one, the important
one which, if it had originally been available, would have been my prefer-
ence. As with the former example, there appears to be no violation here
of either the causal principle or common usage. Implied is a necessary
relation between one ordinary sense of freedom and a given number of
al-
ternatives available to the agent for a given case.
11
Available alternatives, while they are a necessary condition of
freedom, are not sufficient. Would we hold a person to be free, never
mind the determinist/indeterminist conflict, if that person could not dif-
ferentiate the options open to him? Without preferential discrimination,
rather than saying the person chooses freely, would we not be more apt to
say that that person is a victim of circumstances beyond his control?
Perceived alternatives are imperative for conditions of freedom. Myers
supplies a touching portrait of the unfree, those who ostensively have
available alternatives, but who do not perceive them as such:
There is... a city in a region which has made great use of
migratory labor. These people live more or less as a group,
out of economic necessity and for mutual comfort. Many of
them are afraid to go from their familiar area to other areas
of the city . . . .What stops them? They are, as we say, legally
free. The police do not stop them. Their more established
compatriots are not prevented from trading in the stores, and
they are not excluded from the movie houses. But are the
newcomers free? I think not. Not only are they ignorant of
their "rights" but they feel the positive barrier of fear,
the fear of a different and unfriendly world . 14
If there is to be freedom, available alternatives are not enough; they
must be genuine alternatives, i.e., perceived as such, those involving
the capacity to trace, as thoroughly as possible, their implications and
consequences. Alternatives dimly realized and partially understood cannot
be genuine. The school dropout who opts for the glamour of the drug cul-
ture may have abandoned or failed to recognize genuine alternatives which
in the long run may better have served him. It might be a caricature
to
say of him that he has chosen freely; the pressures of environment
and
peer group, the accessibility of quick rewards foreshadow the
choices and
12
actions of the unfree. Nor do propitious circumstances automatically
guarantee genuine alternatives
. "There is hardly more freedom on the
side of varied and flexible capacity of choice," says Dewey, since "pref-
erences are restricted to the line laid down, and in the end the individ-
ual becomes the slave of his success." 15 The capacity to discriminate
among alternatives is the very basis of choice; no matter what the cir-
cumstances of the agent, whether favorable or unfavorable, blinders can
inhibit this capacity. Therefore, choice implies intelligent deliberation
regarding genuine alternative; it can no more rest on blind impulse than
on the vicissitudes of the agent's life. It follows that, to the extent
the agent is ignorant of his options and their consequences, his freedom
is proportionately diminished. Again, in Dewey's words:
Choice, in the distinctively human sense .. .presents itself as
one preference among and out of preferences . . . . as the forma-
tion of a new preference out of a conflict of preferences....
In so far as a variable life history and intelligent insight
and foresight enter into it, choice signifies a capacity for
deliberately changing preferences. The hypothesis that is
suggested is that in these two traits we have before us the
essential constituents of choice as freedom: the factor of
individual participation. 16
Giving Quality Reasons for Choice is a_ Condition of Freedom . It has
been argued that the availability of genuine alternatives is a necessary
condition of freedom. In addition, it was noted that the presence of
genuine alternatives implies a strong cognitive dimension in ascertaining
choice. In this section it will be argued that this cognitive dimension
is identified in the reasons given for choice. Moreover, it will be
argued
that, of the reasons given for choice, it is their quality which
marks
13
another necessary condition. Philosophers have long recognized the cog-
nitive aspect of freedom. In holding that knowledge is the most powerful
affect in a deterministic universe, Spinoza allows that freedom is know-
ledge of one s determined character. Freedom consists in knowing what is
impossible; it is blind response to stimuli which characterizes the unfree.
As insight and understanding increase, freedom and responsibility develop
as logical derivatives. But Spinoza misses the future orientation of
choice. We do not say of rocks and trees, caught as they are in the causal
nexus, that they choose what they will be; only man has options pointing
to the future; only man can initiate significant change. To ignore the
future would be tantamount to delegating man to the condition of the rest
of nature, to the status quo
,
the causal conditions which in fact prevail.
Recent writers like Dewey locate the grounds of freedom and responsibility
in the future consequences of choice. If we heed only the antecedent
causal conditions, as we might in the case of rocks and trees, we miss the
distinctively human contribution, the use of insight and foresight in
making choices. Hence, it is one thing to understand causal relations,
quite another to initiate intelligent change. Knowledge and understanding,
in the Spinozistic sense, supply only part of what is meant by choice, but
they fail to allow for creativity and novelty. Spinozistic man can only
conform to the conditions of his life, but like the neurotic, his life is
repetitious rather than innovative.
The cognitive dimension of freedom requires that no choice will count
as free, in the requisite sense, unless it is an intelligent choice,
in
14
conformity with both the causal conditions and the consequences of the
choice. The intelligent choice implies the absence of restraints and
blinders which would attenuate the choice. Nevertheless, an argument,
which initially might look convincing, has been proffered against this
view. The argument rests on a distinction between causality and compul-
sion. A person's choice will be free, but caused, when it is uncompelled.
A man locked up or in chains falls under causal conditions
,
but he is
unfree not for that reason, he is compelled. Now, according to the prev-
ious argument, where conditions allow for intelligent choice through de-
liberation, evaluation, insight and foresight, one's choice will be free,
but caused, yet uncompelled. According to this position, an intelligent
choice implies certain conditions— the absence of debilitating restraints,
thus allowing for an innovative and hence uncompelled choice. However,
if it could be demonstrated that most, if not all, events are compelled,
then freedom would be an illusion, cognitive activity, since it too would
be compelled, would be to no avail. The wily criminal who employs great
ingenuity in the execution of his trade would be no more blameworthy or
praiseworthy than the average citizen.
The argument for compulsion derives its support from the discovery
of unconscious motivation. According to this interpretation of psycho-
analytic theory, for the reasons given for a choice, there will be a
further explanation unascertainable by the agent. This further explana
tion is the real explanation, it exposes unconscious motives, those ac-
counting for why the former reasons carried more weight with the agent
15
than others. From the agent’s perspective, unconscious motivation will
be discontinuous with conscious cognitive activity, the former being al-
ways veiled from the agent. It follows that conscious cognitive activity
will constitute mere rationalizations or compromises of unconscious moti-
vation. As Hospers expresses the argument for compulsion:
An act is free when it is determined by a man’s character,
say moralists; but what if the most decisive aspects of his
character were already irrevocably acquired before he could
do anything to mold them? What if even the degree of will
power available to him in shaping his habits and disciplin-
ing himself now to overcome the influence of his early en-
vironment is a factor over which he has no control? What
are we to say of this kind of "freedom?"
. . .The conscious
life of the human being, including the conscious decisions
and volitions, is merely a mouthpiece for the unconscious
—
not directly for the enactment of unconscious drives, but
of the compromise between unconscious drives and uncon-
scious reproaches . 17
Most of the examples cited by Hospers are, to say the least, exotic,
and, although he purports to be giving an analysis of normal behavior,
one senses that there certainly must be degrees of compulsion. We hold
suspect the compulsive hand washer whose only excuse is that he wants to
keep clean; if he were a dentist or mechanic, there would be no grounds
for skepticism. What seems to count, in terms of freedom, is the quality
of reasons given for choice, not some inherent aspect of the choice itself.
This is recognized in courts of law where the insanity plea is often in-
voked to cover the inadequacy of the reasons given by the agent for his
crime. Most everyone recognizes a distinction between adequate and inade-
quate reasons, just as most everyone uses the distinction for assigning
culpability for acts. It may be that the main defect in Hospers’ defense
16
of the argument for compulsion lies in his interpretation of psychoanalytic
theory. There would appear to be a difference between the theory itself
and the mechanical principles of therapy implied by the theory. The theory
deals with inexorable laws of human nature, but the therapy would seem to
indicate increasing stages of culpability in proportion to its success. A
person who comes to understand his compulsive behavior is in a position to
do something about it.
It is along these lines that Peters takes a hard stand against the
argument for compulsion. There is a distinction to be made between causes
in general and causes which would count as exonerating circumstances for
a choice, belief or act. Moreover, "the causes of a belief must be dis-
tinguished from its grounds" says Peters, "and it seems only relevant to
speculate about causes when there are no grounds ." 18 In the case of the
"mixed-up kid" who commits a crime, exonerating circumstances would ob-
tain— if and only if—it could be shown that environmental and social con-
ditions were unalterably connected with certain dispositions and traits.
Compulsive behavior is allowed as an excuse only when rational behavior
is missing:
I would want to distinguish carefully between causes proper
such as movements of the body and brain, and things like
deliberating, deciding, having reasons, understanding truths,
etc., which are often also called 'causes'. My view is that
only when explanations of the second sort break down or have
no application can causes of the first sort be sufficient to
account for the happening in question . 19
Obviously, Peters wants to avoid considering reasons as causes, it is
the autonomy of the former he wishes to preserve. A scientific account
17
of causes, say an account of neural processes, does accord with the causal
principle, but mental conduct has a different set of defining characteris-
tics. This distinction allows Peters to aver of Freudian determinism that,
although it is a brilliant insight into abnormal moves, it does not suffice
to explain normal behavior. Reasons or grounds are explanatory of behavior
though they are not causes. Unlike some of his followers, Freud endeavored
to free rather than enslave man, for he believed that, as a person comes
to understand his behavior, he is better able to take charge of it.
Still, it is not clear why reasons cannot count as causes. Assuredly,
one could point out differences between mental and physical conduct, the
private character of mental acts and their lack of spatial dimension, but
the causal principle is predicated in terms of the conditions for an event,
and it is not clear why reasons, beliefs and motives are not events caus-
ally explained in the requisite sense. Kenneth Strike maintains the pur-
ported difference is that we never ask for the justification of a cause,
it is neither moral nor immoral, neither true nor false; but of reasons,
we do ask for justification. Strike seems to be suggesting that, if
reasons in fact have the neutral characteristics of causes, there would
be no grounds for differentiating between the two. To this end he cites,
as the paradigm cases of reasons for behaving, motives and beliefs. It
makes sense to ask of motives whether they are moral or immoral, of be-
liefs whether they are true or false. But what of the fact of holding a
motive or belief? Do we ask of the fact itself whether it is moral or
immoral, true or false? The motive and what is believed, of course, will
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be moral or immoral, true or false, but the fact itself will have the
neutral characteristics of causes. It follows that reasons are causes.
For example, the man who damaged the Pieta probably had motives, but wheth-
er good or bad, it was his holding of the motives that marked the neutral-
ity of causal efficacy. Or take Strike's example. He asks that we con-
sider two sentences:
(1) The reason John goes to church is that he believes in God.
(2) John's reason for going to church is that God exists.
In the first sentence, the referent of the word "reason" is the relation
between John and the proposition "God exists," viz., the fact of believing.
The fact of believing is the relation. However, the referent of the term
in the second sentence is the proposition which John believes :
The fact of believing and the proposition believed have
quite different properties. It is the believing which
explains John's behavior; however, believing is neither
true nor false. On the other hand, the proposition be-
lieved does not explain John's behavior. The proposition
is, however, either true or false. Thus, if true, it may
constitute part of the grounds for going to church. At
the same time, the proposition is itself an object of
justification. .. .Reasons cause people to behave; that is,
people behave because of their motives and beliefs. 20
There appear to be difficulties in Strike's analysis, or, at least,
it is misleading. It is conceivable that Hospers might retort that, even
if John is sincere, he might be compelled for reasons other than the fact
of his believing. What if he has been systematically indoctrinated so
that not going to church results in real physical or mental discomfort?
Or, what if what really motivates him is the pretty girl in the choir? In
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other words, how are we to discriminate those beliefs and motives which
are causal from those which are not? What seems convincing about reasons
and their causal efficacy is their quality
,
and part of what is meant by
their quality is their relatedness to other beliefs, motives and reasons,
to one’s goals and interests. Rather than single acts of believing or
holding motives, it is the coherency and consistency of clusters of motives
and beliefs that yields credibility to the claim that reasons are causes.
Singularly, torn from context, they fall prey to the argument for compul-
sion. A fortiori
,
beliefs fall on a continuum, some having little or no
support, others with more or less substantial support. For instance, in
Strike’s sentence (1), the fact of John's believing may rest in an act of
faith, i.e., belief in the absence of evidence. But then perhaps he sub-
scribes to one of the rational proofs for the existence of God, or perhaps
he has had a compelling religious experience. Surely knowing the origin,
strength and relatedness of John's belief should weigh in an appraisal of
the belief's causal efficacy. One may "believe" in prophetic utterances
of doom without unburdening oneself of sinful ways. Not only must the
agent know himself, but, if his reasons are to count, others must know him
as well. Not all beliefs will be causally instantiated; it is their quality
which marks those which are and those which are not.
The question of to what extent reasons are causes can be left in abey-
ance without undercutting the thrust of Peters' position. His main objec-
tive is to distinguish between actions which merely happen to a person,
such as a muscle spasm, and those which are purposive. No doubt, in
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neural functions and bodily movements, we can identify necessary conditions
of behavior, but they are not sufficient to explain it. Motives and be-
liefs do not arise in a vacuum, nor are the reasons a person gives for his
behavior ordinarily divorced from goals and interests; rather, they exem-
plify a ’’rule-following purposive pattern ." 21 To describe actions only
in causal terms precludes them from being "intelligent or unintelligent,
correct or incorrect, efficient or inefficient." These predicates are ap-
plicable, as it becomes apparent how reasons hang together, how they des-
cribe a consistent, coherent pattern. This contextual awareness distin-
guishes compulsive from intelligent behavior, isolated from meaningful
acts; it is the best evidence that most choices are not merely rationali-
zations of unconscious motives. According to Peters, "the concept of an
action is inseparable from that of intelligence .... the ability to vary
movements relative to a goal ...." 22 And later he says, "the goal which is
quoted to justify a man's action must also be such that reference to it
actually explains what a man has done ." 22 We may fairly ask of a motive
or belief whether it is the reason the agent acted as he did. It will be
a quality reason insofar as it has bearing on the agent's life his pur-
poses, interests and goals. Hospers' contention that all actions are sham,
veiled unconscious motives, fails precisely because it fails to identify
this contextual awareness on the part of the agent. The facts belie the
argument for compulsion; it would be nothing short of grotesque to
analyze
purposive behavior into just so many compulsive acts, into dumb, unintelli-
gent moves
.
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It has been the burden of this section to describe the cognitive
dimension of freedom. This cognitive dimension is revealed in the quality
of reasons given for an act. The rationalist’s insistence on an under-
standing of causal relations is a partial clue to the effectiveness of
reasons to explain behavior. But knowledge, in itself, is insufficient
to account for the human contribution of novelty and innovation. Hence,
a quality reason must be intelligent; it must be related to other motives
and beliefs and to the goals of the agent. Since the argument for com-
pulsion fails to account for the contextual setting in which reasons are
given, unconscious motivation, ordinarily, will not suffice to explain
behavior. Nevertheless, there would appear to be one further condition
of freedom. It is conceivable that a person may have the necessary know-
ledge, interests and goals, yet fail to take action on their behalf. If
there is no intentional action, i.e., active participation in the world,
there can be no freedom.
Intentionality is a_ Necessary Condition of Freedom . It might be
thought that intentionality involves some kind of strict mental conduct.
Increasingly, the term has come to refer as well to action. As O'Shaugh-
nessy puts it, "intentional action is the logically primary case of action
Moreover, the term implies a social context, "a world that is dynamic in-
asmuch as certain items in that world are goals or dangers in relation to
which one is intentionally acting." 2 ^ From the standpoint of freedom, the
problem lies in translating cognitive activity—deliberation, reasons,
knowledge, insight and foresight—into active participation in the affairs
.<24
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of the world. For Spinoza, intentional action presents no problem,
since freedom is merely knowledge of one’s determined character. Action
is accordingly attenuated "by the progressive saturation of all laws and
institutions with greater acknowledgement of the necessary laws governing
the constitution of things ." 26 One merely comes to accept the inevitable;
no meaning, from the human perspective, can be attached to such terms as
"innovation" and "creativity." Classical Liberalism fares no better. On
the one hand, the absence of restraints on economic exploitation, the
theory of laissez faire, only leads to the exploitation of the vast major-
ity of men by vested interests. On the other hand, those who, like
Rousseau, would guarantee intentionality on the basis of the unimpeded
development of innate potentialities, fail to note how choice and action
are mediated by the environmental context. Social interaction dramatically
alters desires and beliefs. What then is the locus of intentionality?
How is cognition related to action in a social context?
In response to the challenge of Rationalism and Liberalism, the
Marxist stresses the importance of "human agency" and "practice." Neces-
sity is not envisaged from the lofty perch of metaphysical speculation
about nature and man, but from a world historical perspective, in which
man can and must bring about significant change. To dissever man from
productive action would be a violation of freedom. For the Marxist the
gulf between theory and practice, between cognition and action, can only
be bridged through "real knowledge of the subject ."
27 This means that
freedom and action are inseparable, and, unless cognition permits
the
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exercise of intelligent action in pursuit of goals, freedom will be
jeopardized, no real knowledge of the subject will occur. Man confronts
nature as one of her own forces, and, as in the case of social progress,
the consistent history of class struggle is inexplicable except in terms
of human agency in the world. Therefore, the ground of intention rests
in the encouragement of responsible and self-producing individuals capable
of properly utilizing nature’s laws. "Freedom does not consist in the
dream of independence of natural laws," writes Engels, "but in the know-
ledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically
making them work towards definite ends . 28
However, natural laws are not predicated along the usual lines of the
hypothetico-deductive method familiar to most scientists; rather, they are
held to be dialectical laws. When Marx admonishes man to "change the
world," he means that man, in confronting the world, in participating, is
engaged in reciprocal causality. Not only does participation extend the
agent's consciousness, but nature is altered as well. No matter how mea-
ger the participation, both agent and nature are proportionately changed.
Now the soul of dialectic is contradiction. Accordingly, on both the
physical and social levels, the agent is responsible for discovering in-
herent contradictions; in turn, these are expressed as the dialectical laws
of nature and society. For instance, the relation between positive and
negative electricity on the physical level is analogous to the relation
between proletariat and bourgeoisie on the social level. It follows that
intentional action involves both the discovery of and the yielding to
the
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inexorable laws governing the motion of nature and society. Only as man
comes to appreciate the demands of historical and dialectical materialism
can there be freedom.
The Marxist's emphasis on practice and reciprocal causality is laud-
but there are difficulties attending the metaphysical schema. The
Marxist seems to be saying the relation between the agent and world is
itself lawful and invariable. Evidence would suggest the relation is far
more flexible; different individuals often come to the same conclusions
about the world via different means; uniqueness marks inquiry as much as
does conformity. For instance, Hesse has demonstrated how one might arrive
at a wave theory of light propagation through either mathematical models
or common analogies to sound and water waves . 30 Moreover, the Marxist's
contention that natural and social laws are dialectical is suspect. If
contradictions are in fact real, if they are known to exist by the Marxist,
there must be theories and laws governing their operation. How else could
one account for their existence? But one of the chief canons of scientific
investigation is testability; there must at least be the logical possibil-
ity of a counterinstance of a given theory or law. According to Marxist
theory though, no event could stand as a counterinstance, the metaphysical
presupposition, the belief in the existence of contradictions, is inclus-
ive and all-embracing. This is poignantly expressed in an example drawn
from Soviet education. One Soviet professor advised his university class
that sociology is in fact "historical materialism in action," that its
goal should be to "generalize the experience of building socialism.
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However, his class remained unconvinced. "If we set out to find general
laws of socialist construction," questioned one member, "then are we
really being scientific? Perhaps we will find fewer general laws than we
think. We really should begin with an open mind. "31
Unlike Rationalism and Liberalism, the virtue of Marxism lies in its
promise to all men, regardless of station, of the fruits of technology and
of the opportunity of effecting significant social change. Intentionality
obtains in the translation of knowledge into productive action, in arduous
labor and experimentation within the human situation where subject and
object "are integrated into a single dialectical event, transformative of
both . 32 Finally, "freedom is made identical with knowledge, and it thus
becomes—intelligent action, or the scientifically informed production of
both natural and social goods ." 33 Were it not for zealously held meta-
physical presuppositions, the Marxist view of intentionality would have
to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, the dialectical laws governing the
movement of nature and society are still forthcoming, and, although the
Marxist allows for an elastic and accommodating timetable, e.g., capital-
ist retrenchments, the essential condition of testability would appear to
be beyond reach. Still, by bringing the essentials of human freedom down
to earth, the Marxist has forced us to face up to such nagging problems
as equalitarian humanism, impartiality, rights and justice. This is cer-
tainly no humble accomplishment.
Dewey's concept of freedom bears remarkable resemblance to the Marx-
ist account. There is the recognition that theory and practice
are
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intrinsically related; the reciprocity between man and environment is
respected. Along with the Marxist, Dewey recognizes the inadequacy of
the Spinozistic overemphasis on knowledge, Liberalism’s neglect of social
relations, the faith that the absence of restraints will alone facilitate
the unfolding of natural potentialities. However, as with the older
positions, the Marxist fails to account for the element of originality and
creativity in choice. The inevitability of natural and historical develop-
m^nt allows man, at best, to aid and hasten the process, but man cannot
change it. The future is contained in the antecedent; the causal chain
is inexorable; the outcome unfailingly predictable. Rather than this
closed system, Dewey seeks "freedom in something which comes to be, in a
certain kind of growth; in consequences, rather than in antecedents ." 34
Antecedent conditioning falls under the purview of science and causal law,
it deals with the "relations between things," but it fails to account for
the "individualities of things ." 35 Such individuality would have to be
anathema for the Marxist. For him the locus of predictability resides
in the antecedent; the relation between agent and object is inviolable;
the resolution of tension between opposites always lawful. It would
follow that, if intentionality is to have relevance for freedom, the con-
sequences of choice must be considered as well as the antecedent condi-
tions of choice.
Dewey is aware that intentionality is a necessary condition of free-
dom. "Choice would hardly be significant if it did not take effect in
outward action," he says, and "the essential problem of freedom... is the
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problem of the relation of choice and unimpeded effective action to each
other. 36 The problem is the relation between freedom conceived as choice
and freedom conceived as power-to-do. The failure of the positions sur-
veyed above, viz., that freedom is either the unimpeded unfolding of in-
nate potentialities something antecedently possessed—or nothing at all,
indicates that choice and power have been unduly dichotomized. A dis-
tinction between the two can be drawn for purposes of analysis, as in fact
Dewey does, but he is quick to mark it as contrived and artificial:
There is an intrinsic connection between choice as freedom
and power of action as freedom. A choice which intelligently
manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and
this enlargement in turn confers upon our desires greater
insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent
.
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If intentionality were conceived procedurally
,
the misleading dichot-
omy between theory and practice, thought and action would be surmounted.
All things in nature, whether electrons, rocks, trees or man, act inten-
tionally, but only man reflects intelligently; only man can trace the con-
sequences of his choices. This does not mean that antecedent conditions
are without value in the development of individual freedom; "these are,
when known
,
aids to the development of that freedom ." 38 But when one’s
intention is the outcome of reflective thinking, antecedents convey only
part of the process; there is still the environment, the unique situation
with its demand for choice involving new and perhaps surprising conse-
quences. Obviously, choice, thinking and power of action are connected
procedurally; consequences call for operations uniting the present with
the future. In the words of a well-known contemporary analyst:
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What distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not
their parentage but their procedure, and this holds no
less for intellectual than for practical performances.
"Intelligent" cannot be defined in terms of "intellec-
tual
. . . thinking what I am doing" does not connote "both
thinking and what to do and doing it". When I do some-
thing intelligently, i.e., thinking what I am doing, 1
am doing one thing and not two. My performance has a
special procedure or manner, not special antecedents. 39
And, in an attack against the artificial distinction often drawn between
thought and action, Hampshire asserts:
A certain minimum of consistency and regularity is re-
quired in behaviour, if that behaviour is to be counted
as intentional human action at all. There is here also
the requirement of connectedness, of a trajectory of in-
tention that fits a sequence of behaviour into an intel-
ligible whole, intelligible as having a direction, the
direction of means towards an end. 40
As conceived procedurally
,
intentionality accords with common usage.
As Dewey says, it allows for "what men actually cherish under the name of
freedom," viz., "that power of varied and flexible growth, of change of
disposition and character, that spring from intelligent choice." 41 It
promotes individual growth, but not just from within, not just as condi-
tioned by antecedents; rather, growth occurs as the agent interacts with
the environmental context in pursuit of interests and goals. In fact, it
is from a contextual setting that men derive their sense of freedom. Wit-
ness the relation between prison riots and prison reform, between totali
tarian parents and nations and their recalcitrant offspring and subjects.
Intentionality, if it is to express freedom, must involve individual par-
ticipation. Aversive controls rend the ends-means continuum the agent
associates with freedom; his choice, rather than being intelligent,
is
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coerced. Moreover, as conceived procedurally
, intentionality accords
with the causal principle. Although Dewey is occasionally ambiguous
regarding this point, he does say that uniform relations and laws are a
necessary factor in the development of power and freedom, for they "take
effect in making preference, desire, and purpose more flexible, alert,
and resolute. Perhaps it is a matter of emphasis. By stressing the
consequences of choice, Dewey wants to protect individual preference and
creativity. This does not mean that the causal sequence breaks down, but
only that the relation between the agent and the environment is not pre-
determined . An intelligent choice is not a fatalistic choice; it can,
however, comply with the causal principle in entirely new and unforeseen
ways. The "choice" of combination among chemical elements is entirely de-
termined quantitatively by weight. Human choice is variable and flexible;
the determining factors—available genuine alternatives, quality reasons,
unimpeded action
—
promote real individuality of choice.
In this section, an attempt has been made to formulate an adequate
concept of freedom. It is proposed that such a concept is the prior con-
dition for any ethical theory. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to
formulate a concept of freedom which is compatible with the causal prin-
ciple, while, at the same time, it does not violate common usage. Inso-
far as men cherish individuality of choice, causal relations and laws,
rather than being impediments, provide lawful criteria by which the con-
sequences of choice can be evaluated. In other words, projected conse-
quences are not ends, they are hypothetical entities, ends-in-view.
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Consequently, in order to overcome the limitations of hit-and-miss pro-
jections, an appreciation of causal relations becomes an invaluable asset
to the agent. His hypotheses regarding future consequences are intelli-
gent rather than guesses. Hence, even if the causal principle holds,
this is not sufficient to vitiate a concept of freedom to which individu-
als can give their assent. It is hoped that the conditions of freedom
explicated above will provide the framework within which the agent may
enjoy the widest possible range of individual choice.
Indoctrination and the Concept of Freedom
Since freedom forms the foundation of any ethical theory, it follows
that pedagogical techniques which undermine the concept of freedom devel-
oped above will, in turn, undermine the development of an adequate theory
of moral education. Implicit in the concept of freedom is the requirement
that the agent comes to see the point of his beliefs, choices and actions.
Bodies of belief, doctrines or ethical codes containing unquestioned basic
assumptions are therefore liable to techniques of teaching obstructive to
conditions of freedom. Of course, a doctrine or code of values can display
internal coherency and consistency; to this extent it could pass muster as
being rational and evidence-regarding. Still, if the basic assumptions
are unquestioned, the curious student's query can only be met with irrita-
tion or silence. For instance, a class of children might be taught that
biological life on earth has not passed through a process of evolutionary
development, but exists today as it always has. Now it may be the case
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that this position is coherent and consistent with a whole body of be-
liefs—say based on the literal interpretation of Biblical creation—and
to this extent, certain evidence, such as Biblical quotations, and certain
demonstrative principles can be adduced. But there is no doubt that cer-
tain assumptions have gone unquestioned. The beliefs of the curious
student may be altered; he may accede to the basic assumptions of the
position; his behavior might be modified on the basis of his altered be-
liefs, but has he come to see the point of his new orientation? Is his
acceptance of the position in accord with the concept of freedom?
Where unquestioned assumptions form the basis of a doctrine, we
might expect that the relation between teacher and student would be one
of indoctrination, i.e., the conscious attempt by the teacher to alter
the beliefs of the student. Of course, if it were only a matter of modi-
fying the behavior of the student, methods of conditioning might be more
appropriate. Yet most teachers, who themselves embrace a given doctrine,
are quite anxious that their wards voluntarily accede to the beliefs and
directives of the doctrine. Moreover, it is clear that indoctrination in-
volves bodies or systems of beliefs rather than isolated beliefs . 43 For
instance, the teacher stands before the class and declares that "Spring-
field is the capital of Massachusetts." Certainly, the class may believe
that it is; they may trust the knowledge of the teacher, but from the
teacher's perspective, is this indoctrination? I would seem odd to sug-
gest that it is. The teacher might be purposely lying or ignorant, but
what would seem to be the logical case of indoctrination is the case where
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the teacher believes what is taught. And, unless a given belief has ref-
erence to other facts and beliefs, it is unlikely that the teacher would
hold the belief in question. Indoctrination involves bodies or systems
of beliefs, such as a religious doctrine or a code of values.
It may be the case that there can be no body or system of beliefs
without unquestioned assumptions. It might be argued that even the phys-
ical sciences hold to assumed canons and procedural techniques. However,
the question addressed here is the relation of indoctrination to freedom,
and ultimately, to moral education. Historically, a number of ethical
codes have been grounded on normative principles which have been assumed.
Obviously, indoctrination works with such codes; it is a viable tool in
regard to a given doctrinal context. But the requirement of freedom, i.e.,
that the agent comes to see the point of his orientation, would seem to
be missing. Consider the condition of genuine alternatives. Ethical codes
based on assumed normative principles cannot vouchsafe genuine alternatives,
viz., those alternatives proscribed by normative principles. One can
easily imagine situations where a Kantian sense of duty must come into
conflict with the Neitzschean will to power. Moreover, what reasons can
an agent give for his actions, except to refer ultimately to assumed prin-
ciples? Does this require reflective thinking—deliberation, insight and
foresight? What of intentionality? One's intentions will always be dic-
tated by the parameters of the system. Hence, although an ethical code
with assumed principles can unquestionably profit from indoctrinational
procedures, it does so at the risk of vitiating the very foundation o:
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ethics and morality, viz., freedom. It follows that indoctrination must
be held inimical to the development of an adequate theory of moral edu-
cation. This would hold as well for the deliberate and explicit dissemi-
nation of values in the school. However moral education is to be con-
ceived, if freedom is to be preserved, such terms as "good" or "bad,"
right or 'wrong, ' must be predicated on the basis of the student's ex-
perience, not the teacher's.
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CHAPTER II
ANTHROPOLOGY AND MORAL EDUCATION
Students in this writer's philosophy of education course often cite
the facts of ethical diversity as substantive justification for an atti-
tude of ethical subjectivity. "Do your own thing" is the contemporary
cliche. Given a society or subgroup within a society, students point out,
one is likely to encounter more diversity than homogeneity. General prin-
ciples regulating choice and conduct, at best, are sanctioned by group
enterprise; never can they be universalized for all peoples. Cultural and
ethical diversity dispel the myth propounded by Herbert Spencer and E.B.
Taylor of a "psychic unity of mankind." It follows, students contend, that
there can be no basis for a theory of moral education. Questions as to what
one ought to value and what one ought to do are answered by reference to
the mores of one's society or by personal opinion and preference. It will
therefore be the purpose of this chapter to investigate the significance
of cultural and ethical diversity for the possibility of a theory of moral
education.
Cultural Diversity and the Thesis of Cultural Relativity
Concern with cultural and ethical diversity is at least as old as
the pre-Socra tics . "To God all things are beautiful, good, and right,
says Heraclitus, thereby assigning the onus of evaluation to man, for he
will "deem some things right and others wrong ."
1 And Protagoras contends,
of the gods man can know nothing, hence, of all things the
measure is
man ." 2 By virtue of his station, man must evaluate, he is
forced to be
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an ethical creature. But how are we to explain the diversity? What in-
ference (s) can be drawn from the obvious fact that ethical opinions differ?
There appear to be at least four stages in the anthropological interpreta-
tion of the data of cultural and ethical diversity. The first stage, as
Louch suggests, regards the anthropologist as traveller
.
3 He enumerates
the various practices of a given culture, he recites interesting stories
about diet, economy, religion and sexual practices. Yet, the traveller's
report hardly yields an adequate explanation of the diverse cultures en-
countered. He may, of course, qualify his experiences with such terms as
"exotic," "alien" or "bizarre," but the question of why such-and-such is
the case remains unresolved. Why polygamy or monogamy? Why infanticide
or parricide? Cultural phenomena require explanation.
In the second stage there is a genuine attempt to interpret data.
The variegated practices of a culture are perceived to be functionally
related. No institution or general mode of behavior is to be considered
in isolation from the conditions under which the culture operates as a
whole. Moreover, since different cultures exhibit obvious functional dis-
parities, the concept of cultural and ethical relativity begins to emerge
as a contingent inference from the facts of cultural and ethical diversity.
"The first impression which one receives from the study of a series of un-
related cultures is one of almost unlimited variety, observes Linton, and
"since all the varied patterns function successfully as parts of one cul-
ture or another, the stage is set for the development of the concept of
cultural relativity ." 4 For instance, the phenomenon of the potlatch
viewed
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functionally is not merely the wasteful distribution of one's property;
instead, one's social prestige is enhanced in proportion to one's resolve
to be freed from material possessions. In like manner, the Dobuan obses-
sion with yams is explained in terms of economy and social structure.
Characteristically, this initial stage of genuine cultural explana-
tion asserts nothing about normative justification; the anthropologist
assiduously avoids value judgements of cultural traits; ethical content
is couched in metaethical explications. The meaning and justification of
institutions and practices are sought in light of the entire functioning
culture of which these traits are but parts. However, not all anthropolo-
gists have abjured personal evaluation. The third stage of the anthro-
pological interpretation of cultural and ethical diversity regards attempts
to imbue what is perceived as functional properties of cultures with nor-
mative status. As Herskovits says, "the very core of cultural relativism
is the social discipline that comes of respect for differences—of mutual
respect ." 5 And in Man and His Works
,
the same writer says that "the rela-
tivists point of view brings into relief the validity of every set of norms
for the people whose lives are guided by them ." 5 The same call for toler-
ance can be found in the closing words of Benedict in her Patterns of
Culture :
We shall arrive then at a more realistic faith, accepting
as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the co-
existing and equally valid patterns of life which mankind
has created for itself from the raw materials of existence .
7
Assuming the functional quality of cultural traits and the edict to
abet mutual tolerance, the fourth stage of anthropological interpretation
AO
materializes as a sophisticated anthropological thesis. The very fact
that there exists cultural and ethical diversity should lead us to divest
ourselves of the belief that ethical rules and principles can be univer-
sally justified. Given an opinion or action, about which there is ethical
disagreement, there is no rational way in which the disagreement can be
resolved. As Brandt formulates the general relativist thesis: "There are
conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid. Derivatively, given
the same subject or set of conditions, there can be conflicting ethical
evaluations which cannot be adjudicated. This of course does not mean
that there are no ethical opinions universally held by mankind, but only
that where ethical opinions do conflict, there can be no rational method
by which the conflict can be resolved. The only justifiable position, in
light of ethical diversity, is one of skeptical or solipsistic reserve,
albeit, tempered with tolerance.
And certainly tolerance seems to be the most compelling feature about
this thesis, an attitude which might very well lead to our uncritical ap-
probation. As relativists we are enabled to allow for an unlimited variety
of possibilities, egocentrism is avoided, and brotherly love flourishes.
Yet, if there is no way to adjudicate conflicting ethical opinions, and
since tolerance is certainly an ethical opinion, can it really serve the
relativist's cause? Can the relativist consistently hold that tolerance
is to be preferred to intolerance? Moreover, as Marcuse points out, tol-
erance often leads to intolerance. In a critique of Comte's positive
philosophy, which ostensibly calls for objectivity and an attitude of
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tolerance, Marcuse indicates that in reality Comte cannot abide "standards
that go beyond given realities" and the "prevailing social system," so
that ' the cry of toleration became increasingly useful to the beneficiaries
of the system ." 9 Forces of revolution as well as of reaction are met head-
on by the tyranny of the majority. Then too, the cry for toleration tends
to blind us of the possibility of common features among cultures, features
which could provide a basis for empathy and better understanding among
people. And, indeed, why should not one question the ethical propriety
of many cultural practices regardless of their functional expediency?
Should tolerance be an inviolable principle without any regard for the con-
sequences of holding the principle?
Failure of the Thesis of Ethical Relativity
There is an even more interesting philosophic question at stake. How
has the anthropologist managed to move from the empirical fact of diversity
to the general thesis of cultural and ethical relativity? What is the
basis for this surprising inference? For instance, in his account of the
development of folkways, Sumner says "need was the impelling force," need
mediated by pleasure and pain was the only "psychical power." All else
evolved from this: habits, customs, the expediencies of the group. One
might suspect that Sumner is attempting to explain diversity either caus-
ally or deductively. On the one hand, if the explanation is causal, in
what sense are basic needs sufficient conditions for cultural traits? Do
we not require a more precise explanation of the causal relation between
needs and their cultural expression, why a given set of needs must be re-
lated to certain cultural traits and to no others? On the other hand, if
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the explanation is in terms of deductive inference, a similar problem of
precision is encountered. Let us assume that human basic needs are em-
pirically ascertainable, and, when enumerated along with initial environ-
mental conditions, provide premises from which habits, customs and expedi-
encies can be logically inferred. Still, how can we deduce from a set of
premises containing no value terms a conclusion which does? Have we not
violated the canons of validity? If medical science discovers that fluori-
dation stops tooth decay, it does not logically follow that we ought to
fluoridate. Insofar as habits, customs and expediencies are value laden
—
enforced through prescription and proscription— their genesis cannot be
explained merely in terms of empirically enumerated basic needs. As the
Edels see it, anthropological inferences "are like enthymemes, whose miss-
ing premises whether of value, fact, definition, metaphysics—would be
the most interesting and possibly surprising parts of their analysis ." 11
As in the example above, a valid deductive argument can be effected by the
introduction of the hidden premise that "We ought to stop tooth decay."
Sumner, however, is like an ideal observer. He extrapolates from diversity
to the original "psychical power" of need and then proceeds to justify
that in terms of empirical data. The argument appears circular, and with-
out further justification, is no more than an enthymeme. A fortiori
,
the
same can be said of all relativists who hold that differing ethical opinions
cannot be adjudicated. They must first produce the basis for their infer-
ence. Is it deductive? inductive? causal? or what? Secondly, the
status of their premises must be established. Are they inductive? assumed
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or stipulative? hurlstic? metaphysical? or what? In short, the thesis
of cultural and ethical relativity cannot rest on an intuitive inference
from the facts of cultural and ethical diversity.
Asch has attempted to explain the anthropological hiatus between evi-
dence and inference. Between external conditions and actions by an agent,
there exists meaning and evaluation, knowledge and understanding. The
relativists, however, have failed to take cognizance of these intervening
steps. Instead, they have tacitly assumed as their explanatory model the
structure of stimulus-response psychology. As Asch explains it, the theory
asserts that one can at will attach to a given situation Si any number of
acts, feelings, and evaluations, depending on the consequences that follow . 12
Simply by manipulating rewards and punishments the same situation is com-
patible with a number of responses. Hence, the relativists thesis follows,
viz.
,
that it is possible in identical situations for there to be opposed
evaluations. As Sumner would have it, pleasure and pain are the mediating
forces; the agent is enculturated through tradition, imitation and authority.
This causal explanation attenuates the possibility of a conscious grasp of
the relation between act and consequence, between habitual modes of be-
havior and rewards and punishments. As Dewey would say, there has been an
omission of the role of intelligence in the determination of choice and
action:
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function
of mind is to project new and more complex ends— to free ex-
perience from routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to
accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of
the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the
use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action....
44
Intelligence as^ intelligence is inherently forward-looking; only by ignoring its primary function doesit become a mere means for an end already given. Thelatter is servile, even when the end is labeled moral
religious, or esthetic
.
13
In the last chapter the role of intelligence or reflective thinking
was emphasized in connection with conditions of freedom. When those con-
siderations are applied here, one might surmise that some anthropologists
have denied man's freedom, that they have perceived the major determining
factor in human motivation to be antecedent events. Perhaps the apparent
coherency and consistency of various modes of behavior encountered in
societies has led anthropologists to identify such factors as authority
and tradition as conspicuous cultural determinants. Nevertheless, and
momentarily leaving aside the question of the role of intelligence, the
thesis of cultural and ethical relativity makes a stronger claim than the
contention that there exists a causal relation between antecedent and con-
sequence. It says in addition that there can be conflicting ethical opin-
ions of the same subject. Moreover, the relativist wants to show that
societies differ in a fundamental way, e.g., that diverse ethical practices
indicate diverse ethical rules and principles. One might wonder how the
relativist can maintain these points without undercutting his own thesis.
On the one hand, if societies have different rules and principles, then it
is difficult to see in what sense the same subject is at stake. On the
other hand, if societies have identical rules and principles yet have
diverse ethical practices, this might support the thesis (insofar as iden-
tical rules and principles imply the same subject), but only by default,
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for then the relativist would be forced to forfeit his cherished corol-
laries: the validity of abiding tolerance, subjective and solipsistic
ethical appraisal, the essential differences separating societies. The
existence of identical rules and principles, rather than supporting the
thesis of cultural and ethical relativity, would seem to support an op-
posing thesis, one denoting the common bonds uniting societies.
Then there is the problem of identifying the same subject. To make
his point, the relativist must show that there can be different societies
manifesting conflicting ethical opinions regarding the same subject, that
is, situations, perceived and understood in essentially the same way by
members of different societies. Relativism, as Asch contends, "if it is
to be psychologically valid, must assert that one can attach different
evaluations to situations that have the same cognitive and emotional con-
tent." 1 ^ But in order to show the same cognitive and emotional content,
the relativist must guarantee that his data is accurate—that his infor-
mants have devulged the truth to him regarding their respective societies
and that he has interpreted the beliefs expressed correctly, without ex-
punging crucial relations or imputing his own evaluations. For instance,
the phenomenon of infanticide might rest in beliefs or attitudes which,
for some reason of deficiency of data or interpretation, are glossed by
the relativist—in one society beliefs concerning what it is to be human,
while in another, attitudes concerning population control. Unless these
beliefs and attitudes are uncovered by the relativist, and though he may
believe he has described the same subject on the basis of brute data, i.e..
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the killing of infants, he obviously will not have been in a position to
describe correctly the significance of the practice as it occurs in the
respective societies. Not only will he have failed to describe the same
subject, but he will have failed to establish the necessary condition re-
quired for exposing a conflict of ethical opinions-if in fact such a con-
flict exists. And we might wonder how extensively societies must be probed
in order to fulfull this requirement. To the extent that differences of
belief or attitude could be cited to explain similarities of practice in
different societies, the same subject would appear to be elusively out of
reach. Where would the regress end and where would we draw the line? What
then is the basis for a conflict of ethical opinions? In the third and
final chapters of this dissertation, it will be argued that the theoreti-
cal basis for a conflict of ethical opinions is misconstrued— that the
real basis for conflict is to be detected in differences of approach to
problems arising from contextual situations. In the meantime, though the
theoretical requirement seems straightforward, there would appear to be
insuperable difficulties attending the relativist's empirical task, and
the contention that there can be differing ethical opinions regarding the
same subject remains problematic.
Thus far the relativist's position would appear vulnerable. It is
at least logically possible that various cultures might enjoy certain
general ethical principles in common. It would not be necessary for these
principles to be verbally available to an agent. It is conceivable that
he could act according to principle without explicit assent. In fact, one
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of the probable weaknesses of the relativist's position is his insistence
on some sort of tenacious relation between ethical practices and ethical
principles, as though, in cookbook fashion, the agent’s choices and actions
are to be precisely determined. It is doubtful that general principles can
be applied in this way. Peters makes the point that principles "cannot
prescribe precisely what we ought to do, but at least they rule out cer-
tain courses of action and sensitize us to features of a situation which
are morally relevant. They function more as signposts than as guidebooks ." 15
Accordingly, if it could be shown that diverse ethical practices are not
necessarily indicative of diverse ethical principles, and if the relation
between the individual and group can be shown to be not wholly determined
by the quality of culture, then relativism would have to be held suspect.
There appear to be two considerations at stake. In the first place, the
relativist may be confusing lower order rules with principles. If indeed
principles are implicit in the agent's choices and actions, the relativist's
informant may not produce an accurate account of ultimate ethical concern.
It is entirely possible for a descriptive metaethical statement to be
true while the normative assertion of an informant is false; an informant
may lie or otherwise be himself misinformed. For example, tradition and
authority, as we have witnessed in Sumner's case, are often cited as ulti-
mate ethical determinants by the anthropologist, both in terms of his per-
sonal apprehension of the culture and in terms of reinforcement by the
testimony of his informants. But the content of tradition and authority
may be concerned more with rules for carrying out principles than the
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actual principles themselves. By imbuing himself with his adversary's
powers, one might consider the cannibal’s actions under the rubrics of
war, under practical rules rather than ethical principles. In the second
place, the relativist fails to take account of the individual agent, his
unique perception of the situation, his determination to bend the rules
(possibly principles) and interpret the facts in terms of the problem at
hand. One is reminded of the deviant Mondugamors who retreat to the lofty
cliffs surrounding the community to lead the lives of hermits rather than
accede to the practices of the group. As suggested before, the relativist
disregards the role of intelligence; he views cultures as complex wholes;
he selects evidence supportive of his thesis while glossing individual
initiative
. For the individual and group "the same external situation may
possess quite varied meanings, depending upon the existing level of know-
ledge and other conditions. The resulting differences of action may there-
fore not be due to a diversity of principle ." 16 There is no reason to be-
lieve that an individual, no matter how insular his group, is just the
victim of external determinants. The anthropologist must allow for in-
dividual cognition.
There is good reason to think that cognition, or as we have previously
defined it, the exercise of intelligence, is central to ethical belief and
discourse wherever encountered. In the first place, recent philosophers,
such as Dewey
,
17 Frankena
,
18 Ladd, 18
,
and McClintock
,
26 have pointed out
that ethics is not a theoretical body of knowledge, in the sense that it
lies logically independent of contingent considerations; rather, ethics is
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a practical rational discipline. Ethical belief and discourse are to be
understood in terms of general practical discourse:
There are a number of types of practical discourse. For
example, one type is concerned with the playing and winning
of games, another with conducting a military establishment
another with running for political office, another with con-ducting a scientific experiment, and so on Each has fun-damental criteria or principles.
. .in terms of which justi-
ficatory reasons are given for practical judgements.
.. in
terms of which people can be motivated to act....^
Continuing this characterization of ethical discourse, it is obvious that
since the requisite criteria are determined by the domain or type of prac-
tical discourse at hand, the agent is forced to take cognizance of the
contextual setting in which problems arise. At times the contextual de-
mands laid upon the agent will be decided by fiat, habit or custom. The
rules of the game govern choice and action; one violates them at his peril;
appropriate penalties are inforced. However, there are times when contex-
ual settings exhibit unique features, for conditions often do change, and
the agent is forced to rely upon his own perception of the situation. It
is then that rules and principles from other domains of practical discourse
impinge upon the agent. One may not ordinarily lie or cheat, but under
specified conditions, say to save a person's life, one might resort to
atypical behavior. In this way the usual hypothetical imperatives employed
in a concrete situation can give way to those of more categorical duration.
It would follow that in order to differentiate that part of practical dis-
course concerned with typically moral or ethical issues is to identify
those rules and principles that reign superior and ultimate:
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~ a person his moral or ethical statements arethose of his practical statements which he regards assuperior and ultimate. That is, they ari~those judg-
ments, rules and principles (including arguments) of apractical sort which he regards: (1) as overriding any
other sorts of practical judgments, rules, and princi-
Pl
?
S
/oN
th Whi<
:
h they might (or do) come into conflict;
and (2) as being the final court of appeal in justify-ing or showing to be unjustified people's acting or
not acting in certain circumstances.^
Consequently, the agent must exercise intelligence; he identifies leading
principles which have served in the past; he sees their relevance to the
present concrete situation. Rules and principles do not become ultimate
and superior because of any absolute or inviolable imperative; rather,
their relevance obtains just because fiat, habit and custom are arbitrary,
because they are unfit to solve the problem at hand. Even the most ardent
Kantian, no matter how much he may disagree with this position, must admit
that allegiance to the categorical realm is insufficient to decide the
problem of applicability. Whether one eschews stealing or exhorts the
sanctity of life in a given case requires deliberation to ascertain whether
the contingent realm is relevant to principle. It would be foolish to
legislate "Thou shalt not steal" in a situation which fails to call for it.
No moral philosopher, any more than the individual agent, can escape the
role of intelligence in the determination of the relation between moral
decision and principle.
In the second place, the centrality of intelligence to ethical belief
and discourse is to be recorded in the distinction between motivation and
justification. The rules and principles governing a realm of practical
discourse may themselves be sufficient to motivate the agent to action,
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and it is possible that, as under aversive conditions, these rules and
principles alone are perceived as justification for a given act. But, as
we observed in the last chapter, unless good reasons can be given for an
act, the agent is held to be compelled rather than free; his is not a
responsible and hence a moral or an ethical act. The distinction between
the motivational and justificatory use of practical discourse discloses
that, xf freedom is absent, there can be no question of ethical principle
at issue. For there to be moral or ethical import, in answer to the ques
tion "What ought I to do?", the agent is entitled to good and sufficient
reasons for choosing and acting in a certain way. The rules and princi-
ples of a realm of practical discourse will suffice, in the justificatory
sense, only if they are good and sufficient reasons for motivation. An
agent can always legitimately ask of any reasons given for or against a
given act whether the reasons do in fact justify or indict the act. The
force of theories of mechanical motivation, such as stimulus—response, are
therefore vitiated by the distinction between motivation and justification
the reasons given for a particular action, in an ethical sense, will over-
ride those rules and principles of practical discourse based upon purely
arbitrary grounds. In fact the anthropologist cannot cite the stimulus-
response model in the identification of ethical and moral content, because
the model is insufficient to differentiate the typically ethical and moral
realm of practical discourse. There is no reason to believe that in gen-
eral societies fail to make the distinction between motivation and justi-
fication, between blind obedience and reasoned choice and action.
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It becomes increasingly evident that cultural diversity cannot support
ethical relativity. Since the exercise of intelligence is a necessary con-
dition for ethical belief and discourse, the anthropologist's descriptive
statements, although perhaps true, may not have as their subject ethical
or moral content. As we have seen, descriptive statements are metaethical,
they differ in regard to truth conditions from normative statements. De-
pending on such variables as the informant's reasons and factual beliefs,
his perception of the situation, the rules and principles he is prepared
to exercise, a belief or an act may or may not have ethical or moral sig-
nificance. It follows that since these variables can conceivably differ
with each agent, inferences from anthropological description to ethical
relativity must ultimately show diversity at the level of ethical and moral
principles. Unless it were known whether ethical principles were at issue,
known that beliefs and acts were related only to some other domain of prac-
tical discourse, the descriptive picture of the agent would be incomplete.
There would be no bases for establishing conflicting ethical or moral opin-
ions that might support the thesis of ethical relativity. As McClintock
contends, "until a diversity of moral principles has been found, it cannot
be known that a diversity of morals has been discovered. What might have
been discovered is a diversity of practical judgments or rules of different
kinds ." 23 It would not serve the anthropologist to cite diverse cultural
practices in defense of his position; as enumerated general patterns,
these practices carry no explanatory weight in ethical or moral terms.
The anthropologist would have to know, in addition, how the individual
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agent arrives at his beliefs and actions. Of course, it is probably true
that all cultures extol certain virtues. Parents, teachers, politicians
and ecclesiastical authorities all disseminate normative advice, and, in-
sofar as the anthropologist is merely calling attention to cultural dif-
ferences in terms of these avowals, there would be little reason to argue.
However, such evidence of relativity is trivial; it is torn from the con-
text in which ethical and moral discourse obtains; it is torn from the
lives of the individuals who make ethical and moral decisions. Whether
individuals actually accord justice, honesty, truthfulness and trustworthi-
ness ultimate and superior authority can only be ascertained through an ex-
haustive analysis of individual motivation and justification. It is sug-
gested that such an analysis could very well reveal much more commonality
than diversity among the peoples of the world.
Is There a Way to Identify Ethical Universals ?
It should be acknowledged that some anthropologists have attempted
to uncover common features of cultures rather than emphasize alleged dif-
ferences. Kluckhohn and Murray cite such inescapable constants as biologi-
cal inheritance, sexual differentiation, care of infants, adjustment to
social life, food, shelter, and clothing, and they conclude that "these
universalities of human life produce comparable effects upon the develop-
ing personalities of men of all times, places, and races ." 24 And in
another place Kluckhohn enumerates common structural categories to be used
in the study of cultures, but readily admits there is no guarantee these
can be filled with uniform cross-cultural content, unless "one states the
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content in extremely general form-e.g., clothing, shelter, incest taboos,
and the like ." 26 These rigid generalities tell us little about the dis-
tinctively ethical and moral realm of practical discourse. In the Edels'
words, "these are so general that they are more nearly universal principles
of social organization than statements about moral agreements ." 26 Allowing
that these empty categories signify universal concerns of all cultures, it
would seem that the crucial consideration, in ethical and moral terms, is
whether the potential exists of objective norms as a means of coping with
these concerns. This would indeed be cross-cultural content relevant to
ethical universals. The various strategies employed by individuals and
groups to solve their problems, the individual and collective exercise of
intelligence, could identify the locus of the convergence of ethical and
moral norms. As witnessed before, the task of the anthropologist cannot
rest in mere descriptions of diverse practices and prima facie interpre-
tations, but in an analysis of the way individuals actually grapple with
the problems which arise in the social and environmental context. It is
the proficient and consistent schemes and strategies actually employed
which mark the arduous construction of ethical and moral content. "We
must recognize that the mind has a pattern, a scheme of arrangement in
its constituent elements," explains Dewey, "and... it is the business of
a serious comparative psychology to exhibit these patterns, forms or
types in detail ." 27 In other words, the anthropologist is charged with
the identification of the method by which certain ethical norms gain as-
cendancy in the lives of individuals. If the method is held as a common
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possession, its exposure might lead to the discovery of a common articula-
tion of norms. If the method presupposes rational and objective criteria
of judgment and evaluation, it seems reasonable to suppose that some of
these would stand the test of universality.
There may be important empirical evidence to support the universality
of certain ethical and moral norms. Kohlberg takes a developmental appro-
ach to moral awareness. Backed by empirical investigations, six rather
distinct stages of ethical and moral development are to be encountered in
all societies. Universality obtains in two respects: (1) for individuals
and groups, the stages themselves are universal; each succeeding stage
.logically presupposes the preceding stage; and (2) stage six comprises
ethical and moral principles which potentially could gain universal assent
Our findings lead us to conclude that there are dif-
ferences in fundamental principles between individuals
or between groups, differences in stage. 28
Moreover, Kohlberg 's investigations appear to confirm our above contention
that moral judgment centrally involves cognitive development:
Effective moral channeling mechanisms are cognitive prin-
ciples defining situations. .. .While more than truth value
is involved in moral principles, the analogy is that you
follow moral principles in a situation because you feel
they correctly define that situation, not because of an
abstract affective identification with these principles
as verbal abstractions. 30
Cognitive awareness is to a great extent a function of social relation-
ships, especially role-taking, so that "the precondition for a moral con-
flict is man's capacity for role- taking ." 31 Here, Kohlberg cites the
pioneer work of Piaget, Mead and Baldwin who suggest, as opposed to the
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stultification associated with a particular value system, that role-taking
is basic to moral development, that it defines rights and obligations and
the reciprocity between individuals and groups. Finally, moral conflicts
arising from social relationships will be adequately mediated by principles
of justice which are only completely articulated in stage six:
In our view, mature principles are neither rules (means) nor
values (ends), but are guides to perceiving and integrating
all the morally relevant elements in concrete situations.
If our formal characterization of the functioning of mature'
principles is correct, it is clear that only principles ofjustice have an ultimate claim to being adequate universal,
prescriptive principles. By definition, principles of jus-
tice are principles for deciding between competing claims
of individuals, for "giving each man his due." 3 ^
There are patent dangers in Kohlberg's analysis. Not only do the
stages appear stipulative of morality, but even if we grant their vitality,
there is the danger of catapulting these psychological findings into a
self-contained normative position. Each stage tends to become an index
of the relative worth of that stage; the criteria defining successive in-
crements of development tend to become value criteria. In this regard,
stages four, five and six offer instructive contrasts. The essential dif-
ference between stages four and five is that between a law-maintaining
perspective and a law-making perspective. Law and order, regardless of
source or content, dominates stage four, while in stage five, contractual
and voluntary considerations of law are the dominant themes. However,
neither the law-maintaining or law-making perspectives are as "high" a
stage of development as the principles of justice generated in stage six,
"because the claims of law and contract my be deduced from them ." 33
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Admittedly, it would not be difficult for many of ns to bestow normative
advantage upon these stages by virtue of their defining characteristics.
What is crucial for Kohlberg's position is whether the defining character-
is tics are related to empirically ascertained states-of-af fairs
.
Kohlberg denies he is making a normative appraisal of the stages;
rather, it is the adequacy and scope of a given stage in resolving moral
conflicts which assures its position. Unlike the cognitive preconditions
for it, Kohlberg finds morality to be "a unique, sui generis realm," de-
finable by a formalistic set of criteria:
We define morality in terms of the formal character of
a moral judgment, method, or point of view, rather than
in terms of its content. Impersonality, ideality, uni-
versalizability
,
preemptiveness, etc., are the formal
characteristics of a moral judgment. These are best
seen in the reasons given for a moral judgment, a moral
reason being one which has these properties .
^
It is not clear that this definition of morality avoids begging the ques-
tion. It is likely that "the reasons given for a moral judgment" include
characteristics of both form and content (at least Kohlberg fails to make
clear where the disjunction between the two occurs)
,
thereby casting "im-
personality, ideality, universalizability, preemptiveness, etc." in the
role of arbitrary criteria of morality. The message seems to be that
morality based on reasons describing rules, factual beliefs or the idio-
syncrasies of an informant (content) nourishes an inadequate relativistic
position, while reasons describing principles of justice (form), being
entirely general, abet universal acclamation. However, even if we allow
that justice has been adequately articulated, why should morality be de-
fined in terms of reasons describing only formal properties? Why should
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the reasons given describe a sui generis realm somehow discontinuous with
the cognitive features which are its precondition? Kohlberg maintains
that his developmental definition of morality approximates the philosopher's
position. Yet, the philosophers he has in mind are those formalists from
Kant to Sidgwick and Ross, and more recently, such quasi-formalists as
Hare and Rawls. Needless to say, not all moral philosophers hold a form-
alist position, e.g., naturalists and emotivists, and whether morality
describes a unique realm having unique criteria needs to be clearly shown
if Kohlberg’ s position is to be upheld. This is not to say that "imper-
sonality, ideality, universalizability
,
preemptiveness" have no bearing
on morality, but only to question their alleged status independent of such
cognitive features as facts and beliefs. At best, Kohlberg has shown that
cognitive development parallels moral development, but the significance
of this beyond mere coincidence is lost in the formalistic definition.
The precise relation between the two needs to be spelled out if cognition
is indeed the precondition of morality. Kohlberg argues that cognitive
development is a necessary condition of morality, but he must further show
why it is not sufficient as well. His final defense is unconvincing:
Philosophers who offer alternative definitions of morality
do so because they ignore formal features of morality, and
define it instead in terms of the particular content of the
normative morality they advocate. To my knowledge, those
who object to a formalist definition of morality have no
positive alternative to offer except (a) morality is what
is in accord with my own system, or (b) morality is rela-
tive. Regardless of psychology, then, our conception of
morality has a strong philosophical base. Anyone who tries
to criticize it must provide a stronger positive alternative . 35
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The purpose of the following chapters will be to explicate and defend
an alternative definition of morality. However, this is not meant to
impugn some interesting and potentially important results of Kohlberg's
investigations. Empirical studies such as his are surely needed if cross-
cultural norms are to be identified. Moreover, the cited parallelism be-
tween cognitive and moral development at least accords with our contention
that there exists a typically ethical and moral realm of practical dis-
course. Consequently, while a formalist interpretation of Kohlberg's
empirical data is plausible, it would not appear to be the only alterna-
tive; a naturalistic interpretation could prove to be viable provided an
isomorphic relation can be exhibited between ethical and moral discourse
and cognitive considerations in general. The various realms of practical
discourse may describe unique classes for purposes of analysis, but it
does not follow that in practice they are unrelated. On the contrary, our
philosophical analysis would indicate that ethical and moral discourse is
coextensive with and constructed out of the cognitive features which pre-
vail in all problematic contextual situations. The task, then, is to
eliminate the false dichotomy between cognition and morality.
Anthropology and Moral Education
The burden of this chapter has been to examine the significance of
cultural and ethical diversity for the possibility of a theory of moral
education. It has been argued that diversity cannot support a general
thesis of cultural and ethical relativity. It follows that diversity can-
not be inimical to a theory of moral education. Questions concerning
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choice and action, in an ethical and moral sense, are not answered merely
on the basis of societal mores or personal preference. On the one hand,
to define morality exclusively in terms of social propriety involves
practical rules to the exclusion of ethical or moral discourse. On the
other hand, a definition of morality in terms of subjective preference
neglects the role of intelligence and objective public criteria in the
determination of choice and action. The suggestion has been that diver-
sity is generally due to the presence of compelling cultural forces such
as tradition, authority and lower order rules. As these are augmented
by the exercise of individual and group intelligence, the distinctively
ethical and moral realm of practical discourse emerges, a convergence of
principles may be expected; motivation and justification for choice and
action are perceived in light of objective criteria available to the
individual and group. Implied are certain structural features a theory
of moral education might contain. These features will be further expli-
cated in subsequent chapters.
(1) It is submitted that ethical and moral principles cannot be
disseminated as such. One cannot just teach morality any more than one
can just teach knowledge and truth. The suggestion is tendered that the
traditional techniques associated with the term "teaching" (instruction,
training, conditioning, indoctrination, demonstration and example, etc.)
are not sufficient conditions for learning morality or knowledge, because
they are compatible with conditions of both truth and falsity. Teaching
techniques can be utilized with false as well as true material; the
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criteria needed to differentiate the two are not logically embedded in the
techniques themselves. Hence, in addition to teaching techniques, other
conditions are necessary in order to guarantee moral agency.
(2) Perhaps the most important additional condition concerns the
activity of the pupil. Even if it is granted that teaching is a necessary
condition of morality, a concession which has been disputed, the burden
must ultimately be shared with the pupil. The demand for the exercise of
intelligence requires the active participation of the pupil. Hence, one
comes to be moral not that one is taught morality.
(3) It is submitted that no artificial distinction between cognitive
and moral realms is sound. A theory of moral education, if the arguments
of this chapter and the last are convincing, would have to involve ob-
jective public criteria of judgment. This is especially evident in the
reasons given for motivation and justification, in the intelligent mani-
festation of deliberation, evaluation and insight, in the determination
of the agent to construct general principles out of the demands of con-
textual problems situations. The "is/ought" controversy of contemporary
moral philosophy would therefore appear amenable to a naturalist solution.
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CHAPTER III
NATURALISM AND ITS OPPONENTS
The aim of this chapter will be threefold: (1) to explicate the current
debate between naturalists and anti-naturalists; (2) to defend naturalism
against its detractors; and (3) to indicate the general features and prob-
lems of naturalism. Naturalism will be identified principally in two ways.
First, as the normative claim that ethical and moral problems can be settled
by empirically gleaned facts, especially those arising out of the methodology
employed in the empirical sciences; second, as the metaethical claim that
ethical and moral judgments are factual assertions, or that descriptive predi-
cates can be substituted for evaluative predicates. There will then be dis-
senting anti-naturalist theses corresponding to both positive claims, and,
although a clear demarcation appears futile, it is still helpful to acknow-
ledge these distinctions. For instance, an anti-naturalist, while holding
the metaethical position that value judgments are not factual assertions,
could agree with the normative position of naturalism that ethical and moral
judgments are rendered more or less appropriate on the basis of factual con-
tent. However, since it is the metaethical claim that has captured the
current debate, most of the subsequent discussion will focus on what has
been termed the "is/ought question" or the "fact/value question." The cen-
tral problem throughout the chapter, then, will be the attempt to unravel
the relation between description and evaluation.
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Ant i~Naturallst Refutation of Naturalism
Contemporary anti-naturalists often acknowledge Hume to be their pre-
cursor. In a famous passage in his Treatise
,
Hume avows that all the moral-
ists he knows make an "imperceptible" move from assertions of God's exis-
tence or observations of human affairs using the "usual copulations of
prepositions, :is, and is not" to prepositions "connected with an ought
,
or
an ought not." For Hume, the consequence of this move is all important; it
necessitates a reason be given "for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it." 1 Opponents of naturalism have interpreted this passage
to mean that no set of descriptive nonmoral premises can logically entail
a normative conclusion; there exists a logical hiatus between description
and evaluation, between is and ought . True, there have been conflicting
interpretations of the passage, and some have even proffered a naturalist
r\
reading. Nevertheless, R.M. Hare, perhaps the present leading expositor
of anti-naturalism, refers to himself as "a stout defender of Hume's doc-
trine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non-moral statements of
fact. 3
Readers of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, 1903, will discover our
century's most influential affirmation of the anti-naturalist interpreta-
tion of Hume's position. Although he does not refer to Hume in the index,
Moore's insistence on the indefinability of "good" and the sui generis
basis of moral questioning complements the traditional interpretation of
Hume and focuses the contemporary Anglo-American moral debate. Emotivists
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and prescriptivists, while eschewing his intuitionism, have generally ap-
plauded Moore's refutation of naturalism. Moore's influence suggests three
issues in connection with Principia Ethica: (1) arguments for the indefina-
bility of good
, (2) the relation of (1) to the interpretation and critique
of naturalism; and (3) the scope and nature of ethical reasoning based on
(1) and (2).
In regard to the first issue, the indefinability of "good," Moore
states in the preface his reasons for writing the book. "I have tried,"
he says, "to distinguish clearly two kinds of question, which moral phil-
osophers have always professed to answer, but which... they have almost al-
ways confused both with one another and with other quesitions." These are:
"What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?" and "What kind
of actions ought we to perform?" 14 Provided we have a clear understanding
of these questions, we should be enabled to discover what kind of evidence,
if any, would count in support of moral judgments, what moral judgments are
susceptible of proof. In general Moore's answer to the first question is
that things intrinsically good ought to exist for their own sakes; the sub-
ject matter of ethics will therefore be "the general enquiry into what is
good." 5 Given an enumeration of things good in themselves, the second ques-
tion is answered by causal or factual reference to goodness, i.e., those
actions ought to be performed which eventuate in the most goodness under
the circumstances. Presumably, other moral predicates, "obligation" and
"duty" for instance, are to be treated in the same derivative manner. In
sum, there are two classes of moral predicates, one containing predicates
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for which no evidence will count and the other containing predicates with
evidential foundation in the first.
In the first chapter, Moore continues his examination of the predicate
"good," far less often its converse "bad." If the problem were merely ver-
bal, a stipulative or lexical definition would suffice to tell us the mean-
ing of "good," use of a dictionary to ascertain how "good" is used in Eng-
lish. But this would be of no philosophic interest. The important case
of definition, Moore thinks, occurs through "analysis" of the "object or
idea" for which a word stands, "definitions which describe the real nature
of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us
what the word is used to mean ." 6 Now it is plain to Moore that any object
or idea capable or definition in the important sense, a real definition,
must be complex and rendered by an enumeration of parts which compose a
whole, as when "horse" is defined in terms of legs, heart, lungs, etc.,
arranged in definite relations to one another. It is equally plain to Moore
that "good" cannot be defined in the requisite sense. Consider an analogy
to color words. The physicist can quantify yellow things in terms of
frequency, wave length and position on a spectrum, but this is not what is
meant by the term "yellow" denoting the simple and unanalyzable property.
Just as we judge a thing to be yellow by virtue of its having the simple
property of yellowness, so we judge a thing to be good solely by virtue
of its having the simple property of goodness. Moore admits the conclusion
to be drawn may seem very disappointing:
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If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good isgood, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am
asked "How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it
cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it . 7
Moore's concept of definition is puzzling. It seems clear he thinks that
if some things are complex and thereby capable of analysis, they must arise
from simple and unanalyzable things without parts. This is a view, perhaps
natural, long held by philosophers (although now discredited), Descartes,
Leibniz and the Logical Atomists for example, and Moore is here merely
voicing a traditional view of definition. Analysis of complex terms will
expose the simple ultimate underpinnings of experience, and since good or
goodness is one of these simple elements, for "good" to have a meaning it
must denote, name, or otherwise stand for this ultimate substantive. It
does not seem to have occurred to Moore, at least in Principia
,
that "good"
might be defined in terms of its function, in evoking certain actions or
expressing certain motives, in commanding or giving approbation. As we
shall see, it was left to more recent anti-naturalists, emotivists and pre-
scriptivists
,
to expand functional definitions of "good" at the expense
of the substantive. At any rate, by virtue of his paradoxical explication
of definition and meaning, Moore holds "good" to be referable to a property,
but "good" itself remains undefinable.
Often it is unclear whether Moore is concerned with a word or concept,
or with something denoted by a word, such as a property or characteristic.
However, when he offers arguments to back his claim that "good" is inde-
finable, it is clear he thinks that only two other alternatives are possible
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In faGt, if it is not the case that ’good’ denotes some-thing simple and indefinable, only two alternatives arepossible: either it is a complex, a given whole, about
the correct analysis of which there may be disagreement*
or else it means nothing at all, and there is no such
subject as Ethics
.
8
The former alternative, that "good" (assuming that Moore means the word or
concept) is complex, "may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consider-
ation of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may always be
asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself
good. 9 Referred to as the "open-question test or argument," the point is
that for any proposed definition of "good," say that "good" means produces
pleasure, it is always significant to ask (or doubt the initial definition)
"Is what produces pleasure good?" It is significant to ask this question,
because if it is the case that "good" means produces pleasure, then whatever
produces pleasure is good, and this is no more than saying that whatever
produces pleasure produces pleasure; the predicate "good" loses cognitive
significance. But obviously, argues Moore, when one says "good" means
produces pleasure, one has before the mind two different notions, not the
trivial tautology that X is X. Certainly, a person genuinely concerned
with moral issues wants to affirm more than a simple identity, but this
being the case, it is always an open-question whether any proposed defini-
tion is adequate. Consequently, "good" cannot be held to be complex with-
out falling prey to destructive analysis. Similar considerations are ad-
vanced against the second alternative that "good" means nothing at all and
there is no subject matter such as ethics. When anything is said to be
good, the agent wants to utter more than a mere tautology, that pleasure
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is pleasure for instance; rather, the agent, by virtue of his moral con-
cern, must be aware of some distinction between goodness and other things
in the world, for "whoever will attentively consider with himself what is
actually before his mind when he asks the question ’Is pleasure (or what-
ever it may be) after all good?' can easily satisfy himself that he is
not merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant that in every case he
has before the mind a unique object ." 10 Although this seems more a re-
wording of the position than an argument, the thrust is that ethics is
salvaged and good has a meaning, because we all do in fact distinguish
goodness as a unique object from other things; we are not concerned with
ethical and moral problems for nothing.
We have, then, the indefinability of "good" based on Moore’s concept
of definition and his insistence on the primacy of analysis. The second
issue cited above, the relation of the indefinability of "good" to the
interpretation and critique of naturalism, can now be examined. Moore dis-
tinguishes between natural and non-natural properties of objects, but,
more often than not, he does so by example rather than on the basis of
unambiguous criteria. Pleasure, for instance, is held to be a natural
property, while good or goodness is counted a non-natural property. Con-
sequently, one is led to believe that the arguments for the indefinability
of "good" are directed solely at attempts to equate natural with non-
natural properties. And it is true that Moore holds in special contempt
those who have ventured to say, e.g., that "good" means "produces pleasure,
"happiness," "in accordance with human needs" or "in accordance with God s
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providence,’* but his primary concern is to show that an£ definition of
"good" constitutes a fallacy, the fallacy of attempting to define the
indefinable. Even if it were the case that "good" denotes a natural prop-
erty, "that would not alter the nature of the fallacy or diminish its im-
portance one whit ." 11 Hence, the "naturalistic fallacy," to use Moore’s
title (although he does not much care for it), is directed primarily at
any definition of "good" and only secondarily at the confusion of natural
with non-natural properties. In its primary sense, the naturalistic fal-
lacy materializes due to the concept of a simple and an unanalyzable prop-
erty, as in the attempt to define the indefinable; in its secondary sense,
it focuses on attempts to equate natural with non-natural properties, as
in the equation of pleasure with goodness. It is in the secondary sense
of the naturalistic fallacy that Moore identifies the position of natural-
ism:
I have thus appropriated the same Naturalism to a partic-
ular method of approaching Ethics This method consists
in substituting for ’good’ some one property of a natural
object or of a collection of natural objects; and in thus
replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences....
The name then is perfectly general; for, no matter what the
something is that good is held to mean, the theory is still
Naturalism. Whether good be defined as yellow or green or
blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bit-
ter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as
willed or desired or felt..., I have called such theories
naturalistic because all of these terms denote properties,
simple or complex, of some simple or complex natural object . 12
At the beginning of this chapter, a distinction was drawn between a
normative and metaethical sense of naturalism. This distinction appears
clouded in Moore’s above description. On the one hand, a naturalist at
72
least holds that the factual claims of the natural sciences are relevant
to the solution of ethical problems, that factual information somehow
supports normative judgments. On the other hand, Moore appears to tender
a much stronger characterization of naturalism, the metaethical claim that
ethics as such does not constitute an independent discipline, its typical
nomenclature, in particular the term "good," to be replaced by, or defined
in terms of some natural property (ies) of objects. A naturalist, there-
fore, is one who commits the naturalistic fallacy; regardless of the grounds
for the replacement or definition, the equation of natural with non-natural
P^®P®^bies constitutes the commission of a fallacy. Moore cites, for ex-
ample, those philosophers from Rousseau to Spencer who have held as ob-
vious that everything natural is good. Not only is it questionable on
empirical grounds whether everything natural is good, but, a fortiori
,
"this must not be taken to be obvious; that it must be regarded as an open
question. To declare it to be obvious is to suggest the naturalistic
fallacy ." 13 Insofar as everything natural is good constitutes more than
a tautology, it is significant to ask whether everything natural is in
fact good, and failure to do so commits the naturalistic fallacy. In
short, it would be inconsistent to maintain that everything natural is
good and, at the same time, maintain that the equation represents more
than a trivial tautology. Hence arises the dubitability of all natural-
istic positions; in each case there is the fallacy of attempting to equate
natural with non-natural properties. Naturalism, as described by Moore,
destroys the possibility of securing ethics as a legitimate and independent
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discipline, and it is a "science of ethics" that Moore wants to preserve
at all costs. 11* What then does Moore offer as an alternative? To answer
this question we must turn to the third issue mentioned above, viz., the
scope and nature of ethical reasoning based on the indefinability of "good"
and the interpretation and critique of naturalism.
Moore avers that one of his main objectives in Principia is to "dis-
cover what are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning ." 15 Ordi-
naril y> especially if one leans toward naturalism and away from formalism,
ethical reasoning entails the discovery of facts, criteria, arguments or
reasons relative to the solution of ethical and moral problems. For the
naturalist, each problem carried its own requirements j within each problem
context what emerges as right or wrong, good or bad, is directly related
to these unique requirements. It is therefore ironic, despite his avowed
concern, that Moore not only obviates the role of ethical reasoning as
here construed, but he is unable to allow it much of a substantive role
at all. Since "good" denotes an unanalyzable and indefinable property,
its presence cannot be ascertained on the basis of facts, criteria, argu-
ments or reasons. To claim that goodness is so based would allow for the
incursion of inferential chains, the fallacious attempt to bridge the
logical gap between natural and non-natural properties. Goodness is logi-
cally independent of anything else and to grant that anything, aside from
goodness itself, counts in its apprehension would destroy the foundation
of Moore's position. Moore is aware of this impasse, for he acknowledges
that, though judgments about goodness or intrinsic value are independent
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of anything else, still facts, criteria, etc., "may indeed have relevance
to practical Ethics ." 16 Practical ethics deals not with intrinsic value,
those things which ought to exist for their own sakes, but with the ques-
tion: What actions ought we to perforin? In answer, Moore contends that
it is demonstrably certain "that the assertion 'I am morally bound to per-
form this action' is identical with the assertion 'This action will produce
the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe Given the appre-
hension of goodness, ethical reasoning is reduced to the purely mechanical
process of establishing the causal or inductive factors which will produce
the most goodness in the world. Yet these same factors are to no avail when
confronted with what we earlier cited as the central problem of ethics for
Moore, viz., "the general enquiry into what is good." G.J. Warnock insight-
fully appraises this role assigned to ethical reasoning:
In view of Moore's announced concern with 'the fundamental
principles of ethical reasoning', it is curious that his
conclusion is really that there are no such principles.
For on questions about goodness he has no place for reason-
ing at all, while on questions of what is right there is
purely causal or inductive enquiry into the consequences
of actions, of a kind that we might engage in without any
moral interest whatever . 16
To ascertain, then, whether ethical reasoning is relevant, one must be
clear regarding the status of the ethical assertion at hand. Assertions
of the kind "This is good," since they are sui generis , require no reason-
ing in their justification, for one simply sees (although not literally)
that such is the case. Assertions concerning right action, obligation or
duty, since they have subordinate status, do require reasoning in their
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justification, but always with reference to goodness. Hence, the "general
enquiry into what is good," rather than providing grounds for argumenta-
tion, virtually eliminates a fecund role for ethical reasoning; such asser-
tions as the former are "synthetic," incapable of being "logically deduced
from any other proposition," for "the fundamental principles of Ethics
must be self-evident ." 19 Moore allows that he is an intuitionist, though
he disclaims the traditional position. Accordingly, he abjures deontologi-
cal intuitionism, obligation and duty, since they are not fundamental ethi-
cal principles, must be ascertained by measure of consequences and by
causal inference. Moreover, there is no claim by Moore for a special
faculty of intuition. He is not concerned with the psychological factors
involved in the act of intuition; the truth of the assertion that "X is
good" depends solely on the necessary relation between X and the property
of goodness, depends on the fact of the relation, not on the perception
of the fact. That an assertion appears true to us may, of course, cause
us to utter it, but the objectivity of the fact is not thereby disturbed.
Presumably, whatever their psychological etiology, intuitions are corri-
gible, for "in every way in which it is possible to cognise a true propo-
sition, it is also possible to cognise a false one ." 20 As in the case of
the naturalistic fallacy, the case for intuition follows from the concept
of the simple, indefinable and unanalyzable property of goodness, and
though Moore is consistent in his adaptation, it is doubtful that he has
avoided the difficulties of the traditional position. Indeed, since in-
tuitions are corrigible, on what basis could one adjudicate among con-
flicting intuitions? How could one differentiate between belief and
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knowledge, between "I believe that X" and "I know that X," between "It
appears to me that X is good" and "X is good?" On the basis of intuition,
the science of Ethics" that Moore is anxious to establish appears im-
probable; its fundamental principles would always lie veiled from the
normal channels of scientific investigation.
A Naturalist Rejoinder
The picture emerging from these considerations of Principia Ethica
is one of economy and austerity. All ethical problems have ultimately
to do with the possession or nonpossession of just the one property of
goodness. Only one kind of ethical problem exists, and it can be settled
by factual or causal reference to goodness. We can now examine the ex-
tent to which Moore has been successful in his attempt to discredit natur-
alism. Let us begin with Moore's characterization of naturalism. Since
it strikes at the heart of the metaethical claim that descriptive and
ethical predicates are somehow interchangeable, the open-question test
is undoubtedly Moore's most incisive weapon. Certainly, this test has in-
spired much of the subsequent anti-naturalist critique of naturalism.
From Moore's point of view, the naturalist retains both descriptive and
ethical vocabularies, but that on those occasions where "good" is to be
defined, terms of the descriptive vocabulary are substituted. The open-
question test implies that the substitution is made at the risk of incon-
sistency, that the naturalist cannot have it both ways, both that the
equation of natural with nonnatural properties is significant and yet
avoids being a mere tautology. On the one hand, if the naturalist
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maintains that "good" means "produces pleasure, etc.," then the assertion
"whatever produces pleasure, etc., is good" is tautologically equivalent to
the assertion "whatever produces pleasure, etc., produces pleasure, etc."
On the other hand, if the naturalist maintains that more than a tautology is
at stake, it is difficult to see how "good" could mean "produces pleasure,
etc." One would presume that, in order to show that the equation is signifi-
cant, the naturalist is prepared to advance grounds for the equation. But
in that case, one could always significantly question whether "good" in fact
means "produces pleasure, etc.," and by extension whether "whatever produces
pleasure, etc., is in fact good. However, when certain philosophers with
unassailable naturalistic credentials are considered, the crucial question
is whether Moore has caught very many of them in his net, whether it is not
the case that a straw man has been constructed. Mill, for instance, is clearly
a naturalist in the wide normative sense, in that he believes that factual con-
tent does have bearing on the solution of ethical problems. Yet, as Carl Well-
man asks, "does he believe that the word 'good' stands for pleasantness, or
does he simply believe that pleasure is the one thing which is in fact good? It
is not easy to know whether hedonism is analytic or synthetic for Mill ." 21
Again, Dewey could hardly be accused of creating a synonymy between the predi-
cate "good" and some natural term, that "good" stands for just this or that
natural term or denotes just this or that natural property. In fact, Dewey of-
ten proceeds as though it were possible to dispense entirely with an ethical
vocabulary, as when he speaks of d<2 jure and de^ facto problem solutions. It
is difficult to see how Dewey, a consummate naturalist, would be liable
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to the restricted picture of naturalism drawn by the open-question test.
Admittedly, anyone to whom the open-question test is applicable, in
the way described by Moore, would be a naturalist; he would hold, as cited
at the beginning of this chapter, a species of metaethical naturalism. How-
ever, the two positions are not identical. The metaethical position, as
such, does not discriminate among ethical predicates, nor does it single
out one which is sui generis
. But Moore’s position does, and it will be
recalled that for him a naturalist is one who "substitutes for 'good' some
one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects."
Of course, the open—question test could be modified so that it might be
thought to be applicable to metaethical naturalists in general. There would
be no restriction of ethical predicates; the question would remain open for
the proposed substitution of natural predicates for any ethical predicates,
more broadly, for any evaluative terms. This modification would be in the
spirit of Hume's observation of the "imperceptible" move from description
to evaluation, the move from is^ to ought . Still, it is doubtful that this
modification would really expose a defect of naturalism. Vigorous natural-
ists are dedicated to a reformative program for ethics, and mere verbal
definitions, if they are all that the open-question test is intended to
reveal, completely neglect the context in which evaluations are made. For
many naturalists, a necessary condition for any substitution of descriptive
for evaluative terms is the awareness of the contextual background of eval-
uation. The critical vitality of the open-question test does not lie in
the exposure of alleged verbal stipulations of "good" (or of other evaluative
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terms), but in whether an object or a course of action is worth pursuing,
liking, desiring, approving, etc. When the naturalist asks, by way of the
open-question test, "But is it good?" he is asking whether an object or
course of action is worthy of choice, asking for justification not a defi-
nition of the term "good." In this way, the open-question test can function
to alert the naturalist of unchallenged presuppositions, of the failure to
justify evaluations, of the need to expose inconsistencies and counter-
examples; but it cannot be used to undercut naturalism at the level of
verbal analysis. Moore supposes the naturalist seeks the summum bonum, a
synonymy whose denial would be self-contradictory. His failure, all too
often the failure of those who have followed his lead, lies in not having
drawn a distinction between what Brandt has called overt and covert synony-
my. "Male sibling" and "brother" are overtly synonymous, recognized immedi-
ately by virtue of knowing the meanings of the terms involved, and denial
leads to self-contradiction. Yet, only a very idiosyncratically inclined
naturalist would relate descriptive and evaluative terms in this manner,
for he would realize that this move would destroy the reformative object
of ethical naturalism. It is for this reason that Dewey speaks only of
multiple goods; the relation between "good" and descriptive predicates
represents covert synonymy, dependent always upon the context at hand. Con-
sequently, though Moore criticizes a naturalist position, it is doubtful
that there exist many, if any, naturalists who would be liable to his
strictures, and thus the assumption that the critical analysis of the defi-
nition of ethical terms is the only proper procedure in ethical theory
should be viewed with skepticism.
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Indeed, even if it were the case that credible ethical theory deals
only with the attempt to define ethical terms, it begs the question to as-
sume this as its purpose. It also begs the question to assume that any
suggested definition must fail due to the existence of a simple and an un-
analyzable object, for if goodness were allowed to be complex, then, as
Mary Warnock observes, "not only might one perhaps be able to analyse it,
but it would naturally be significant to convert the proposition and inquire
whether that into which one had analysed it was good ." 22 Rather than ad
hoc support for a curious assumption regarding the nature of definition,
the utility of the open-question test is really apparent in its possibility
as a corrective instrument. Strange it is that Moore, for all his emphasis
on definition, should find his central concept to be indefinable. Yet,
he is quite prepared to attribute to naturalists the definition his own
theory will not allow. Moore accuses the naturalist of seeking a synonymy
or analyticity of terms, and he finds that the open-question test will be
fatal for any definition by exposing a naturalistic fallacy, but only be-
cause he has previously supposed there to be an independent class of in-
definable predicates. Obviously, there would be no naturalistic fallacy,
no logical confusion, if there were no pretense at overt synonymy, no at-
tempt to define the indefinable. Equally, there would be no naturalistic
fallacy should Moore’s concept of definition prove to be incorrect. There
might be, as Frankena points out, a definist fallacy, viz., "the process
of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by
another, or of substituting one property for another ." 23 Moore has supposed
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that "good” is indefinable and that the naturalist has committed the nat-
uralistic fallacy - (1) by committing the definist fallacy, and (2) by
attempting to define the indefinable. And it may be the case that some
naturalists are liable to (1), but it would surely be impossible to estab-
lish this by the assumption of (2). The open-question test cannot, as
Moore supposes, uncover the commission of a fallacy without using that which
is to be proved, viz., the indefinability of "good," as part of the proof.
Naturalists may run afoul of the definist fallacy because of error, but
that would be a far cry from the offense attributed to them by Moore.
The artificiality of the is /ought dichotomy is evinced in Moore's pre-
suppositions. Though he cannot clearly differentiate the two, Moore has
hypostatized both natural and non—natural realms
; he has characterized
naturalists as those who have fallaciously confused these realms by defin-
ing terms relating to the latter by terms relating to the former. The
naturalist must fail in his attempt to define "good," because for "good"
to have a meaning it must denote or stand for some simple and indefinable
property, just as "yellow" denotes or stands for the simple and indefinable
property we perceive. Clearly, the is /ought dichotomy has been created by
the supposition that there exists an independent realm of indefinable predi-
cates. Recent anti-naturalists, capitalizing on Moore's example, believe
they have preserved the logical gap between is^ and ought by devising equally
rigid structures in which to cast naturalism. Two moves are believed to
exemplify naturalists, and further, that both are untenable: (1) the de-
duction of an ethical conclusion, in an argument, from premises containing
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no ethical content, and (2) the definition of ethical terms by non-ethical
terms. For instance, in reference to (1), P.H. Nowell-Smith says of an
argument containing factual premises and an ethical conclusion that it "must
be illegitimate reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain
nothing which is not in the premises." 24 And in reference to (2), R.M. Hare
says that "value- terms have a special function in language, that of commend-
ing; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which
themselves do not perform this function." 25 The assumption, in these cases,
is that naturalists are bound to violate either the canons of logic or the
function of ethical language, in the reduction or ought to i£. Some form
of the open-question test would surely expose the violation; the reduction
must fail because no further alternatives are envisioned. Generally, anti-
naturalists have described naturalists as definists who have committed the
definist fallacy, to use Frankena's terminology, and this they believe they
have established by virtue of the invulnerability of the is /ought distinc-
tion that naturalists engage in invalid deductions and illegitimate defi-
nitions, because they have failed to preceive this invulnerability. No
doubt there are naturalists who are also definists, for example, R.B. Perry;
yet it is not clear, at least to this writer, that anti-naturalists have
exerted the effort to examine seriously the definitions proposed by defi-
nists. After all, some of them may be correct. Obviously, the anti-natur-
alists cannot concede this possibility without relinquishing belief in a
logical gap between ij3 and ought . Still, the question is whether the gap
really exists, or whether it merely appears to exist due to presuppositions
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and stipulations on the part of anti-naturalists. Moreover, a naturalist
would be a definist, in the requisite sense, only if he were engaged in
overt synonymy. If there were grounds for covert synonymy, room for con-
textual considerations, it is difficult to see how the above moves would be
applicable to all naturalistic positions. One might describe many natur-
alists as being more in the tradition of Socrates and his interlocutors,
concerned with questions of goodness and virtue, but with the awareness
that the endless dialogue is inimical to the belief in definitive answers.
With the exception of naturalists who are in fact definists, and as noted
before, the problem may not be a matter of stipulative or reportive defi-
nition at all, but one of reformative justification, the active construc-
tion of covert synonymy, a commitment to experience and denial of ethical
theory which arbitrarily bifurcates is from ought . It remains to be seen
whether the naturalist can defend such a commitment.
Contemporary anti-naturalists have not abandoned significant features
of Moore's ethical program. They have further emphasized the logical
structure of ethical language, which, for them, has become the focal point
of ethical theory. They have also accepted Moore's characterization of
naturalism, and they have viewed some form of the open-question test as
being deadly for naturalism. Above, it was suggested that the open-question
test, because of the justificatory and reformative aim of ethical naturalism,
serves as a corrective instrument; it is not destructive of naturalism,
since, of itself, it does not prove that any proposed definition is wrong.
Only when the open-question test is taken in conjunction with certain
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generated assumptions, e.g., the indefinability of
-good,” then, within
the frame of these assumptions, a proposed definition will fail. The ex-
tent to which recent anti-naturalists have adopted the open-question test
against the backdrop of supposition is not entirely clear; their positions
are still in the middle of the ethical debate. However, both emotivists
and prescnptxvists have initiated one significant departure from Moore's
concept of definition which may hold the answer. Moore's insistence that
for "good” to have a meaning it must denote or stand for some property or
characteristic is contrasted with the proposal that ethical terms are to
be defined by their use, role or function. The is/ought dichotomy is held
invulnerable by the observation that ethical predicates, unlike descriptive
predicates, are defined by their function, in evoking certain actions or
expressing certain attitudes and motives, in bestowing approbation or dis-
approbation. Hence, the open-question test does not divulge the commission
of the naturalistic fallacy, the attempt to define the indefinable, but
rather the definist fallacy, of substituting for ethical predicates terms
irrelevant to their function. The above quote from Hare recommending that
we adopt the commendatory function of value-terms is a case in point. This
prescriptivist appeal coupled with the open-question test allows Hare the
following remarks about naturalism: "The essence of naturalism is to say
'If you understand the meaning of such and such a moral word, you cannot
deny such and such a moral assertion ',” 26 and further on he says that "the
naturalist seeks to tie certain moral judgements analytically to certain
content . This really is to try to make verbal legislation do the work of
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moral thought." 27 The upshot is that the naturalist will be exposed as a
defxnist, presumably by the open-question test, and this because he has
failed to comprehend the real business of ethical language, that of com-
mending, prescribing or guiding conduct. For a slightly different appro-
ach, consider the following working models of the emotivist, C.L. Steven-
son :
(1) "This is wrong" means I_ disapprove of this ; do so as well.
(2) He ought to do this" means I_ disapprove of his leaving this
undone ; do so as well .
(3) "This is good" means I approve of this ; do so as well . 28
These models reveal the emotive and persuasive character of ethical lang-
uage, that ethical terms function, on the one hand, to reveal the agent's
beliefs and attitudes, while on the other, they are calculated to alter the
beliefs and attitudes of the recipient. Stevenson further indicates his
departure from Moore:
Almost all those who now emphasize the emotive aspects
of ethics ... have at one time been greatly under Moore's
influence. It is not easy to believe that this is an
accident. The parallel between his views and the present
one—will be evident from this observation: Wherever
Moore would point to a "naturalistic fallacy," the
present writer. . .would point to a persuasive definition. 29
According to Stevenson, a persuasive definition, among other things, lays
stress on the emotive impact a term or an expression will have in influen-
cing the attitudes of a recipient, as, e.g., in the case of a toastmaster
introducing an otherwise unscrupulous politician as "a man of culture."
Whatever cognitive or descriptive content the phrase contains will be
clouded, for the sake of influence
,
by its positive emotive content. Even
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more pronounced is the emotive function of ethical predicates, for they
will not contain, in Stevenson's estimation, any cognitive content, and
they can therefore only function to betray the agent's attitudes and in-
fluence the attitudes of those to whom they are addressed. It follows that
anyone, especially a naturalist, who fails to apprehend this emotive func-
tion of ethical predicates will be liable to the definist fallacy, be-
cause, whereas he believes he has identified a synonymy or analyticity of
terms, he has really created a persuasive definition, as in the style of
the above models. The open-question test readily uncovers the definist
fallacy:
I may add that my analysis answers Moore's objection about
the open question. Whatever scientifically knowable proper-
ties a thing may have, it is always open to question whether
a thing having these (enumerated) qualities is good. For to
ask whether it is good is to ask for influence . 30
Here we have a clear example of how certain presuppositions about the na-
ture of ethical language allow for a critique of naturalism. In this ex-
ample, the open-question test is employed to reveal the definist fallacy
of defining ethical terms by terms not representing their function. This
serves to keep alive the myth that naturalists violate the is /ought gap by
their devotion to overt synonymy, in Hare's words, that they "try to make
verbal legislation do the work of moral thought."
Undoubtedly, ethical language often does function in the various ways
enumerated by emotivists and prescriptivists . As emotivists contend, be-
liefs and attitudes often are intoned in a way to influence psychologically
the beliefs and attitudes of others. And a strong empirical case can be
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made that much ethical language is used to commend and prescribe just as
prescriptivists insist it does. No advantage would be gained by the nat-
uralist in overlooking these obvious uses of ethical discourse. However,
these anti—naturalists also maintain that they have discovered the real
function of ethical language, and what is more, that this function fully
explains ethical life and obviates naturalists’ attempts to reconcile des-
cription and evaluation. This point requires examination, and, since Hare
is especially instructive, the remainder of the anti-naturalist critique
of naturalism will be principally concerned with his position. Naturalists
cannot, for example, ignore Hare's avowal that "what is wrong with natural-
ist theories is that they leave out the prescriptive or commendatory ele-
ment in value judgements, by seeking to make them derivable from statements
of fact." 31 For if Hare is correct, the case against naturalism could be
couched purely in terms of linguistic analysis, and the determination of
internal logic would tend to underscore the substance of ethical theory
rather than reformative acts of reasoning and deliberation. Hare’s argu-
ment, substantially supported by Stevenson, appears to make the following
points:
(1) Ethical, language has a special function.
(2) Given this special function, two types of meaning obtain, (a)
descriptive or factual meaning, and (b) evaluative meaning.
(3) Since the internal logic of one type constitutes that which
distinguishes it from the other type, any attempt to derive
logically one from the other is fallacious.
(4) Naturalists commit the definist fallacy, as exposed by the
open-question test, by attempting to derive evaluative mean-
ing from descriptive or factual meaning.
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Although the argument is leveled at naturalists, the bifurcation of mean-
ing applies to Stevenson's and Hare's positions with equal force. Whereas
Stevenson distinguishes between descriptive and emotive meaning, Hare dis-
tinguishes between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Between the two
positions, the similarities are far greater than the disparities, and Hare,
like Stevenson, is alert to the emotive factor present in evaluative mean-
but his concentration on the prescriptive and commendatory functions
of ethical terms frees him of a purely psychological analysis of ethical
discourse, that ethical discourse is fundamentally nonrational and must
ultimately create an "influence" to be successful. Aside from this dif-
ference, both Stevenson and Hare are faced with the same problem of justi-
fying and relating two kinds of meaning. Hare clearly perceives "the key
problem" in his distinction between "This is a sweet strawberry" and "This
is a good strawberry":
The first sort of remark is often given as a reason for
making the second sort of remark; but the first sort
does not by itself entail the second sort, nor vice
versa. Yet there seems to be some close logical con-
nexion between them. Our problem is: 'What is this
connexion?'; for no light is shed by saying that there
is a connexion, unless we can say what it is. 32
Before we can estimate the success of Hare's answer to the problem, there
is a prior obstacle. Since the bifurcation of meaning hangs on the con-
tention that ethical language is defined by its unique function, Hare must
defend his view that ethical language is exclusively prescriptive and com-
mendatory .
Hare's defense of the prescriptive and commendatory function of ethical
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language steins primarily from his observations and reflections regarding
how this language is ordinarily used. We discover what a person's moral
principles are by observing his actions, and this because, whatever rele-
vant facts a situation may bear, whatever alternative choices available,
the central problem before an agent is "What should I do?" It is in con-
fronting this question "that he would reveal in what principles of conduct
he really believed. The reasons why actions are in a peculiar way revela-
tory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to
guide conduct. The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive lang-
uage. ^ The principal function of ethical language, then, is guidance
—
given in such diverse forms as advice and instruction, in commending and
affirming; in a word, ethical language is prescriptive. In order to clarify
his insight. Hare asks us to consider a logical peculiarity of value words
in general and of ethical words in particular—words such as "good," "bad,"
"right," and "ought." "All such words are names of 'supervenient' or 'con-
sequential' properties.
"
3Lf Hare is not alluding to the natural and non-
natural properties adumbrated by Moore; rather, supervenient properties,
he thinks, define the function value and ethical words perform. As an
illustration, suppose it were said of two pictures that both were alike in
every respect save one, viz., that one was good while the other was bad.
Hearers of this distinction would naturally be puzzled; they would insist
that some further difference accounted for one picture being good, the
other bad. Yet no protest would be leveled if it were said of two pictures
that both were alike in every respect save one, viz., that one was signed
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while the other was not. Such examples. Hare maintains, will always reveal
the supervenient character of value and ethical words, that words like "good"
and "bad" will always differ essentially from words like "signed" because
there is a difference in the logic of their application. It is in account-
ing for this supervenient character that Hare detects the weakness of all
naturalist positions:
And so a natural response to the discovery that ’good'
behaves as it does, is to suspect that there is a set
of characteristics which together entail a thing being
good, and to set out to discover what these character-
istics are. This is the genesis of that group of ethi-
cal theories which Professor Moore called 'naturalist'
The terra has, unfortunately, since Moore's introduction
of it, been used very loosely. It is best to confine
it to those theories against which Moore's refutation
(or a recognizable version of it) is valid.... I shall
argue... that what is wrong with naturalist theories
is that they leave out the prescriptive or commendatory
element in value-judgements
,
by seeking to make them
derivable from statements of fact. If I am right in
this opinion, my own theory, which preserves this ele-
ment, is not naturalist . 35
Hare's kinship to Moore is abundantly clear in this passage. Both view
the naturalist as attempting to create a synonymy or analyticity between
descriptive and evaluative predicates; both indicate a miscalculation of
the logic of ethical discourse as the naturalists' prime error. But,
whereas Moore thinks of ethical discourse as being primarily informative,
by pointing or alluding to the non-natural property of goodness. Hare seeks
its importance in its function, in its supervenient character. Supervenience
lies in the prescriptive function of ethical language—to teach or affirm,
or otherwise draw attention to rules, standards and principles governing
choice and action . 35 Naturalists, in their account of supervenience,
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violate this function of ethical discourse. To mark the locus of super-
venience in descriptive predicates, an "entailment" between description
and evaluation, prevents value and ethical predicates from doing the job
for which they are logically responsible. In the example of the two pic-
tures, a naturalist computation of descriptive predicates disallows the
prescriptive function and masks supervenience
. The open—question test
readily exposes the definist fallacy:
Let us generalize. If 'P is a good picture’ is held to mean
the same as ’P is a picture and P is C', then it will be-
come impossible to commend pictures for being C; it will be
possible only to say that they are C. It is important to
realize that this difficulty has nothing to do with the
particular example that I have chosen. It is not because
we have chosen the wrong defining characteristics; it is
because, whatever defining characteristics we choose, this
objection arises, that we can no longer commend an object
for possessing those characteristics
.
36
We have noted the circularity in Moore’s position, that his refuta-
tion of naturalism stands or falls with the existence or non-existence of
the non-natural property of goodness. Similarly, it would appear that
Hare, in order to avoid circularity, must show that ethical discourse is
restricted to the unique function he describes, and that naturalists are
indeed liable to the overt synonymy he ascribes. Only then could the open-
question test uncover the commission of a fallacy. Analysis, however,
seems to reveal a wider functional base than that indicated by Hare. War-
nock, for instance, cites multiple functions of ethical discourse:
There are... dozens of things which those who employ
moral words may therein be doing. They may be pres-
cribing, certainly; but also they may be advising,
exhorting, imploring; commending, condemning, deplor-
ing; resolving, confessing, undertaking; and so on,
07
and so on.
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Hare would presumably retort that, of course ethical discourse exhibits
these multiple uses, roles and functions, but at bottom they are all action-
guiding, all basically prescriptive. As we have seen. Hare’s defense of
prescriptivity is drawn from reflections on the ordinary use of ethical
discourse, that to understand ethical life is just to understand its defini-
tive language. Accordingly, it is observed that there is a close connec-
tion between choice and action, the substantive question "What should I
do?" calling for a prescription, the agent’s principles revealed in his
actions. Yet there is something grossly misleading in Hare's analysis.
Few would argue that ethics has to do with the relation between choice and
action, and the first chapter of this dissertation argued that the estab-
lishment of this relation is a necessary condition for any ethical theory.
But Hare, all too often, is saying the relation itself is fully explained
in the functional dimension of ethical discourse. He is saying that to
understand any ethical utterance is just to understand what we are doing
with it. And his answer is that we are prescribing. Even if this were
the case, does it follow that this function is_ the relation between choice
and action? Can an analysis of ordinary usage really explain the arduous
process the agent must undergo in order to choose and act rationally and
wisely? Surely, one would suspect that linguistic analysis, in this case,
has rendered a rather shallow description of ethical life. Surely, it is
misleading to draw the inference, from the fact that ethical discourse is
prescriptive, that the relation between choice and action is itself ex-
plained by prescriptivity. A correct analysis of ethical discourse is one
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thing, but this is no certain indicator of the richness and manifold re-
quirements of ethical life.
There is, then, a sense in which it is unnecessary for the ethical
naturalist to dispute prescriptivity
; Hare may well have advanced our un-
derstanding of the logic of ethical discourse, and for this he is to be
commended. The ethical naturalist will point out, however, that ethical
discourse does not measure the full extent of ethical life, what it means
to be an ethical agent. Hare purports that naturalists blindly manipulate
descriptive and evaluative predicates—at the linguistic level, and that
they are therefore liable, at this level, to the open-question test and its
subsequent disclosure of a fallacy. Naturalists cannot prescribe or com-
mend, that is, perform the correct linguistic function, because they have
attempted something quite different, viz., to tie together, linguistically,
descriptive and evaluative predicates. In short, Hare charges naturalists
of overt synonymy. Yet by his own reckoning he identifies the central
problem to be the relation between choice and action, in all cases a pres-
cription being advanced. How can prescriptivity, binding as it is only
discursively, explain the relation between choice and action? Prescrip-
tivity says nothing about the grounds of decision, says nothing about the
background of evaluation, why a particular course of conduct is in fact
instituted. The agent may be prescribing, but not merely prescribing; he
is choosing and acting in a situation, against a backdrop of deliberation.
On Hare's account, how could one differentiate between the merely capricious
and gratuitous, and conduct which could be termed moral or ethical? At the
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risk of importing a foreign terminology into the present discussion, Dewey
does prove instructive. He is alive to the anti-naturalist's utilisation
of the open-question test, termed by him a "regressus ad infinitum ." but
he asks us to look to the conditions under which evaluations are made.
Dewey concedes the possibility of a "tautological" relationship between
means to ends and ends themselves, that it is possible "to isolate some
event projected as an end out of the context of a world of moving changes."
And he further concedes that "human beings do indulge in such arrests.":
But to treat them as models for forming a theory of ends
is to substitute a manipulation of ideas
,
abstracted from
the contexts in which they arise and function, for the
conclusions of observations of concrete facts. It is a
sign either of insanity, immaturity, indurated routine,
or of a fanaticism that is a mixture of all three ." 38
How unlike this is from Hare’s caricature of naturalism, the imputation
that naturalists are in search of the correct "defining characteristics,"
or that they confuse verbal legislation with moral thought. For, whatever
else evaluation may entail, if choice and action are to be at all meaning-
ful, the contextual background of evaluation is all-important. By adopt-
ing Moore's characterization of naturalism, Hare has failed to demonstrate
that naturalists have a propensity for overt synonymy, and this because
both Moore and Hare have failed to consider context, the covert grounds of
evaluation, in their explication of the relation between choice and action.
We can now return to Hare's bifurcation of meaning. Like Moore and
Stevenson before him, Hare is faced with the problem of justifying and
relating two kinds of meaning, descriptive and evaluative. We have seen
that, in Hare's estimation, there exists a logical gulf between descriptive
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and value words, it being the supervenient character of value words, their
prescriptivity, which sets them apart from words which merely describe.
Value words indicate a course of action or conduct; descriptive words tell
what is the case. How then can any given prescription be justified? How
can a prescription based on whim or fancy be distinguished from a pres-
cription which represents a truly ethical or moral judgment? On the one
hand, prescriptivity cannot be grounded in descriptive judgments, because
the logic or criteria of application of descriptive words is at variance
with those which prescribe; but, on the other hand, prescriptions cannot
be left dangling without grounds, because such an omission would be tanta-
mount to an evasion of questions ethical and moral. Hare is aware of this
dilemma, and though his solution is quite complex, for our purposes the
salient moves are relatively clear. Let us begin by unpacking prescrip-
tivity a bit further. If we consider a simple prescription such as "Shut
the door," it will be evident that the command may or may not eventuate
in the appropriate action; it will only if the addressee assents to the
command. The case of value judgments is different, in Hare’s view, for,
although all value judgments will be prescriptive and thus "entail" impera-
tives or commands, not all imperatives or commands will be value judgments.
The essential difference is that, in the case of value judgments, it is a
matter of definition and/or common usage for Hare that the addressee assent
to the command:
I propose to say that the test, whether someone is using
the judgement ’I ought to do X' as a value-judgement or
not is, 'Does he or does he not recognize that if he
assents to the judgement, he must also assent to the
command "Let me do X"?’ 39
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What is true of value judgments in general will also apply to ethical and
moral judgments in particular. Since the principal function of ethical
and moral language is guidance in determining choice and action, the agent
must assent to the command:
But to guide choices or actions, a moral judgement has
to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent
to some imperative sentence derivable from it, in other
,
if a person does not assent to some such imperative
sentence, that is knock-down evidence that he does not
assent to the moral judgement in an evaluative sense....
This is true by my definition of the word evaluative
Thus to say that moral judgements guide actions, and to
say that they entail imperatives, comes to much the same
thing
.
40
Ethical and moral judgments share in common with imperatives their pres-
criptivity, but they differ from imperatives in general because they re-
quire assent by the agent to the command. Just as in logic, if proposi-
tion p entails proposition q, I cannot with consistency assert p and deny
or reject q. I cannot assent to a moral judgment without assent to the
imperative the judgment entails. One mark of ethical or moral judgments,
then, is the agent's commitment to the imperative entailed by a judgment.
Although it may be a necessary condition for ethical and moral judg-
ments that they entail imperatives to which the agent gives assent, it is
obviously not a sufficient condition. Assent, in itself, is hardly an
index of morality, and innumerable cases could be cited, such as the agent
under coercive conditions, where ethical or moral content would be absent.
Consequently, in order to further discriminate ethical and moral judgments
Hare introduces the concept of universalizability
.
Confronted with a pres
cription, the addressee is entitled to ask the question "Why? that is to
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ask for a reason. The reason cannot be, as naturalists are alleged to con-
tend, a set of descriptive predicates; rather, the reason must allude to
some standard. In the example previously mentioned, "This is a sweet straw-
berry" and "This is a good strawberry," the first statement may be a reason
for the second only if one were to accept the appropriate major premise,
namely, that sweetness is a standard by which to measure the goodness of
strawberries. Only if one were prepared to accept the standard would there
be an "entailment" between the two statements. Another mark, then, of
value judgments in general and of ethical and moral judgments in particular
is the agent’s readiness to apply certain standards, that in any given situ-
ation whose features measure up to appropriate standards, the agent is pre-
pared to make the same judgment; cases of the same kind deserve to be judged
in the same way. In other words, certain judgments must be universalizable
if they are to pass muster as being ethical or moral. Lest it be thought
that the universalizability thesis has been smuggled in as a disguised
moral principle. Hare explains:
The thesis of universalizability itself, however, is still
a logical thesis. It is very important not to confuse the
thesis of universalizability with the substantial moral
principles to which, according to it, a person who makes a
moral judgement commits himself. By a 'logical' thesis I
mean a thesis about the meanings of words, or dependent
solely upon them. I have been maintaining that the mean-
ing of the word 'ought' and other moral words is such that
a person who uses them commits himself thereby to a uni-
versal rule . 41
As best I understand Hare, he is saying that both descriptive and evalua-
tive judgments are universalizable, and we are thus committed to the same
Accordingly, "if I call a thing red,logical requirements in both cases.
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I am committed to calling anything else like it red. And if I call a thing
a good X, I am committed to calling any X like it good." The universaliza-
bilxty thesis is therefore not a moral principle; the thesis is a reminder
once more that the logic of ethical discourse sets demands for its proper
use. We are thus better able to understand Hare's contention regarding
supervenience, that ethical and moral words are used to call attention to
rules, standards and principles of conduct. The proper use of these words
obligates the agent to choose and act according to linguistic rule. In-
stead of grounding ethical and value judgments in descriptive predicates,
as Hare imputes to naturalists, they are grounded in the rules, standards
and principles embraced by the agent. Summarizing, then, according to Hare,
there are three truths about ethical and moral judgments: (1) they are a
species of imperatives or commands; (2) they imply assent by the addres-
see, and (3) they are subject to the thesis of universalizability
.
We are now in a position to observe how Hare proposes to cope with the
relation between descriptive and evaluative meaning. His substantive claim
is that evaluative meaning has descriptive meaning. To understand how this
can be, it is necessary to review briefly the use of "meaning-rules." For
Hare, all descriptive words and judgments are defined in terms of meaning
rules. By this, he is not referring to conventional grammatical or syntac-
tical rules, nor is he referring to traditional philosophic interpreta-
tions of meaning such as those found in the referential or coherence
theories. "By 'rules' I do not mean very simple general rules which can be
formulated in words," explains Hare, "but, rather, that consistency of
practice in the use of an expression which is the condition of its
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intelligibility ." 42 This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s edict that to
know the meaning of a word is to know its use in discourse. I can be said
to know the meaning of the word "red," if I display consistency in its
application, if I can demonstrate a grasp of its criteria of application,
if I do not, for instance, call red things blue or blue things red. Know-
ing the meaning-rules of a descriptive word is not an independent exercise;
it is a matter of experience and practice, a matter of progressively
learning and refining the criteria of its application. Now, in the case
of a value word, this is not enough, because meaning-rules alone are not
sufficient to indicate its meaning; in fact, "its meaning is independent
of the criteria for its application ." 42 What, in addition to descriptive
meaning-rules, complicates value expressions? As noted before, both des-
criptive and evaluative judgments are subject to universalizability
. Now
we can see that, in the case of descriptive judgments, universalizability
is solely a matter of consistency, governed by the correct application of
meaning-rules. In the case of evaluative judgments, consistency of appli-
cation must be augmented by reference to standards and principles. Though
universalizability is a common characteristic of both descriptive and
evaluative language, the latter must, in addition to meaning-rules, des-
cribe some standard of judgment. Given some standard, expressions such as
"This is a good X," or "I ought to do X," are, in effect, partly descrip-
tive as well as prescriptive; I am saying, in effect, that some standard
has been met. Those who are aware of my standards will know that I am
not merely mouthing ungrounded exhortations, but that I am prescribing
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according to the standards and principles I have embraced. Evaluative
judgments, then, have both descriptive and evaluative meaning. There must
be an implicit description of the standard by which an evaluative judgment
is made, for without this entailment between standards and judgments, choice
and action would be meaningless, prescriptions without grounds. An agent
without standards will have abandoned the basis of choice and action, but
more importantly, he will have failed to use ethical and moral language
correctly, and it will remain essentially nonproductive and nonrational.
Consequently, by establishing descriptive meaning as part of evaluative
meaning. Hare believes he has decisively undermined the foundation of
naturalism:
Both naturalism and my own view lay great stress on the
fact that, when we make a moral judgement about something,
we make it because of the possession by it of certain non-
moral properties. Thus both views hold that moral judge-
ments about particular things are made for reasons; and the
notion of a reason, as always, brings with it the notion of
a rule which lays down that something is a reason for some-
thing else. Both views, therefore, involve universaliza-
bility. The difference is that the naturalist thinks that
the rule in question is a descriptive meaning-rule which
exhausts the meaning of the moral term used.... But for me
the position is different. Since the 'descriptive meaning’
of moral terms does not exhaust their meaning, the other
element in their meaning can make a difference to the logical
behavior of these terms in inference. This is the point at
issue in the controversy about whether an 'ought' can be
derived from an 'is '. 44
And Hare leaves no doubt regarding "the other element in their meaning,
for "in the case of moral judgements the universal rules which determine
this descriptive meaning are not mere meaning-rules, but moral principles
of substance ." 45
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General Features and Problems of^ Naturalism
We have now the picture of anti-naturalism's critique of naturalism.
We have witnessed that anti-naturalists err in their characterization of
naturalism by building a straw man. Naturalists are accused of attempting
to create a synonymy of descriptive and evaluative predicates and, as in-
dicated in the final quote from Hare in the previous section, naturalists
have failed to exhaust evaluative meaning due to having taken descriptive
meaning-rules as the sole authority in deriving an ought from an is. The
point has been labored, throughout, that the error in this approach is its
uncritical adaptation of Moore's original stipulation of naturalism, an
interpretation which, in turn, is easily dispatched by the open-question
test by rendering a definist fallacy. In their refutation, however, anti-
naturalists have failed to discern the difference between overt and covert
synonymy, and in their sketch of naturalism, no allowance has been made
for such non-linguistic factors in evaluation as context, the alternatives
available to the agent, and the consequences of choice and action. No
allowance has been made for the fact that deliberation, insight, imagina-
tion and foresight, the necessary marks of the responsible agent, are always
products of the actual situations in which problems arise. True, anti-
naturalists sometimes acknowledge the importance of contingencies, but
all too often they are an afterthought, considered as rather embarrassing
and untidy adjuncts, compared to the artful unraveling of the internal
logic of ethical discourse. Because of their articulation of ethical
theory, it is understandable that anti-naturalists would wish to cast
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naturalism according to rules and precepts that they, the anti-naturalists,
have assiduously promoted. These same rules and precepts define the con-
tours of legitimate ethical theory; they are thus readily utilized to
undercut a misleading, if not spurious, account of naturalism. Still, it
is understandable that Hare would hedge his description of naturalism by
contending that "it is best to confine it to those theories against which
Moore s refutation is valid;" it is understandable, since it is just that
particular way of interpreting naturalism which avails itself of exposure
to logical irregularities. Hence, it is demonstrated that naturalists
have failed to observe certain logical peculiarities of ethical discourse;
they have failed to observe the prescriptive and commendatory function of
ethical and moral words; they have restricted analysis to descriptive
meaning-rules, thereby failing to note that standards and principles are
somehow "entailed" by evaluative judgments. Nevertheless, why should we
not inquire of the anti-naturalist concerning his preoccupation with the
logic of ethical discourse? And even if we were to grant that anti-natural-
ists do take account of more than internal logic, why then must their refu-
tation of naturalism be restricted to the commission of logical errors?
Apparently, if the anti-naturalist is determined to go the way of analysis,
maintaining his own rules and precepts, his description of naturalism will
be unavoidably inaccurate. But if he introduces non-linguistic factors,
then he can hardly rest his case against naturalism as being simply a fail-
ure of logical awareness.
The final quote of the last section betrays one more fundamental de-
fect of Hare's position. Because of his concentration on ethical discourse,
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scant attention is paid by Hare to what has been called the ethical life.
In order to account for evaluative meaning. Hare must augment descriptive
meaning-rules; he cannot rely on them exclusively, as he improperly im-
putes to naturalists, for then the resulting equation would be subject to
the open-question test. Consequently, in addition to meaning-rules, there
is another element in the meaning of evaluation—"moral principles of
substance. These principles, which supposedly ground prescriptions, are
implicitly described in making ethical or moral judgments. Now, few would
argue concerning the importance of principles to ethical life; they are,
for many, the sine qua non of choice and action. Granting their importance
(we shall presently study their relationship to naturalism), in Hare's case
they appear without warrant and serve only to complement a linguistic
function. On the basis of Hare's analysis, principles must, of necessity,
lie logically prior to the prescriptions that they are intrusted to guide.
What, then, is the basis of these principles? We are told by Hare that
principles are always a matter of "decisions."^6 What, then, is the basis
of these decisions? In fairness to Hare, it should be noted that he does
adduce criteria for decisions of principle, but they do not differ markedly
from criteria that many other ethical theorists, including naturalists,
might produce. We are told to appeal to fact, to imagination, to inclina-
tion and interest; but the point to notice is that these appeals are made
independent of ethical discourse. Precisely those factors stressed by
naturalists are, for Hare, discrete and independent concerns. We are thus
left with the impression that ethical discourse and ethical life are really
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not related at all. Since prescriptivity is the most important concern
for Hare, ethical life is left barren, and there is only silence, except
to refer the matter to decisions, regarding the crucial connection be-
tween the two. George C. Kerner has succinctly described the problem:
According to Hare, whenever assertions like 'This is a
good strawberry' are genuinely evaluative, they have no
logical connextion with any factual statements whatever.
The connexion between evaluations and descriptions de-
pends on standards and principles and those, in turn,
on decisions. Such a conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory.
Hare has told us that the most important thing about value-
judgements is their prescriptive and commendatory force.
Their function is thus to guide our decisions. But if the
connexion between value-judgements and their reasons de-
pends on our decisions, what is and what is not a well-
supported value-judgement is itself a matter of decision.
We are thus clearly going in a circle
.
47
If we appeal to principles, within discourse, there will be grounding for
prescriptions. If we are then asked to justify principles, we must aban-
don discourse and appeal to those factors already stressed by naturalists,
but which, in discourse, are insufficient for Hare, i.e., descriptive
meaning-rules. What then is the relation between principles as they func-
tion in discourse and principles as they are arrived at by consideration
of independent criteria? By his own admission, Hare does not wish to
allow a logical connection between description and evaluation, and there-
fore, there can be no logical connection between descriptive meaning-rules
and evaluation. How then can principles be legitimately grounded? For if
we appeal to facts, imagination and interest, etc., that is, appeal to in-
dependent criteria, have we not done precisely what Hare thinks he has
prohibited the naturalists from doing? Clearly, Hare has not produced a
coherent picture which would account for both ethical discourse and ethical
life.
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Hare's failure to provide a satisfactory account of ethical and moral
principles grows out of his futile effort to relate descriptive and evalua-
tive meaning. The needed continuity of ethical discourse and ethical life
is not forthcoming, and a sterile, if uncompromising, ethical theory is the
reward. Therefore, we might consider whether a naturalist theory will bet-
ter serve us. In light of Hare's failure, reconciliation of ethical dis-
course with ethical life, by virtue of an adequate account of meaning and
the status of principles, would constitute the basic requirement of such
a theory. Let us begin with the problem of meaning. Anti-naturalists
consistently maintain a sharp distinction between descriptive and evalua-
tive meaning. The suggestion has been made that the distinction may be
unwarranted, a presupposition rather than a point to be defended, and it
may be the case that two kinds of meaning are unnecessary where contextual
considerations are granted equal audience with discourse. Now we are in
a position to appreciate that this is the case.
The term "meaning" is not easily unpacked; its long and controver-
sial history in philosophy, the multiple senses in which it is used, would
require a tedious digression. For our purposes, three senses of the terra
are appropriate. The first sense, as we have encountered it with the
anti-naturalists, has meaning tied with the rules governing the function
that descriptive and evaluative words perform. Yet, to be precise, it is
unclear that words normally perform any function as such. Normally, it
is sentences not words which have useful significance. We can speak of
word meaning in terms of definition, a lexical meaning, but as Kerner
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points out, "what has meaning in a primary and full sense is a complete
utterance or speach-act, such as informing, describing, warning, commend-
ing, ordering, promising, and so on ." 48 If we are to speak profitably of
meaning," we require a second sense of the term, one which deals with a
complete utterance or sentence. Obviously, if we are interested in the
locus of sentence meaning, lexical definitions will be to no avail; the
meanings of sentences must be sought elsewhere. Now we might turn to the
rules governing grammatical and syntactical meaning, or as indicated in
recent literature, we might turn to philosophic or logical meaning criteria.
For instance, the expression "He drew a square circle on the blackboard,"
might be held as being grammatically and syntactically meaningful, but as
a contradiction it lacks philosophic significance. Moreover, we might take
the broader view of anti-naturalism and maintain that meaning is established
by having discovered the correct functions of language. What is common to
all these ways of establishing sentence meaning is their reliance on rules
and criteria suitable for a universe of discourse. But, although the nat-
uralist appreciates these avenues of establishing significance, he cannot
allow that they are sufficient. Plainly, an utterance does not simply be-
long to a universe of discourse, dependent exclusively on rules and cri-
teria; it belongs, in addition, to the circumstances which brought it into
existence. Plainly, an utterance is a sign of something independent of
discourse (provided it is not merely analytic or tautological) , a sign of
the extralinguistic context in which it is made. Consequently, a third
sense of "meaning" is required, one which will, in addition to rules and
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criteria, fully exhaust the significance of sentences and utterances. We
roust account for a contextual sense of meaning
.
The anti-naturalist will likely object that, with this third sense
of meaning," we have smuggled in an improper extension of the range of the
term. It will be argued that, strictly speaking, there can be no such
thing as a contextual sense of meaning, that the various senses of the
term "meaning" are properly restricted to linguistic entities, to words or
sentences, or to meaning-rules. There is reason to restrict the range of
the term precisely because che implementation of rules and criteria gov-
erning the maneuvers of linguistic entities constitutes meaning. This
alleged third sense is not really a different sense of the term, but an
entirely unwarranted and unrecognized application of the term. This ob-
jection is surely untenable, for even granting the role played by linguis-
tic rules and criteria, the significance of an utterance is only complete
in the further sense that it belongs to
,
or is a sign of an extralinguistic
context. Failure to note that significance depends upon extralinguistic
factors only serves to bifurcate language from its origin in what Wittgen-
stein has called "a form of life," the observation that language is integ-
rally "woven" into other activities . 49 Wittgenstein's cryptic comment that
"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" 50 is immediately de-
ciphered with the recognition that language must be augmented by other
typically human activities in order that meaning accrues. The obdurate
and narrow view which restricts the term "meaning" to linguistic entities
is clearly arbitrary; to speak of a contextual sense of meaning seems en-
tirely justified. Undoubtedly it is very important for the anti-naturalist
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to restrict meaning to linguistic entities, to disallow contextual mean-
ing, for to do otherwise seriously jeopardizes the crucial epistemological
distinction maintained between description and evaluation. The naturalist’s
espousal of contextual meaning would appear to obviate the need for this
distinction. This is most clearly evident in the observation that contex-
tual meaning allows for both descriptive and evaluative judgments to arise
from contextual considerations. Consequently, if it is plainly unreward-
ing to attempt to exhaust meaning in terms of a universe of discourse,
there is reason to believe no anomaly exists between description and evalu-
ation; we can plausibly suppose that ethical discourse and ethical life
can be related without the assumption of two incompatible kinds of meaning.
Moreover, the collapse of the distinction frees the naturalist to pursue
his reformative program for ethics, that in reconciling ethical discourse
and ethical life, he is in a favorable position to give a credible account
of choice and action.
If it is granted that meaning, in its original and most important
sense, is tied to an extralinguistic context, two questions are occasioned:
(1) How, in general, does context bestow significance on judgments? (2)
What constitutes typically evaluative judgments within a contextual set-
ting? In regard to the first question, perhaps the best way we might
illustrate contextual significance is in terms of the instrumentalities
afforded by a context. In this sense, certain qualities of a situation
accrue significance in proportion to their instrumental possibilities in
solving problems. This concept of contextual meaning is central in Dewey's
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position
:
In responding to things not in their immediate qualities
but for the sake of ulterior results, immediate qualities
are dimmed, while those features which are signs, indices
of something else, are distinguished. A thing is more sig-
nificantly what it makes possible than what it immediately
is. The very conception of cognitive meaning, intellectual
significance, is that things in their immediacy are sub-
ordinated to what they portend and give evidence of. An
intellectual sign denotes that a thing is not taken immedi-
ately but is referred to something that may come in conse-
quence of it. Intellectual meanings may themselves be
appropriated, enjoyed and appreciated; but the character
of intellectual meaning is instrumental
.
51
Let us suppose, for example, that I am lost in the forest. My dominate
concern is to discover a way to familiar terrain. My immediate situation
bombards me with contingencies, with trees and rocks, with streams and
sky, and it is to these qualities of the situation that I must turn if
my future is to be secured. Now, many of the qualities and features sur-
rounding me are plainly irrelevant; these "qualities are dimmed, while
those features which are signs, indices of something else, are distinguished."
Some qualities, the compass and map in my pocket, the food in my knapsack,
the direction of the streams and the position of moss on trees and rocks,
accrue significance as they portend possible solutions of my problem. True,
before awareness of my predicament, these qualities were there in their
"immediacy," but now, in my new appraisal, they become propitious, each
points to "something that may come in consequence of it." Consequently,
"things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give
evidence of." In my situation, there is a congeries of things in their
immediacy, but they are not all significant in connection with the context
of my problem; only some will point the way to solution.
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There is a slightly different but related way we might approach con-
textual significance. Dewey’s distinction between things in their immedi-
acy and things in relation to what they portend is a reflection on the
future orientation of significance as it relates to choice and action. The
distinction suggests what might come to be by virtue of certain operations
on the part of the agent. But the illustration also indicates how context
may determine the significance of individual judgments. Suppose I am
about to commence my trek into the forest, and I am asked by a friend to
enumerate the survival gear 1 have in my possession. Among other things,
I make the judgment that "I have a compass in my pocket." The judgment,
in this initial state of affairs, is innocuous; its significance blends
with the other items of my enumeration, taken collectively, a purely pre-
cautionary and prudential statement of possibility, having no more or less
import than judgments concerning many other features surrounding me. How-
ever, in the ominous circumstance of being lost, the context, we might
say, determines a new significance, one dealing with imminent peril. My
original cursory and incidental judgment now stands out, its significance
magnified by a threatening context. The report to my self that "I have a
compass in my pocket" has new significance by virtue of the context in
which I now find myself. At all times and places, then, qualities are con-
textually bound. The overriding character of a context bestows signifi-
cance, a significance which permeates and enhances qualities, and which,
in turn, is reflected in the significance of judgments concerning them.
We can conclude that, not only do qualities portend a future, but the
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contexts in which they find reference, overlap and envelop one another,
and judgments will therefore change in significance as they reflect this
fluidity of circumstance. The compass in my pocket varies with the con-
text in significance, but so do the judgments concerning it vary in sig-
nificance due to the context in which they are made. We could say of
descriptive judgments, then, that they have both present and future sig-
nificance, the deciding emphasis, in any given case, a matter of determining
when and where the judgment is made.
Not all contexts represent immediate natural conditions; human con-
trivance often marks the origin of operational situations. Contexts
appropriated from past, deliberation bestow significance on present and
future contexts, and meanings of the past consistently foreshadow present
and future deliberation. Especially, in regard to social institutions, do
we encounter the impress of previous deliberation and decision. Antecedent
meanings, which have adequately served in the past, become conventionalized
and institutionalized; they appropriate the mantle of rule-like directives
to which the agent turns for advice. Where there are social conditions,
enumerable contexts function by dent of tradition or authority, by ascent
or consent. In many cases, perhaps the majority, these fixed contexts are
innocuous enough, serving to organize and give meaning to data, thereby
characterizing the habitual ways a society conducts its affairs. Many
games, to take a simple example, are defined by rules, and it is in refer-
ence to rules that brute data and judgment gain meaning:
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Many of the actions one perforins in a game of baseball one
can do by oneself or with others whether there is a game or
not. For example, one can throw a ball, run, or swing a
peculiarly shaped piece of wood. But one cannot steal a
base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an error, or
balk; although one can do certain things which appear to
resemble these actions such as sliding into a bag, missing
a grounder and so on. Striking out, stealing a base, balk-
ing, etc., are all actions which can only happen in a game.
No matter what a person did, what he did would not be des-
cribed as stealing a base or striking out or drawing a walk
unless he could also be described as playing baseball, and
for him to be doing this presupposes the rule-like practice
which constitutes the game. The practice is logically prior
to particular cases: unless there is the practice the terms
referring to actions specified by it lack sense . 52
Antecedent meanings, however, can and do become unyielding and viru-
lent; as testimonies of past deliberation, they may or may not constitute
criteria suitable for inclusion in the significance of present and future
deliberation. Charles Peirce points out "the uncorrigible tendencies of
tenacity, and a priori speculation—which may have good purposes in build-
ing character, social institutions, and new perspectives," but he cautions
that such "fixations of belief" are "unreliable as modes of inquiry for
setting conflicts or doubts ." 53 At this time, we can affirm that antece-
dent meanings constitute prime material for moral and ethical deliberation,
and we shall see, momentarily, that they represent for naturalism a for-
midable problem. For the present, let us summarize the general relation
between context and the meaning of descriptive judgments. We have seen
that both temporal and spatial factors are intimately "woven," to use
Wittgenstein's term, into descriptive judgments. The irritation, doubt and
disequilibrium, evinced by problem situations, imbue qualities and judgments
with meanings, facilitating and directing choice and action towards a more
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stable condition. The sharp edge of confrontation between present mean-
ings and projected conditions (Dewey calls them e„ds-in-view) Is dissolved
through deliberation; choice and action arrogate meanings derived from
overlapping and enveloping contexts. Then, too, there is often an ele-
ment of the past in judgment; habitual modes of behavior, fixed ideas and
beliefs, which may or may not facilitate adequate decisions and actions,
contribute their share of significance to judgment. The salient point at
issue, however, is that descriptive judgments, as regards their meaning,
cannot be dissevered from contextual considerations; the attempt to ex-
haust meaning in terms of linguistic rules and criteria is, at heart, a
fruitless enterprise destructive of any theory of meaning aspiring to
completeness
.
The naturalist further argues that not only are the meanings of des-
criptive judgments derived from contextual considerations, but they are
also value laden. Therefore, we must turn to the second question above:
What constitutes typically evaluative judgments within a contextual setting?
The key point that the naturalist would make is that any descriptive judg-
ment may
,
since its significance depends on contextual factors, be evalua-
tive as well. In the above illustration of the rules governing baseball,
evaluative meaning abounds, the criteria of evaluation being constitutive
of the institution. A good game, a bad pitch, the right strategy, or the
obligation and duties of players are all explicitly spelled out in the
authentic execution of the game. Our enjoyment of the national pastime is
enhanced by our knowledge of the criteria of judgment embodied in the in-
stitution, and no better place can be found to appreciate the fact of
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evaluation than in the active disputations of spectators at the game.
Where criteria of judgment are implicit in the institution, known by the
agent, no mystery attends the fact that description entails evaluation.
Whether grading apples, automobiles or baseball players, the agent brings
to bear his knowledge of the criteria of judgment, his knowledge being the
consequence of prior experience. "In its popular sense," says Dewey, "all
judgment is estimation, appraisal, assigning value to something; a discrimi-
nation as to advantage, serviceability, fitness for a purpose, enjoyability
,
and so on ." 54 In cases where the context is formalized and the criteria
known, even the preliminaries of judgment, discrimination and selectivity,
are initial acts of valuing and prizing. However, what of contexts in
which institutional criteria are diffuse or lacking? In what sense would
judgments be evaluative? Contexts often appear to give rise to immediate
and uncritical valuings and prizings where, as Dewey says, attention is
"absorbed in the object, a person, act, natural scene, work of art," to the
exclusion of extraneous features and relationships. Dewey speaks of an
"intuitive" aspect of judgment, where the agent seems to "size up" immedi-
ately the situation at hand and bestows valuation without apparent recourse
to deliberation.^ The choice of the term would be unfortunate if it were
simply used in the tradition of such British moralists as Moore, Prichard
and Ross, but Dewey’s reference to intuition is far more provocative and
subtle. He is not referring to a faculty of intuition, nor is he contend-
ing that evaluative predicates are perceived as analytically tied to
descriptive features. Dewey's point is that, due to previous experience
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and habit, expertise gained through prolonged training and practice, the
agent can immediately, in many cases, come to terms with objects and per-
sons, in a way prohibited the uninitiated. Dewey is no traditional intu-
itionist; rather, he is giving an account of intuition which will square
with his commitment to experience:
The results of prior experience, including previous cons-
cious thinking, get taken up into direct habits, and express
themselves in direct appraisals of value. Most of our moraljudgments are intuitive, but this fact is not a proof of the
existence of a separate faculty of moral insight, but is the
result of past experience funded into direct outlook upon the
scene of life. As Aristotle remarked in effect a long time
ago, the immediate judgments of good and evil of a good man
are more to be trusted than many of the elaborately reasoned
out estimates of the inexperienced.^
However, to say that most moral judgments are intuitive does not commit
one to saying that prior deliberation and experience can, of themselves,
vouchsafe the moral content of a present judgment. The fact that immedi-
ate prizings are unreflective suggests that the moral issue is problematic,
that judgments made without reference to present features and relations of
the context may not, as experience demonstrates, command moral approba-
tion; Aristotle's good man is capable of the greatest vices as well as
the greatest virtues. Immediate prizings may well give evidence of consis-
tency but not necessarily of commendable morality, and consequently, the
crucial questions of choice and action cannot be decided merely on the
basis of intuition.
The subtlety and importance of Dewey's point in binding intuition
to prior experience becomes evident when it is recalled that far too many
theories of moral life are arrested before they can do justice to what
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ordinary people most desire and need to know about choice and action.
Antecedent meanings are all too often taken as the final arbiters of
morality. The search for the summum bonum is testimony of this tendency.
And more recent theories fare no better. Consider the extreme case of in-
tuition, a situation in which, except for the isolation of the object
prized, intuition is entirely divorced from present or future conditions.
Intuitions would be explicable only in causal terms, "of psychological
rather than moral import .... indicators of formed habits rather than ade-
quate evidence of what should be approved or disapproved ." 57 There would
be no basis for distinguishing immediate prizing from appraising of moral
content. Yet, this psychological determinism is precisely what the emo-
tivist pretends is the basis of ethical and moral life, the meaning of
judgment being the creation of influence. One's accumulation of attitudes,
dispositions and habits exhausts the significance of judgment. And we
have witnessed that prescriptivists
,
in order to assure a measure of ration-
ality, invoke standards and principles of judgment. Still, the burden is
placed on antecedent meanings, on decisions made in the past. In all
these cases, antecedent meanings, as evinced in immediate prizings, are
thought to guarantee the morality of choice and action. But, because of
their connection with the past, intuitions fail to yield an adequate ethi-
cal or moral theory. Unless the intuitionist can produce evidence for a
faculty of intuition, the explanation of immediate prizing reverts to
prior experience and habit, and moral import is shuttled to antecedent
meanings rather than meanings gleaned from present and potential contextual
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situations. It follows that, unless the present resembles the past in
relevant respects, the application of antecedent meanings to present and
potential contextual situations is gross, mechanical and gratuitous, a
matter of casuistry rather than of morality. It further follows that, in
order to demonstrate applicability, it is a necessary condition of morality
that the meanings of the present context be considered. No one would dis-
pute the advantage of antecedent meanings; they give evidence of direct
sympathetic response," as Dewey says, and "they form the chief materials
of our knowledge of ourselves and of others ." 58 But for all that they are
not, in themselves, guarantees of morality. Having the courage of one's
convictions is no sure indication of morality; but it may be the mark of
an obdurate refusal to face up to the demands of ethical and moral life.
Of course, it could be argued that we must have tested standards and prin-
ciples to guide us, but regardless of their efficiency in numerous situ-
ations, their applicability is always problematic, a function of present
contextual features. No categorical scheme can be its own guarantee of
applicability. There is no escaping the fact that antecedent meanings
must take account of the contingent and present to determine their fitness,
and in the event they should prove inappropriate, the quest for morality,
held in abeyance, is still ominously with us. Ethical theories which
place the emphasis of morality in antecedent meanings, in patent formulas,
are sterile, lacking adequacy and completeness; they attenuate the role
of intelligence, and crucial concerns of choice and action are divorced
from thought, deliberation, the tracing of consequences, the identification
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of relations, and the weighing of alternatives within the potentially
moral context.
The case for the role of intelligence in its connection with freedom
was argued in the first chapter. It was further argued that freedom is
an indispensable prerequisite of any ethical theory. If freedom requires
the exercise of intelligence, it follows that an adequate and a complete
account of morality must be based on the exercise of intelligence. Since
only the free agent can be held morally responsible for choice and action,
theories allotting the burden of morality to antecedent meanings fail, be-
cause they fail to afford the full measure of freedom. The free agent
exercises intelligence, not the agent exclusively bound to antecedent mean-
ings; only the former satisfies the conditions of morality. A context
exudes a moral tenor if intelligence reigns:
The primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate
character of the concrete situation is to transfer the weight
and burden of morality to intelligence. It does not destroy
responsibility, it only locates it. A moral situation is one
in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to
overt action. The practical meaning of the situation— that
is to say the action needed to satisfy it—is not self-
evident. It has to be searched for.^
If a context is to contribute moral significance for judgment, intuitive
meanings must be fecundated by the direct exercise of intelligence. Dewey
sometimes uses distinctions of locution to drive his point: between esteem
and estimation, prizing and appraising, appreciation and criticism, de
facto and de jure
,
desired and desirable, satisfying and satisfactory. At
other times, the distinction between the intuitive and problematic is
drawn in terms of the additional conduct demanded of the agent: the need
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for exercise of intelligence, the need for inquiry and deliberation, the
imaginative rehearsal, the awareness of alternatives and projected conse-
quences. If I understand Dewey correctly, in all cases of moral signifi-
cance, what appears to be common is that an^ descriptive judgment may
accrue moral significance as the judgment is made with a view of its rela-
tions and bearings, in terms of the conditions which brought it into exis-
tence, and in terms of its portent of the future. There would be, for
instance, no difference in kind between assertion of warranted belief about
the world and assertion of warranted value or morality. The assertions
"I believe that X," "X,” "I believe that X is good,” and "X is good” are
all warranted by consideration of the same kind of judgment because they
all specify the same kind of extraneous relations. This I take to be the
import of Dewey s contention that "properties and relations that entitle
an object to be found good in belief are extraneous to the qualities that
are immediate good; they are causal, and hence found only by search
into the antecedent and the eventual
. To differentiate descriptive and
evaluative judgments is not a matter of encapsulation into discrete classes,
but a matter of emphasis and degree. The notation of antecedent and conse-
quence, of relations and properties, of persons and objects denotes judg-
ments of the same kind, and hence no artificial bifurcation of them into
inviolable classes of descriptive, evaluative and moral is required. Dis-
tinctions among them are detected in the agent's perspicacity in dealing
with contextual features and relations. How I go about securing desperately
needed funds may be decided on the basis of arbitrariness, uncalculated
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response, prescription or proscription, but if these intuitive meanings
are the onl^ considerations, my eventual choice can only be judged in de
facto terms. Strictly speaking, my choice will be neither moral or immoral,
but amoral. Upon consideration of the weight and impact of my choice, its
relation to myself, to my friends and family, perhaps even its relation
to the fabric of society, my choice accrues a moral tenor, a consequence
of the exercise of intelligence. Of course, it could be allowed that moral
judgments are a species of evaluative judgments, which in turn, are a
species of descriptive judgments, yet the passage from one to another is
not a consequence of bridging the unique logic of classes, but a matter of
emphasis and degree, a matter of the extraneous relations which obtain.
The observation that all judgment is warranted by the same kind of
extraneous relations grounds the metaethical position of naturalism. The
usual ascription to naturalists of normative presuppositions which are
codified in the contrived and logically unjustified synonymy of descriptive
and evaluative predicates is misleading and shallow. In holding that
ethical and moral judgments are factual assertions, or that descriptive
predicates can be substituted for evaluative predicates, the naturalist
is holding an epistemological view of judgment, not merely a view of the
logic of judgment. He is saying that any judgment is liable to ethical
or moral interpretation to the extent that (1) its meaning is derived from
context, and (2) it is warranted by the intelligent consideration of the
extraneous relations defining context. At this point, it might be ob-
jected that this view of judgment confuses meaning with truth, that con-
ditions of meaning lie logically and temporally prior to conditions of
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truth, belief and knowledge, that it would make no sense to attempt to
warrant a judgment whose significance had not been previously established.
This objection would carry weight if meaning were only a function of
language. For then it would have to be treated as a logically separate
issue from truth which is, unless construed analytically or in rationalist
terms, ultimately a function of experience. However, if meaning as well
as truth are contextually bound, the burden for discovering both still
rests with the agent. The naturalist test for both meaning and truth
hinges on whether the agent is in a position to make meaningful and truth-
ful judgments, tested by the agent’s exercise of intelligence. Accordingly,
to say that a judgment is descriptive, evaluative, or moral indicates that
the agent has been or is in a position to discover that such is the case,
but it does not follow that meaning and truth are thereby logically and
temporally compartmentalized, components of meaning vis-a-vis components
of truth. Whether, in any given case, meaning or truth is to be stressed
or sustained is itself a matter of critical judgment:
But the realm of meanings is wider than that of true-and-
false meanings; it is more urgent and fertile. When the
claim of meanings to truth enters in, then truth is indeed
preeminent. But this fact is often confused with the idea
that truth has a claim to enter everywhere; that it has
monopolistic jurisdiction. Poetic meanings, moral meanings,
a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness
and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth; a large part
of our life is carried on in a realm of meanings to which
truth and falsity as such are irrelevant . 61
We could say, then, that the metaethical position of naturalism is grounded
in a general description of how meaning and truth are manifested in intelli-
gent judgment. This has been the object of the above discussion of contextual
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significance. Actually, metaethical naturalism is, if the foregoing is
substantially correct, the epistemology of judgment; since the naturalist
denies there are grounds for the logical separation of description and
evaluation, his metaethical position is really an investigation of the
general nature of judgment. If it is subsequently found that all intelli-
gent judgment must take account of the same kind of extraneous relations,
that the is/ought distinction is really a verbal distinction having no
basis in experience, metaethical naturalism will have performed its task.
In concluding this chapter, a preliminary word must be said about
the naturalist treatment of principles. In the concluding chapter, the
question of principles will be more fully developed in connection with edu-
cation. We have observed Hare's failure to give a credible account of
principles because of his failure to relate two kinds of meaning, des-
and evaluative, and that the continuity of ethical discourse with
ethical life is thereby jeopardized. By alleviating the need for a logical
distinction between description and evaluation, it might be thought that,
in so doing, the naturalist has resolved the problem of principles. How-
ever, numerous questions will inevitably arise; Has the naturalist really
tapped the wellspring of morality? Or has he engaged in a bit of leger-
demain to divert attention from the real issue? Having transferred the
burden of morality from antecedent meanings to critical and intelligent
judgment, can the naturalist now stand aside and dispassionately appraise
the worth of his enterprise? What would constitute the basis of such an
appraisal if not the authority of cherished standards and principles?
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What, for instance, regulates the direction of intelligent deliberation
and action, and how does the agent recognize the potentially moral situa-
tion? On the basis of problems? But since most problems admit of a var-
iety of strategies, on what basis does the agent select the moral direc-
tion? In assimilating prior meanings to the present exercise of intelli-
gence, have we not abandoned the mark of the moral agent, viz., guidance
by immutable standards and principles? Has not the naturalist accorded
intelligence and all it implies the status of a principle? Can it be
supported? By yet another principle? And where does it end? Can the
exercise of intelligence by the agent, notoriously prone to error and
foible, be justified other than as an article of faith? It would seem
that no ethical theory can dispense with the notion of principles, whether
or not they are construed as essential to the theory, and the question is
whether the naturalist can give a better account. Consider Eliseo Vivas'
rather scathing remarks regarding Dewey's alleged neglect of principles:
Remember that, for Dewey, men are adequately understood as
systems of impulses and desires, regulated by habit and in-
telligence. Principles and ideals are for him but needs
and demands stated in generalized terms. Hence, if a secu-
larly oriented intelligence cannot effectively satisfy its
ideals, it is of the essence of its wisdom to modify or
abandon its demands. But this conception of human nature
is true only of the uprooted denizens of our acquisitive
civilization. It is not desires that constitute men but
values, organized hierarchically against the disruptive
forces of the world; these are our true selves, the inner-
most core of our moral personality . 62
The above questions and Vivas' comments, suggesting again a gulf be-
tween description and evaluation, indicate that the first step required is
the identification of what "moral" means. Specifically, what does it mean
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to have a moral view or make a moral judgment? Can a judgment without
obeisance to principle really be termed moral? We have seen that the
naturalist, from the standpoint of metaethics, will answer that a judgment
is moral to the extent that it is made with a view of its relations and
bearings. But since this is equally true of descriptive and evaluative
judgments, is there not some way, in view of these relations and bearings,
that we can further identify the typically moral judgment? At the outset,
it must be admitted that the naturalist cannot give a precise definition
of "moral." If all judgments specify the same kind of extraneous rela-
tions, the naturalist, of necessity, must refer to a general range of
phenomena or clusters of actions ; he must admit of numerous marginal cases
where precise application of the term remains in doubt. Still, it seems
to me possible to tighten up on the naturalist concept of morality without
doing violence to the overall position.
The history of philosophy bears testimony of conflicting accounts of
morality. Kant exalts in the moral law, while Hume, oblivious of this
possibility, propounds a theory of moral sentiments. Between the a priori
and a. posteriori range a variety of possibilities. Warnock suggests that
the problem can be somewhat simplified by distinguishing between positions
"which do, and those which do not, assign to moral discourse a characteris-
tic content or subject matter ." 63 Then it is noted that positions assign-
ing no content tell us very little about morality; they can be
"about any-
thing at all ." 64 If, for instance, it is held that morality is etched in
the conscience, in feelings of guilt and reproach, or, as in the case of
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Vivas that morality is represented in the independent principles of conduct
which dominate in a person’s life, or, as in the case of Hare those prin-
ciples the agent is prepared to prescribe universally, then a moral view
can cover virtually any content; there will be nothing about which morality
is essentially concerned. This is not to say there is nothing of morality
in these positions, but that they represent a view of morality which covers
all cases indiscriminately, covers none in particular, and which is there-
fore not particularly illuminating. Analogously, the vacuity of a scien-
theory which entails all observation statements and hence none in
particular, as with the luminiferous ether, constitutes a reductio ad ab-
surdum . We are left, then, with those positions which attempt, albeit
roughly, to discriminate or specify moral content, a general range of
phenomena or considerations, certain clusters of decisions and actions.
The question hangs on what could possibly or understandably pass as a moral
point of view. I think a strong argument can be made that, if we ask a
man to justify his moral views, he will of necessity, provided he is to
understand our question and we his answer, refer to some benefit or harm,
some goodness or badness commensurate with the observance or breach of
his code. He can, of course, deny he has a code, that his life is of the
moment, or that though he admires various virtues, he never lives up to
them or thinks of them as being decisive in his life. However, if his
position is conscientiously held, it is doubtful his retort would consti-
tute an exception; it has proven beneficial to live accordingly, and pre-
sumably such a life will continue to be reinforcing. The point is that
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we do justify our own moral views along the lines of benefit or harm,
goodness or badness. We are, accordingly, amenable to codes which, like
the utilitarian, promote the greatest happiness principle, or codes which
abet human desires, interests and needs, or the harmonious reciprocity
between persons. Also, we will wish to acknowledge tortuous and benighted
moral codes; it is not necessary that there actually be benefit or good-
ness, but that in holding a moral view it is presumed or thought that
benefit or goodness does and will accrue. What justification can be
given if not in these terms? A fortiori
,
would be understand anything
less as being moral justification? There is, then, a sense in which men
of goodwill, concerned with the good or harm or well-being attendant on
their choice and action, are not entirely at odds with storm-trooper
morality. But for the same reason that they share commonality, one can-
not say that morality is arbitrary and without roughly specifiable content.
A parent beats his children and justifies it with the insouciant remark
that "It is good for them." Whatever contorted advantage due the children,
there is nevertheless some advantage envisioned, if the action is to lie
within the moral purview. The term "moral" carries with it roughly speci-
fiable content; our understanding of its application, our crediting of
others with its proper use, are not without foundation or explanation.
It will no doubt be objected that by identifying estimations of bene-
fit or harm, goodness or badness as the content of morality we have said
very little. It will be objected that the content, itself, is a matter
of judgment and can provide no neutral guide to choice and action. In
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Dewey's estimation, "if the standard is itself a value, then it is by
definition only another name for the object of a particular liking, on
the part of some particular subjective creature ." 65 Warnock agrees that
the charge of circularity must be answered:
It might be urged that the notions of benefit or harm are
themselves evaluative' notions— that they cannot be sup-
posed to fix the content of morality for the reason that
they themselves have no definite, independently specifia-
ble content. And so for 'interests' or 'needs': a man's
interests or needs cannot, surely, be the factual grounds
of judgment, since it is a matter of judgment what his
needs or his interests really are
.
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Warnock tenders two replies to the charge of circularity: In the first
place, we should not let ourselves be "bullied out of the conviction"
that some things are beneficial or good, deficient or harmful, or that
the reasons we give are not wholly arbitrary and without merit. In the
second place, and more philosophically important, the content will involve
circularity "only if it can be shown itself to involve the exercise of
moral judgments":
That a certain person, or a certain community of persons,
would, if certain things were done, be in a better or
worse condition, advantaged or disadvantaged, helped or
harmed, may be partly or even wholly a matter of judg-
ment; but it is, I submit, quite clear that it is not
always, not wholly or necessarily, a matter of moral
judgment. But if so there is, from the point of view of
moral theory, no reason to object to the project of de-
fining morality at least partly in such terms . 67
It seems to me that our considerations of meaning support Warnock 's
observations. If all judgment is of the same logical kind , what is des-
criptive, evaluative and moral is a matter of emphasis and degree. In
saying that benefit or harm, etc., define the rough contours of morality
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saying this from the standpoint of a £rima facie argument as to what
we ail, or most of us, will accept as legitimate justification for moral
views. When we ask a person to justify his moral views we are, in effect,
ascertaining whether they are gratuitous, relatively groundless, or based
on the exercise of intelligence. A person is inclined in the moral direc-
tion in proportion to his perception and appraisal of the relations en-
tailed by his moral perspective. That a person is in fact headed in a
moral direction is not substantially a moral judgment, but a judgment that
he has critically and intelligently taken control of his life. Of course,
a moral view need not lead to any beneficial results for anyone; but it
is a necessary condition that it be thought or supposed to be beneficial.
Moreover, it may be that there are no logical limits to what a person may
approve and desire, but surely there are limits to what a person could
understandably be said to approve and desire: "What does he want it for?
What appeals to him about it? In what way, should he get what he wants,
does he expect to be satisfied? If we have no notion at all of answers
to these questions, then someone's assertion that he wants whatever it may
be is, in a clear sense, not intelligible to us ." 68 Since it is true that
reflection may alter a person's approvals and desires, or cast them in
such perspective that change is initiated, we expect that good and suffic-
ient reasons will be adduced for moral views. This bears on an impressive
and important point. For if the locus of morality is content, definable
in terms of benefit or harm, goodness or badness, needs, desires or in-
terests, the crucial questions of choice and action, the ethical life, fall
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under the aegis of naturalism, i.e., the test for morality will be experi-
ential. This is clearly the case when it is realized that the differenti-
ation between the supposition of morality and the realization of morality
is made on the basis of the critical judgment of the consequences of hold-
ing a given moral point of view. It is simply not the case that what is
of benefit or harm, etc., is merely a matter of opinion. Though sweets
are desired and prized by a child, it would still be remiss of his parent
not to admonish against gorging; good and sufficient reasons account for
parental intrusion, not arbitrary whim. It is this difference between
uncritical judgments and prudent judgments which is analogous to the
difference between the supposition of morality and the warranted support
and attainment of morality.
There is yet another objection to our account of morality. Granted
that morality has the content specified, how are we to decide between ego-
ism and altruism? It cannot be denied, in view of our concept of morality,
that both egoism and altruism are legitimate alternative moral views; at
least this would appear to be the case. The content of morality would
appear to justify both the manipulation of means to ends with selfish
intent, and genuine concern for the welfare of others. The issue might
seem to turn on whether egoism or altruism represent innate or acquired
dispositions. Robert G. Olson argues that "men are born selfish," but
that we must not confuse this innate drive with what he terms a "basic
drive." Olson distinguishes between the pursuit of selfishness, identi
fied, as innate, and the pursuit of self-interest, identified as an
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acquired basic drive:
A basic desire is not an original desire or an innate
drive waiting to be unfolded. It does not antedate
conscious experience; it rather emerges in the course
of experience as our knowledge and understanding in-
crease. It is a principle of conduct that we believe
would bring us greater overall satisfaction than any
envisaged alternative—a principle, moreover, upon
which we do not necessarily always act but upon which
we would like to be able consistently to act
.
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Rational self-interest thus becomes a moral principle or criterion for
Olson. The question is whether or not, in the light of reason, interests,
needs and desires will be altered or changed in such a way that the agent
will discover it to be in his interest to engage in social reform and to
have concern for the welfare of others. Olson is convinced that there can
be no essential conflict between the long-range interests of the agent and
long-range interests of society:
For if I am right, the rational pursuit of one’s own best
long-range interests can rarely if ever be rightly as detri-
mental to the best long-range interests of society as a
whole; and if or when it could, the appropriate moral re-
action is not to berate the man who exercises his right to
the pursuit of happiness but rather to dedicate ourselves
to the creation of a social order in which the interests
of all individuals may be more fully harmonized . 70
The difficulty with Olson’s position, as I see it, is that he cannot really
dissever himself from his assumption that man is innately selfish. In-
stead, he reintroduces this original drive in morally respectable guise,
as a principle of conduct, that is as rational self-interest. But is
egoism or altruism really innate in man? As Spinoza says, there is no
vice in nature, but only as we so interpret it. Unless it can be demon-
strated that human nature reveals such sophisticated drives as selfishness,
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we would probably be better off not promoting rational self-interest
(or altruism for that matter) as a principle of conduct. For this reason,
Dewey finds "that neither egoism nor altruism nor any combination of the
two is a satisfactory principle ." 71 The truth of the matter is that
neither selfishness nor unselfishness are revealed as innate drives; "our
native impulses and acts... are not actuated by conscious regard for either
one s own good or that of others. They are rather direct responses to
situations.
. .certain reflex acts ." 72 Selfish and unselfish acts must be
attributed to a wider context, to choices and actions which have resulted
from critical judgment or a lack thereof. Olson is therefore correct in
thinking that interests, needs and desires are altered and changed by
reason and knowledge, that individual and social interests can be harmon-
ized, but that our interest in the welfare of others must be weighed
against a principle of rational self-interest is an unnecessary assumption.
The naturalist holds that the moral question of egoism and altruism must
be settled through experience, where the dominate emphasis is placed on
"what kind of a self is being furthered and formed ." 73 Then it will be
noticed that neither egoism nor altruism are automatically to be regarded
as being of benefit or harm, of goodness or badness, in the interest of
oneself or of others. Selfishness and unselfishness are derivative con-
cepts, their significance a consequence of further considerations of
relations and bearings; they are not general principles to be obeyed in
any and all circumstances. This being the case, we could just as well say
that cooperation with others is as much characteristic of human nature
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as selfishness or self-interest.
If it can be held, then, that morality has a content, there is no
anomaly in the naturalist embracing general leading principles of conduct.
It is the status of these principles which distinguishes naturalism from
traditional positions. For the naturalist, principles do not stand as in-
dependent and supreme ends to be achieved; there is no attempt to ferret
out the summum bonum
,
of Egoism versus Altruism, Good, Pleasure or Happi-
ness. As we have witnessed, the reason for this is that antecedent mean-
ings, intuitions, cannot provide an infallible guide to choice and action,
their application to contingencies being problematic. Therefore, there
can be no analytic relation between principles and choice and action; no
specific requirements can be deduced from principles. Since morality is
grounded in what we will allow as justification for a moral view, it will
have roughly specifiable content, but since the test for morality is ex-
periential, the relation between concrete decision, on the one hand, and
principles on the other is noncommutative
.
That is to say, the content
is specifiable but its application is experiential. We do not call out
principles to give specific guidance, recipes for conducting our lives,
for this must be hewn out of the contingent situation. But principles,
insofar as they are felt embodied in concrete situations, are directional
criteria. It is not Benefit or Goodness we seek, but that on this occasion
or in this situation, certain specific choices and actions are envisaged,
in view of their relations and projected consequences, to have a better
chance of providing benefit or goodness, for this occasion or this_ situation.
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than alternative choices and actions. The reason that principles are
thought to provide specific guidance is because they are confused with
intuitive meanings, with rules or habitual modes of behavior:
Rules a_re practical
; they are habitual ways of doing things.
Bvrt principles are intellectual ; they are the~final methods’
used in judging suggested courses of action. The fundamental
error of the intuitionalist is that he is on the outlook for
rules which will of themselves tell agents just what course
of action to pursue; whereas the objec t of moral principles
is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the~
individual to make for himself an analys is of the elements
of_ good and evil in the particular situation in which he
finds himself
.
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If our interpretation of meaning is correct, principles are not themselves
moral judgments having a status distinct from other judgments, for then the
content of morality would entail circularity. Since all judgment has the
same logical status, principles cannot constitute independent ends to be
achieved. Benefit and harm, goodness and badness, interests, needs and
desires, like egoism and altruism, are determinations of concrete situa-
tions. As general criteria, the content of morality provides a basis for
selection and discrimination, for what is meaningful in a given situation.
Embodied in concrete situations, principles serve to suggest that certain
ends-in-view will be of benefit or harm, will contribute goodness or bad-
ness, will meet desires and interests, and will accord with human needs.
Principles are signposts, not recipes; they provide a coherent direction
without specifying the details of that direction, in Dewey's words, a prin-
ciple provides a "point of view from which to consider acts ."
75 The nat-
uralist will therefore conduct his life according to principle, but there
will be no automatic guarantee of success; no ultimate end can serve as
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infallible reference. Naturalists' principles are always subject to
reinterpretation and modification as new experience and situations con
front the agent.
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CHAPTER IV
NATURALISM AND MORAL EDUCATION
Mora1 Principles and Moral Education
Until now we have been occupied with problems and considerations ante-
dating the serious development of an adequate theory of moral education.
In the first chapter, it was argued that freedom is a necessary condition
of any ethical theory. It would follow that an adequate theory of moral
education must guarantee freedom. This means, in light of the arguments of
the first chapter, that three necessary conditions must obtain in moral edu-
cation commensurate with freedom. These are, first, that there be available
to the agent genuine alternatives; second, that quality reasons be given
for choice; and third, that there be intentionality
,
a transition from choice
to action. In the last chapter, the argument was advanced that anti-natural-
ist positions, those we have considered, have failed to afford the full meas-
ure of freedom, primarily because they have appropriated antecedent meanings,
intuitions, as the final arbiters of morality. In so doing, there is an
attenuation of critical and intelligent judgment regarding present and po-
tential contextual conditions; alternatives go unperceived, reasons revert
to the antecedent, and choice and action are accordingly compromised. Moral
responsibility is diminished because the development of freedom is arrested.
We might imagine, then, that anti-naturalist theories of moral education
will reflect the inadequacies of the general moral positions advanced, and
that they represent fairly accurate paradigms of moral education as it often
exists in our classrooms today. Hare, for instance, writing on the question
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of moral education, urges the dissemination of moral principles in the
classroom:
Without principles, most kinds of teaching are impossible,
for what is taught is in most cases a principle. In par-
ticular, when we learn to do something, what we learn is
always a principle. Even to learn or be taught a fact
(like the names of the five rivers of the Punjab) is to
learn how to answer a question; it is to learn a princi-
ple.... The point is... this, that to learn to do anything
is never to learn to do an individual act; it is always
to learn to do acts of a certain kind in a certain kind
of situation; and this is to learn a principle.^
According to the thesis of universalizability propounded by Hare,
cases of the same kind deserve to be treated in the same way; we need
principles to assure consistency. Therefore, it might be expected that if
a student can acquire a catalog of relevant principles, along with speci-
fications for exceptions, he will be in the best possible position to solve
moral dilemmas. However, Hare is not so naive as to think that principles
acquired through instruction can be utilized in cookbook fashion to solve
moral problems. In addition to the dissemination of principles, the stu-
dent is admonished not to follow instruction unquestioningly , and it is
incumbent on the instructor to explain, with consideration for the age and
development of his group, why certain principles are thought to be good and
why a given moral view or way of life is considered desirable. Moreover,
it must be made plain to students that, although the instructor holds cer-
tain principles dear and extols a certain way of life, students are free to
decide for themselves whether to follow the instructor's lead:
What we do, if we are sensible, is to give him [the student] a
solid basis of principles, but at the same time ample opportunity
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of making the decisions upon which these principles arebased, and by which they are modified, improved, adaptedto changed circumstances, or even abandoned if they be-
come entirely unsuited to a new environment. To teach
only the principles, without giving the opportunity of
subjecting them to the learner's own decisions of prin-
ciple, is like teaching science exclusively from text-books without entering a laboratory.
^
Finally, we are familiar with Hare's rationale for this approach to moral
education:
To become morally adult... is to learn to use ' ought '—
sentences in the realization that they can only be
verified by reference to a standard or set of principles
which we have by our own decision accepted and made our
own. This is what our present generation is so pain-
fully trying to do
.
3
There can be no doubt of the continuity of Hare's theory of moral edu-
cation with his general moral orientation. Since prescriptions and hence
choice and action are grounded in decisions of principle, it is understand-
able that Hare would urge the dissemination of principles as the basis of
\
moral education. The sophistication of the instructor is pitted against
the inexperience of the student; the former, a repository of wisdom, articu-
lates and defends principles which will guide the latter on occasions of
choice and action. Hare's position has the commendable feature that its
aim is not strictly moral discipline, a matter of prescribing conduct, but
of giving the grounds of conduct. Moreover, the position allows for the
fact that the contingent realm frequently fails to answer to principle and
that the student is therefore encouraged to approach the instructor's ad-
vice critically, to modify and improve principles, and in some cases to
give them up entirely. But does Hare's position afford the full measure
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of freedom? Certainly, in providing for criticism, a considerable measure
of freedom is afforded, and principles, as a result, are obviously not
sacrosanct. But there is also an emphasis on divulging, giving or dissemi-
nating, in practical terms of which, the idea of principles originates ex-
ternal to the experience of the student. The student's initial encounter
with principles will be tainted with the real posibility of indoctrination.
Faith in or allegiance to the instructor could sufficiently smother further
critical development on the part of the student. From an affective point
of view, then, there is doubt whether Hare's position can get students
aware of their moral responsibility, as long as the instructor stands in
an initial position of moral authority. However, it is the logical and
philosophical problems of Hare's position which are most dangerous for
the development of freedom. Of necessity, decisions of principle must lie
temporally and logically prior to the prescriptions which they are entrusted
to guide; that is, problems are grouped according to kind, according to
the principles under which they are to be subsumed. But if principles come
first in the order of priority, they will always enjoy a status independent
of the situations to which they are to be applied, and their applicability
will always be problematic. Hence, the only way the instructor or student
can justify the application of principles is to turn to the contingent
realm, in an effort to discover under which principles a situation belongs.
The emphasis will be on discovering the correct class to which the problem
situation belongs, not on the critical examination of principles; moral
perplexity will not be settled by critical examination of principles, or
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of the situation at hand, but in defining the problem according to class.
Morality, then, reverts to antecedent meanings, to the attempt to adduce
tried and true principles which have served in the past. The modification,
improvement or abandonment of principles will be of subservient importance
compared to the search for the correct principle, and critical and intell i-
gent judgment will be directed to the logic of classes rather than to the
unique properties defining the problem situation. This means that freedom,
which is manifested in the quality of judgment, will be diminished, be-
cause the agent s attention has fastened on the fruits of past deliberation.
This emphasis on the dissemination of principles is certainly not
an isolated feature of Anglo-American moral education. Israel Scheffler,
although he stresses the importance of "reasonableness" over tradition and
authority, nonetheless calls out a propaedeutic for inculcating the "moral
point of view":
The moral point of view is attained, if at all, by
acquiring a tradition of practice, embodied in rules
and habits of conduct. Without a preliminary immer-
sion in such a tradition—an appreciation of the im-
port of its rules, obligations, rights, and demands
—
the concept of choice of actions and rules for oneself
can hardly be achieved. 4
Similarly, Frankena, in an influential article on moral education, indicates
"that the problem of producing virtue in the next generation is a twofold
one: (1) that of handing on a 'knowledge of good and evil' or 'knowing how'
to act, and (2) that of ensuring that our children's conduct will conform
to this 'knowledge'." 5 These quotes reveal an attitude toward moral edu-
cation, at least as old as Aristotle's ethics, rooted in the conviction
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that the moral proselyte, if he is to take rational possession of his con-
duct, must be at least partially indoctrinated in the traditions and habits
of his community. And while there is certainly much to recommend this
attitude, it also indicates a crisis of confidence as to what can reason-
ably be expected of teachers and students, a conviction that the individual,
left to his own devices, will inevitably fail to achieve moral awareness.
Although neither Scheffler or Frankena advocate an uncritical acceptance
of principles, they do stress, like Hare, antecedent meanings in the ar-
rangement of pedagogical priorities. Perhaps, then, the rationale for the
dissemination of principles is more subtle. Much of the professional
malaise in current moral education is funded by the is /ought distinction,
by the belief that description is logically incapable of indubitable support
for evaluation. Moreover, a pervasive feeling that all moral views are
subjective, whether individual or collective, has been buttressed by what
seems to be unassailable evidence that people and societies simply do not
agree on moral issues. It is natural to believe, then, that in concern
for moral education, teachers must be content with impressing students to
behave in ways sanctioned by society. It is thought that this modus viv-
endi at least has the advantage of protecting the fabric of society, of
preparing and training that individual least apt to challenge time-honored
authority, of providing the best chance of securing individual success
and societal goals. Because the moral philosopher despairs of justifying
any other alternative, his attitude toward moral education is one of skep-
ticism. R.F . Atkinson's assessment of the meager role which can be justi-
fied for moral education reflects this prevailing skepticism of Anglo-American
moral philosophy:
Take any moral position and its opposite can be main-
tained without logical error or factual mistake. It
can, of course, be taught and learnt (it is a possible
object of knowledge) that a certain moral position isheld by certain people, but, whatever adequate grounds
for holding a moral position might be, it is clear that...
there can be moral teaching, instruction in, as opposed
to instruction about morality, only if there are criteria
of truth, cogency, correctness in the field. Are there
such criteria ? 6
Atkinson's conclusion is that there are irreconcilable differences
of moral orientation. The inference to be drawn is that moral education
must be descriptive rather than normative—or else, as Hare, Scheffler
and Frankena seem to think, the teacher must be content with the dissemi-
nation of societal norms, rules and principles; only as the student
achieves rational fruition, his budget of received principles having
taken hold, can he be trusted to be a morally competent, autonomous agent.
The message seems to be that, since there are really no certain grounds
of morality, the teacher, forced to make a decision, can turn to either
second-order description or first-order indoctrination. In lieu of cer-
tainty and as a buttress against subjectivity, the teacher, for the benefit
of his students and society, must contrive a sense of objectivity. But
must we demand apodictic certainty in order to forge a significant theory
of normative education? If the prevailing supposition of subjectivity
persists, we can only be disheartened at the usurpation of freedom and re-
sponsibility. The second chapter above suggested that there is no great
body of evidence to support the current wave of subjectivity. On the con-
trary, relativity in morals can only be supported if it can be shown that
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people and societies do in fact differ at the level of principles. If we
are dealing with rules for carrying out principles (Dewey’s distinction
between rules and principles is relevant here), the anthropologist or mor-
alist may have evidence of cultural diversity, but a thesis of ethical and
moral relativity would have to await evidence that there exists a differ-
ence of principles. It seems to me that the only way in which it could
be established that principles differ is to suppose that their status is
such that we must maintain a logical distinction between judgments of
principle and judgments in general. Obviously, if we conceive of princi-
ples as externally imposed guides to choice and action, there may be no
logical limit to what might conceivably pass as a moral principle. With
the recognition that there are no logically incompatible realms of des-
cription and evaluation, judgments of principle, like judgments in general,
are grounded by the same kind of considerations of relations, bearings and
consequences, grounded in concrete operational contexts. This being the
case, the complexion of moral education most change; pedagogical priori-
ties must be reconsidered. True, with the recognition that in making moral
judgments we are in fact exhibiting moral principles, there is no addition-
al claim for apodictic certainty, but, by the same token, the naturalist
cannot agree with Atkinson’s dismal conclusion that there are no criteria
of judgment— that "any moral position and its opposite can be maintained
without logical error or factual mistake." For if the criteria of judg-
ment are conceived as internally constitutive of the contextual situation,
externally imposed criteria, such as antecedent meanings in the guise of
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principles, must themselves be judged, in turn, as to their fitness, from
considerations of the contextual situation at hand. For instance, in a
situation where the student or teacher claims that "X is good," X need not
be subsumed under an independent principle, but that it is shown that X is
perceived as good in light of certain relations, bearings and projected
consequences, among which there may well be antecedent meanings. Conse-
quently, those who would have the teacher disseminate principles, no matter
how imaginatively, impartially and critically the task is done, must even-
tually come to terms with the status of principles. If the naturalist is
correct, it is no answer to describe principles as representative of
various subjective appraisals, from which the student is encouraged to
choose; nor is it an adequate answer to represent principles as the best
that our society and our teacher have been able to devise. For if we
attempt to justify principles as being more than mere decisions, to use
Hare’s term, we are forced, precluding the possibility of a moral faculty,
to turn to the experiential situation at hand, to the embodiment of prin-
ciples in judgments of concrete operational contexts. It follows that the
dissemination of principles cannot be a logical priority of moral educa-
tion.
In order to focus the issue clearly, it is unlikely that the council
of despair in moral education will change until educators are prepared to
reexamine the status of moral principles. As long as principles are held
to belong to an independent realm, moral education will tend to be associ-
ated with a disjunction, an option between either authority or subjectivity.
149
The reason for this, as Atkinson indicates, is because it is thought that
there can be no objective criteria by which to adjudicate conflicting moral
positions. At the extremes, the options are reflected in such slogans as
”We must return to the traditional values," or "Each person has the right
to his own opinions." On the one hand, some educators will cling to prin-
ciples, not as though they are self-vindicating, but out of fear of sub-
jective anarchy. Independent principles are sought because they are tried
and true, since having answered to our demands for moral instruction in
the past, we have reason to believe they will serve with equal poignancy
in the future. Because the evils of anarchy will have been averted, free-
dom will thrive, with necessary amendments, within the parameters of ration-
al standards of authority. On the other hand, precisely the same despair
of finding objective criteria signals to those of a more daring liberal
persuasion that practically anything goes. Since independent principles
cannot be grounded, they must be eschewed in order to avoid the repression
of tradition and authority. With the loss of security associated with ob-
jective standards, educators can at least guarantee the maximum of personal
freedom for the student; he will at least be free to create his own moral-
ity out of the welter of alternatives open to him. In neither case is the
question of truth or falsity an issue; rather, both extremes represent a
reaction to the despair of discovering a public system of justification
intersubjective grounds of morality. However, neither alternative accords
with our concept of freedom, and therefore, neither indicates an acceptable
basis for moral education. In fact, by disclaiming that there are grounds
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for moral judgment, both alternatives constitute an abrogation of moral
responsibility and a diminution of freedom, for neither is capable of
releasing the critical and intelligent capacities required of moral judg-
ment. The naturalist, on the other hand, reassesses the status of prin-
ciples. Principles are perceived as embodied in judgments of concrete
problem situations. In the last chapter, we spoke of moral justification
in terms of the understandable or conceivable reasons which could be given
for a judgment or moral point of view. And the reasons given, if we are
to understand the agent, will describe some benefit or goodness, etc.,
which is envisaged in regard to certain choices and actions. In other words,
we will not accept as moral justification just any reasons, but only those
which have contextual grounding according to some specifiable moral con-
tent. Hence there will be no divorce of moral principles from the judg-
ments, reasons, facts, choices and actions actually exhibited in attacking
moral problems . The lamented criteria sought by Atkinson and others is
to be found, not in transcendent independence, but embedded in the problem
context at hand.
It is clear, then, that it is logically and pedagogically unsound
to base the model of moral education on priorities of either the dissemi-
nation of principles or the promotion of blind subjectivity. There is,
however, a logical priority in moral education, in the sense that the
presence of morality can only be ascertained by reference to the actual
attempts of the student to come to grips with problem situations. If the
criteria of judgment cannot be divorced from the actual strategies employed
in confronting problem situations, it would be pointless, in terms of
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procedural priority, to attempt to derive a theory of moral education
which did not take this fact under initial consideration. When a student
claims that "X is good,” or that "I ought to do X,” there is no supposition
on the part of the teacher of an analytic relation between the judgment and
an independent principle, nor is it supposed that the judgment is based
on mere whim or fancy; on the contrary, the logic of the situation assigns
to the teacher a unique position in relation to the student. The teacher
is in a position to nurture and guide, not by calling out the correct prin-
ciple or by encouraging laissez-faire subjectivity, but by knowing whether
the student has been in a position warranting the judgment made, in a
position to identify relevant relations and consequences. For the natural-
ist, moral education will take its cue from this special relation between
teacher and student, from the observation that morality will ultimately
arise from the experience of the student. Now, it will be objected that
this special relation holds up only under certain conditions, those con-
ditions where there could be no disputing, as a condition of rationality,
the conclusion reached or the criteria of judgment involved. A student
having been exposed to all the evidence for the shape of the earth, would
be thought either dull or perverse, were he to continue to ask why he
should believe it to be round; for it will be argued that the questiorE of
what evidence is given and what will count as evidence, in this case, are
not subjects for rational disputation. Hence, the special relation be-
tween teacher and student will be preserved in cases where the issue is
a statement of fact. However, the relation breaks down with problems of
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evaluation and morality; for it will be argued that there would be no
obliquity in the student's questioning either the evidence or what will
count as evidence. The student could count anything he wished as evidence
for X is good," and while the teacher might disagree, there would be no
rational basis for disputing the student's avowal. This contrast between
the preservation or breakdown of the teacher-student relation is, of course,
analogous to the contrast represented in the respective theoretical ap-
proaches to morality of naturalism and anti-naturalism, and in the words
of Philippa Foot, "it would not be an exageration to say that the whole
of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast be-
tween statements of fact and evaluation," whereby it is thought that in
regard to statements of fact, "no two people can make the same statement
and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least
of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance." Whereas, in regard
to statements of evaluation or morality, "one man may say that a thing is
good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that
fact as any evidence at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of
'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another ." 7
We therefore encounter the question of moral autonomy as a concrete class-
room issue; for if the teacher decides that there are insufficient grounds
for preserving the teacher-student relation, at least in cases of evalua-
tion and morality, the options of authority or subjectivity take on new
significance regardless of their logical dubitability
.
But could a student, without logical error, base his moral views on
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premises which no one else accepted or recognized, or refuse to accept the
evidence that others take to be supportive of a moral view, simply because
he has decided not to acknowledge this as evidence for him? If the answer
is in the affirmative, we might suppose, for instance, that a morally eccen-
tric student could hold that a man was a good man because he clasped and
unclasped his hands, and never turned NNE after turning SSW. He could also
reject someone else's evaluation simply by denying that his evidence was
evidence at all."® Those holding a thesis of the autonomy of moral terms,
i.e., that there must be certain free moral terms, seem entirely resigned
to the possibility and validity of such a reductio ad absurdum
,
and that,
unless perforce certain specific measures are taken in the classroom, such
as conditioning or indoctrination, there will be no defense against im-
pending chaos. But surely, before we would accept just any judgment or
action, we would want to have a notion of what will generally pass as
moral judgment or action. The oddity of the moral eccentric’s suggestion
prompts us to suppose there is a special background to be disclosed by
such questions as "Why?" or "What is the point?" And surely to speak about
the point is not to speak about anything whatsoever:
It is no good saying that there would be a point in
doing the action because the action was a morally
good action: the question is how it can be given any
such description if we cannot first speak about the
point. At it is just as crazy to suppose that we can
call any thing the point of doing something without
having to say what the point of that is. In clasping
one’s hands one may make a slight sucking noise, but
what is the point of that? It is surely clear that
moral virtues must be connected with human good and
harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything
you like good or harm.
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Mrs. Foot’s contrast between the claims of the moral eccentric and
the point of moral judgment or action dramatizes the need for a satisfac-
tory concept of morality; to deny the question of how judgment or action
affect people, the benefit or harm, goodness or badness, etc., conveyed,
bestows legitimacy on the moral eccentric’s claim and is tantamount to re-
fusing anything as the substantive content of morality. A person cannot
decide for himself what evidence will count for a moral view any more than
he can decide for himself what evidence will count for a disease or a
scientific theory. What Mrs. Foot seems to be asking is whether it is
profitable to speak of morality without assuming it to have a point, and
whether the point or ultimate reason has been given in the moral eccentric’s
claim. The reference to moral content, much like that developed in the
last chapter, does not appear to be based on an a priori assumption, but
on the contingent observation that, in calling for reasons, the agent must
narrow the range of his responses before we are convinced his judgments
and actions fall within the moral purview. However, it might be urged that
we have not discovered the content of morality, that benefit or goodness,
etc., are not always the point of judgment or action, though they may be
incidental. For instance, some might feel that making a promise entails
carrying it out, without further reference to a specified moral content.
Still, the content we have adduced is a relative matter, a matter of per-
ceived relations and bearings, a reference to a general range or cluster
of concerns. Under ordinary circumstances, the feeling of obligation may
very well be the point of executing a promise. But we could just as well
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hold that the institution of promising has its office in some sense of
benefit or harm; for surely, if one were convinced that carrying out his
promise would lead to irreparable harm, this conviction would figure in
one’s final decision whether to keep a promise. At least, we would tend
to assign the moral edge to the decision which took this into considera-
tion. Our position is this: if there is to be a point to morality, it
seems there must be some restriction as to what will pass as a moral view,
and though we have perhaps missed the mark as to the content (we can only
ask the reader to consider for himself)
,
there would seem to be no question
that some content must be cited. It follows that, if there is to be a
point to moral education, there will be logical restrictions placed on the
teacher-student relation; for as Dewey says, "the teacher presents in
actuality what the pupil presents only in posse . That is, the teacher
already knows the things which the student is only learning. Hence the
problem of the two is radically unlike ." 10 If it is granted that morality
has the content we have adduced, or at least some content, then the student
cannot, with logical consistency, base his moral views on just any premi-
ses, nor can he refuse to accept all evidence which fails to support his
cherished convictions. Since it is the teacher who possesses the per-
spective needed to identify the content of morality, it is the teacher’s
responsibility to guide the student to the realization that not any view,
whatsoever, can be a moral point of view.
If it can be held, then, that morality has a content and that not
just any evidence can support just any moral judgment or view, it follows
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that what will count as a moral principle, in any given case, will have
to be established against a contextual background which includes intelli-
gent thought and action. As might be expected, the process of moral edu-
cation sheds light on the status of principles, and an impartial observer
of the teacher-student relation would be expected to detect great varia-
tions of moral awareness. It might be discovered that, in the early
stages of a child's moral development, goodness and badness, benefit and
harm relate to considerations of immediate needs and desires
. As initial
principles regulating choice and action, immediate needs and desires,
through their satisfaction may, in turn, generate new needs and desires,
new principles by which to gauge choice and action. One might discover,
for instance, that self-interest gives way to a wider range of considera-
tions, such as benevolence, trust or social impact. In other words, the
process of moral education sheds light on general questions of morality,
by exhibiting how moral context, evidence and principles are combined and
interrelated in attacking concrete problems. In studying choice and action
against a background of intelligent deliberation, an observer begins to
grasp how morality is manifested, how it is that the traditional separa-
tion of such terms as "good," "bad," or "ought" from such terms as "benefit,"
"harm," or "desire" is untenable. They cannot be separated in moral phil-
osophy because they are not separated meaningfully (though, of course,
they are separated linguistically) when applied in concrete operational
contexts. To say that they should be is thus seen to be an evaluative
judgment which can only lead to circularity, no basis being found for
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their separation in experience. We have surveyed the reasons for treat-
ing principles as embodied in judgment, and we have endeavored to show
that judgments of principle do not differ logically from judgments in gen-
eral, the relation between principles and evidence being itself a matter
of judgment, principles comprising part of what is meant by judgment:
How exactly the concepts of harm, advantage, benefit,
importance, etc., are related to the different moral
concepts, such as rightness, obligation, goodness, duty,
and virtue, is something that needs the most patient
investigation, but that they are so related seems un-
deniable, and it follows that a man cannot make his own
personal decision about the considerations which are to
count as evidence in morals.
As a child becomes evidence- and reason-regarding, principles are generated
out of the experience of the child; the teacher, shepherding and nurturing
through wisdom and a wider moral perspective, is in a position to identify
the cul-de-sac and to take measures freeing choice and action in enter-
prising and enlightening directions. The teacher-student relation is main-
tained and validated as the child becomes increasingly adroit in discrimi-
nating and selecting those meanings of the contextual situation contributing
moral weight.
Democratic Principles and Moral Education
There is another way we might approach principles and their function,
as Dewey says, in supplying "the final methods used in judging suggested
courses of action." 1 ' A number of recent writers inclined toward natural-
ism have distinguished between brute and institutional facts. The object
seems to be an attempt to render a rigorous basis for identifying meaning
158
according to the contexts defining institutional requirements; institutions
imply the meanings to be assigned to evidence. This, of course, is remin-
iscent of the antecedent and intuitive meanings we have previously dis-
cussed, and of the attendant danger of catapulting them into a position of
external authority. It seems clear, however, that some institutional re-
quirements have a more compelling claim on our attention and allegiance
than others; it has been urged, for instance, that there is reason to em-
brace democratic over despotic institutions. Consider the following simple
example of the relation between brute and institutional facts:
A man hits a home run only given the institution of
baseball; without the institution he only hits a
sphere with a stick. Similarly, a man gets married
or makes a promise only within the institutions of
marriage and promising. Without them, all he does
is utter words or make gestures. We might character-
ize such facts as institutional facts, and contrast
them with noninstitutional, or brute, facts; that a
man has a bit of paper with green ink on it is a brute
fact; that he has five dollars is an institutional fact.*"
We sometimes speak of the institution of justice, in the sense that it de-
fines many forms of duty, rights, obligations, reciprocity and commitments.
We seize on justice because, in a generic sense, this institution does so
much work for us, as opposed to the specter of might makes right or utter
chaos, and in Chapter Two we saw that there may be empirical backing for
principles of justice operating in all societies. The institution of
justice retains its cogency because it is capable of guiding even the most
mundane transactions:
That I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum would be one of
a set of facts which would be ’brute’ in relation to the
description ’I am a bilker' . 'Bilking' is of course a
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species of dishonesty' or 'injustice'. (Naturally the
consideration will not have any effect on my actions
unless I want to commit or avoid acts of injustice
.) 14
If it xs true that the institution of justice can influence even the most
ordinary matters, we might inquire as to whether there are educational
principles which can be defended and which can perform a comparable ser-
vice. The basic requirement would be, as with the example of justice, that
the presence and efficacy of such principles would be perceived and felt
in confronting concrete problems. We would hardly expect that a child
would appreciate principles of justice or democracy in some pure form, as
external ideals to which to conform, or to apply, indiscriminately, to
any and all circumstances. We have argued that principles must arise from
the experience of the child, and it is no good thinking that justice and
democracy, as abstract concepts, will command the allegiance of a child
whose perspective is circumscribed by urgent and limited demands. The
logic of the teacher-student relation suggests, however, that the teacher's
perspective may include leading principles for reasons unascertainable by
the student. There can be no doubt that in our society much is said about
democracy in very loose and unenlightening ways, but the very ubiquity of
the term's use suggests a pro-attitude, a desire to preserve this insti-
tution regardless of how dimly its requirements are perceived. The per-
tinent question is whether democracy is a living presence in our lives,
an institution whose presence is felt in decisions and actions, or whether
democracy is an empty concept whose function, as the emotivist would con-
tend, is to influence and cajole us to choose and act in prescribed ways,
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whether or not democratic in any meaningful sense. In short, although we
are aware of institutional facts, the task is to ascertain whether democ-
racy as an institution can be defended.
We must attempt to uncover, then, whether the institution of democ-
racy can be defended, whether democratic principles are manifested in
choice and action, and whether the institution guarantees the full measure
of freedom and responsibility. Democracy is often defined as a system of
government, whereby various possibilities of reciprocity among the governed
exist, and we will therefore begin by examining political democracy to see
if this is the concept we require. Robert Paul Wolff has recently argued
that the moral autonomy of the individual will be of necessity inimical to
the moral authority of the state. That the concept of the state implies
moral authority is tautological for Wolff, since "the distinctive charac-
teristic of the state is supreme authority," and "to claim authority is
to claim the right to be obeyed ." 15 The problem is to determine whether
there is cte jure as opposed to de facto justification for the concept of
the state. That is, the descriptive concept of the state’s authority is
justified by pointing out that some states do in fact claim supreme auth-
ority, while the normative concept of the state’s authority, since it is
nonempirical, referring "to what ought to be rather than to what is, must
await a priori justification. "We must demonstrate by an a_ priori argu-
ment that there can be forms of human community in which some men have a
moral right to rule ." 16 However, conflict is foreshadowed as men become
aware that they are "metaphysically free," aware that they cannot put
aside
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responsibility for choice and action; "the moral condition demands that
we acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever
possible ."^7 To the extent that we submit to the claims of the moral
authority of the state we forfeit moral autonomy and responsibility; there-
fore, no a. priori argument for the de jure authority of the state can be
sustained, the primacy of autonomy and responsibility precluding the demon-
stration or deduction of the state's legitimacy:
If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the
highest degree of autonomy possible, then there would
appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obli-
gation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a
de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous,
and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only
reasonable political belief for an enlightened man. 1
"
If we turn to political democracy in an effort to resolve the con-
flict between moral authority and moral autonomy, we encounter several
possibilities, every one of which Wolff believes must fail. We might, for
instance, turn to "unanimous direct democracy," whereby every member of
society freely gives assent. This indeed would solve the conflict, ex-
cept, practically, one dissenting vote on a crucial issue could bring the
operations of government to a halt. Similarly, with "representative democ-
racy," we have no ultimate control over elected officials who may at will
disregard our prerogatives, and hence we have no moral obligation to obey
laws to which we are vehemently opposed. Finally, in the case of "majori-
tarian democracy," we encounter the tyranny of the majority, as Mill called
it, whereby the minority systematically suffers the loss of moral autonomy.
Clearly, the critique of political democracy is based on Wolff's premise
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describing the logical incompatibility of moral authority and moral auton-
omy. It would do no good to signal such redeeming slogans as "Democracy
is the best system that we have been able to devise," because, if the logi-
cal incompatibility between moral authority and moral autonomy holds, no
system can be proven to be morally superior over another purely on grounds
of prudential results:
Indeed, the prudential and casuistical defenses of democracy
do not succeed in distinguishing it morally from any other
form of political community. A man might find that his affairs
flourished in a dictatorship or monarchy, and even that the
welfare of the people as a whole was effectively advanced
by the policies of such a state. Democracy, then, could
claim to be no more than one type of <de facto government
among many, and its virtues, if any, would be purely rela-
tive
.
19
Though Wolff's argument is indeed ingenious, I think a naturalist
assessing its impact would point out that it proceeds along with two as-
sumptions. In the first place, there is no doubt that Wolff has stipulated
the independence of a normative realm, and he freely admits that he has
"been forced to assume a number of very important propositions about the
nature, sources, and limits of moral obligation," and that he has "simply
taken for granted an entire ethical theory ." 20 In the second place, it is
assumed that political authority, in the sense that men ought to accede to
supreme authority, is identified with this normative realm; indeed all
authority is moral authority. Given the independence of moral authority
and the identification of all authority with moral authority, and since
the primary case of morality is moral autonomy, no a priori argument can
be adduced in defense of de jure political authority. Moral authority and
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moral autonomy are strictly incompatible. However, it is doubtful that
Wolff has made the strong case he would like, and a naturalist interpreta-
tion would challenge his underlying assumptions. Provided we do not assume
the independence of morality, moral authority becomes a chimera, and the
need for a £r iori justification of political authority disappears. Moral
authority, if not simply a contradictio in adjecto
, would have to be
authority derived from a consideration of the consequences of holding a
given moral view; in like manner, political democracy, if it is to be
assessed for moral worth, would have to be assessed in terms of the conse-
quences which follow from it. Wolff analyzes the concepts of authority and
autonomy as rarefied abstractions, and he has done so through the agency
of arbitrary fiat— that moral and political authority are divorced, in
terms of their justification, from contingent considerations. Naturally,
if we can solve the problem through a priori analysis, authority and au-
tonomy will be manifestly incompatible, it being contradictory that a
person could be both free and coerced at the same time and in the same
respect. By the same magic of a_ priori analysis, we can derive correla-
tive reinforcement of the point, viz., that we cannot morally distinguish
democracy from any other political system, and that a person’s moral au-
tonomy is inversely proportionate to the coercion of his choice and action.
Nevertheless, if morality is perceived in the consequences which follow
from a moral view or political system, not only are we able to distinguish
morally among competing political systems, but it may be the case that
moral autonomy cannot be analyzed in vacuo , without reference to other
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considerations. It might be determined, for instance, that there is con-
siderable advantage to be gained through the conjoint efforts of a community
of individuals and that certain extensions of authority may be compatible
with personal and collective freedom. This being the case, the a priori
concept of moral autonomy would be vacuous and would have no bearing on
substantive questions of morality. In short, it may be the case that moral
autonomy can only be understood within a wider context of considerations,
and that authority may well be compatible with these considerations. In
this regard, Jeffrey Reiman describes the fallibility of moral autonomy
—
a suggestion of wrongheadedness in assuming that the concept's significance
can be exhausted by a priori analysis:
Political and legal systems arise in response to the
fact of power in human communities, and to the assump-
tion that individual conscience or moral autonomy is
not an adequate safeguard against the exercise of that
power by some to the detriment of others or to the
community as a whole. Without the fact of power, and
the assumption that individual conscience is an inade-
quate control, there would be no such thing as a poli -
tical system. Hence the starting point of a^ political
system is the fallibility of conscience
Moral autonomy, conceptually bound by <a priori analysis, constitutes
no more than inner freedom, exclusive and personal, and as Wolff points
out, it is conceptually incompatible with political authority. But the
question remains whether conceptual analysis can render the content we need
to understand autonomy and authority. If Reiman is correct, there can be
no moral autonomy without both political autonomy and political authority,
it being power which links them all. The power for which men struggle and
die is political autonomy, for it is perceived that only through political
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autonomy can moral autonomy survive; yet the conjoint efforts of men to
gain political autonomy require social order. That is to say, some forms
of political authority would be indispensable for political autonomy and
hence for moral autonomy. Reiman is suggesting, as opposed to conceptual
analysis that in reality, moral autonomy depends on political autonomy.
It depends on the availability of power— to think, to inquire, to evaluate,
to experiment, to accumulate and exchange and test ideas—and this depends
on social order. ^ Translated in terms of moral education, we might be
inclined to think that political democracy constitutes the political auth-
ority we need— that in the forum of debate, political democracy would surely
win over competing systems, because it manifests superiority in the release
of power and moral autonomy. However, such a conclusion could be mislead-
ing, for if political democracy must, in terms of its justification, en-
compass reasons, procedures and possibilities external to any of its forms
as a system of government—forms such as representative or majoritarian
—
then political democracy would appear to be too narrow to yield the prin-
ciples we require in moral education. The emphasis would be on democracy
as an antecedently conceived meaning, a system of government competing with
others, but not necessarily a living constituent of the judgments actually
made by students. To be sure, the student would cite the consequences of
abetting one form or system over another, but the presence of democratic
principles in judgment would not thereby be identified or explained. Even
though some form of political democracy might win a student’s allegiance
that he notes that the form satisfies certain requirements, such as the
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release of power, the teacher would still want to know how it is that the
student is able to come to that conclusion. What is needed is an explana-
tion of wh^ the student is able to reach the conclusion, not simply the
reasons he gives for the conclusion. We need to know what it is that per-
—
t ^ie student to affirm political democracy. Consequently, the concept
of democracy we require must not only encompass a form of government, but
must be broad enough to encompass the factors leading to the justification
of the form. For this reason, Dewey draws a distinction between democracy
as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government:
The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than
can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To
be realized it must affect all modes of human associa-
tion, the family, the school, industry, religion. And
even as far as political arrangements are concerned,
governmental institutions are but mechanism for secur-
ing to an idea channels of effective operation . 23
However much we may be disposed to political democracy in general,
or to one of its forms in particular, we still must inquire into the con-
ditions under which it is permitted to operate, what it is that makes it
effective in promoting individual and communal welfare. Only by identi-
fying these further conditions are we in a position to understand how
democratic principles might be manifested in moral education. By way of
further distinguishing democracy as a social ideal from political democ-
racy, Dewey describes a "community of shared common interests," wherein
various social groups are free to interact in "meeting the new situations
produced by varied intercourse":
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is pri-
marily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated
experience. The extension in space of the number of individ-
uals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer
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his own action to that of others, and to consider the
actions of others to give point and direction to his
own is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers
of class, race, and national territory which kept menfrom perceiving the full import of their activity.
These more numerous and more varied points of contact
denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an indiv-
idual has to respond; they consequently put a premium
on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of
powers which remain suppressed as long as the incita-
tions to action are partial, as they must be in a group
which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests.^
In attempting to unpack this concept of democracy, to show its signifi-
cance, it seems to me possible to cite at least two principal ways of
justifying the concept and of showing its bearing on moral education. In
the first place, to the extent that education ought to accord with human
nature, and to the extent that the only feasible way to get at human na-
ture is by reference to a social environment, there may be grounds to
justify democracy as a community of shared common interests. Of course,
it might be argued that human nature is so perverse and fallible that we
ought not attempt to organize education on that basis. Moreover, if human
nature is thought to have no evil stigma, it might still be argued that,
since it denotes an inner core of innate capacity, it cannot be properly
expounded in terms of social interaction and interdependence. Since both
objections suppose that human nature is dominated by inherent or innate
characteristics, they are both liable to the same critical analysis; if
one fails, they both fail. Now we have witnessed the fallibility of moral
autonomy as an a_ priori conception, and we might therefore be wary of a
concept of human nature characterized by innate, self-actualizing capaci-
ties. There have been attempts, of course, in the name of individualism,
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to expunge the picture of the frail dependent agent and, instead, promote
the vision of the isolated, proudly independent being. This impetus is
detected in Locke's skepticism regarding government which exceeds the pres-
ervation of inherent rights of property, in Cartesian doubt and the medi-
tating ego s claim of indubitable truth, and in the rugged individualism
of Rousseau's natural man, unfolding from within, unimpeded by societal
demands. And it is not unusual, today, to find many who perceive the
essence of democracy in the preservation of laissez-faire individualism.
Individualism follows from a belief in the inherent or innate, the belief
that government and society, at best, constitute necessary evils, while
inevitably clouding natural proclivities and hindering their natural de-
velopment. The individual, up against government and society, must learn
to preserve his integrity; he must learn to manipulate in order to gain
the best possible advantage. Human nature thus conceived naturally re-
volts against assimilation, and, although it is possible that human nature,
when coupled with technological achievement, might eventuate in the "Great
Society," to use Dewey's expression, the dominate feature of this society
would be a disparity and conflict of interests, various factions represen-
ted by competing individuals and isolated groups, and the "Great Community"
of shared common interests would fall short of realization. The problem
confronting those who hold this view of human nature is one of testability,
a problem of separating the inherent or innate from learned dispositions
and behavior. On first glance, the test would seem improbable, it being
after the fact, probing the individual already, in some calculable degree.
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a product of environment and society. Indeed, unless we are convinced by
a £rion arguments for innateness, the practical logistics of unraveling
innate characteristics would appear rife with technical difficulties.
The peculiar difficulty of uncovering an innate core of self or human
nature is evident in Carl Rogers' attempt to reveal the existence of an
"organismic base for an organized valuing process within the human indiv-
idual. The persuasiveness of Rogers' insight rests in his authoritative
interpretation of psychotherapy and his extensive experience with patients.
Rogers believes he has detected a basic tension, in the valuing process of
his patients, between what he calls operative and conceived values. An
operative value springs from an organismic base; "it is simply the value
choice which is indicated behaviorally when the organism selects one object,
rejects another ." 27 Accordingly, in an infant's world, food, comfort and
security are positively valued; pain, hunger, bitter tastes and sudden loud
sounds are negatively valued. And operative evaluation occurs in "much
more complex situations." Studies have recorded a specific appetite, where-
by an infant will choose, according to the "wisdom of the body," those
foods which enrich a deficient diet. These paradigm cases of infant eval-
uations become, for Rogers, the model for the adult, whereby "the locus of
evaluation is again established firmly within the person." 2® However, as
the child grows, he is subject to approbation and disapprobation regarding
behaviors, confronted with the conceived values of his parents and society.
If I understand Rogers correctly, conceived values are comparable to the
antecedent or intuitive meanings previously discussed, and when confronted
with these values, the child begins to lose contact with the organismic
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base which has served so well in the past. In order to hold the love of
parents and the approbation of society, he introjects values often alien
to hxmself. Hence, the adult personality becomes fractured, operative and
conceived values at loggerheads, the agent no longer in contact with the
inner core:
I believe that this picture of the individual, with values
mostly introjected
, . . . is the picture of most of us. By
taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose
contact with the potential wisdom of our own functioning
and lose confidence in ourselves. Since these value con-
structs are often sharply at variance with what is going
on in our own experiencing, we have in a very basic way
divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for
much of modern strain and insecurity
.
29
There is, of course, no lack of evidence for introjected values: the
young student, out of deference to parental wishes, becomes convinced of
the value of being a doctor rather than an artist; the older brother enjoys
pulling his sister’s hair until, faced with parental disapprobation, he be-
comes convinced his behavior is unworthy. But why must we assume, given
this evidence of introjected values, that they are representative of evalu-
ations in general, operative values at odds with conceived values? Rogers
seems to be saying that they will be at odds, unless, perhaps, introjected
conceived values, mediated through an organismic valuing process, become
operative values, become the agent’s own. However, since the organismic
valuing process has been forced to assimilate alien material, the seeds of
»
conflict take root, an unauthentic self or personality the consequence.
Rogers does not pursue the possibility that an introjected value might be
deemed worthy for reasons which are entirely objective and intersubjectively
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open to validation. And it seems to me that the reason he does not pursue
this possibility is because he is using as his model the extreme cases ren-
dered in psychotherapy. Rogers’ argument appears to be centered on two
major moves: (1) an extrapolation from infant studies, where unsophisticated
evaluations are plausibly tied to what might be termed an organismic base,
to the sophisticated and complex evaluations of the adult; and (2) an in-
terpretaion of the patient’s attempts at recovery as attempts to recapture
this primitive organismic base enjoyed by infants. However, when we inquire
regarding what it is that Rogers means by "organismic base," we learn that
"it is the capacity [italics mine] for receiving feedback information which
enables the organism continually to adjust behavior and reactions so as to
achieve the maximum possible self-enhancement."^ Leaving aside the open-
question of self-enhancement
,
is Rogers saying anything more than that the
organismic base is the capacity for evaluation, anything more than the ca-
pacity to choose and act wisely? Why then would we want, in general, to
distinguish between operative and conceived values? We have argued that
intelligent judgment generates values, not because of some special locus
or etiology marking these values, but because the agent is aware of rele-
vant relations and bearings. Although it is not entirely clear what it
is that Rogers wants to establish, it seems clear that he has not empiri-
cally established that there are operative values, tied to an internal
organismic base and conceived values, tied to external sanctions. What
he may have shown is that, in some cases, those revealed in psychotherapy,
some values figure preeminently in a person's life to the exclusion
of
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others which might have figured had the full capacity for evaluation been
present. But this does not imply a unique locus or origin of values inde-
pendent of judgment. When values are considered as the product of intelli-
gent judgment, it seems a metaphorical assignation, based on a dubious in-
ference from what is empirically known, to single out values as originating
within the self, others as externally imposed. Only in cases where intelli-
gent judgment is arrested does it make sense to cite external or internal
restraints or sanctions to explain judgment. And it seems to me that Rogers
has been unduly swayed by cases of arrested judgment in giving us a model
of human nature or self.
Rogers seems to have been overly impressed by successful retrench-
ments of personality encountered in psychotherapy. He thus sees the
success of therapy "marked by one primary value: namely, that this person,
this client, has worth. He as a person is valued in his separateness and
uniqueness ." 31 It follows that, if we are to understand the mechanisms of
recovery, the capacity for evaluation must be represented by an inner self,
crying to be heard, and just as we perceive an organismic base in infants,
the unimpeded wisdom of the body, so it must be that the patient is stri-
ving to cast off the onerous load of introjected values and return to this
primitive base of optimum functioning. Genuine evaluation will be the
reward and consequence of this return to an organismic base. But to char-
acterize successful therapy in terms of an organismic base patterned on
the stimulus-response prizings of infants exceeds the bounds of what is
empirically ascertainable. Rogers tries to explain therapeutic success in
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terms of an implosion of personality, whereas we might just as well say
that the successful patient has learned to submit his judgments to a tri-
bunal of factors which would not be properly characterized as being either
subjective or objective, internal or external. That we have evidence of a
patient striving for a sense of worth or self-confidence does not neces-
sarily imply a search for an organismic base, for we cannot establish what
a new sense of value means independent of the circumstances of evaluation.
In other words, we have argued that values are the product of the process
of evaluation, and the capacity for evaluation, intelligent and hence
healthy evaluation, depends on factors which cannot be established prior
to actual cases of evaluation. To say, then, that genuine evaluation con-
cerns operative values, having an origin or locus in an organismic base,
exceeds the evidence and seems entirely arbitrary.
If we cannot make a determination of values prior to an assessment
of the factors involved in evaluation, it would seem pointless to speak of
human nature or self as being somehow independent of choices and actions
as they occur in an environmental setting, that is, to speak of the self
as an independent, metaphysical entity, empirically unascertainable . Yet,
Rogers often seems to be saying just that, and though he does cite, as in-
dicative of a mature individual’s judgments, the value of information and
feedback, ”it means that this is taken for what it is—outside evidence
and is not as significant as his own reactions ." ^ The "outside, and
by extension, "inside" metaphors are surely empirically unwarranted, surely
not the locus of the pathological and healthy, for what is empirically
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ascertainable are choices and actions regulated by environmental factors
whose locus is established in the process of judgment, not independent of
it or prior to it. The distinction between the pathological and healthy,
from an empirical standpoint, is made only because we can distinguish in-
telligent from arrested judgments and evaluations. To say that a person
has a need or desire which springs from "within" suggests that the need
or desire has no object, has no relation to features, goals and purposes
which are environmentally bound. It might make some sense to say that an
infant’s wants and needs spring from "within," in an effort to make sense
of positing an organismic base, but there can be no doubt that their sig-
nificance and satisfaction are just as much a function of factors "with-
out"— the mother's breast, the warmth of the blanket, and other agencies
of comfort and security. The question concerns where to draw the line be-
tween inner and outer, and even if we make the differentiation in theory,
this is not what is perceived empirically. It would therefore appear that
the practicable and profitable way to view the self is in terms of an en-
vironmental complex which includes what is deemed inner and outer . In this
way we can explain the pathological cases of introjection cited by Rogers
without the assumption of an inner core of values. Along with Rogers, we
can single out such factors as the influence of parents, peers and society;
we can identify cases of obdurate habit and exaggerated reliance on con-
ceived values. But now explanation is couched in terms of empirical data,
in terms of factors regulating (arresting) choice and action, not by hy-
potheses positing an inner self or organismic base. The latter we cannot
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empirically ascertain, and the factors which we cite indicate, as opposed
to hypothetical supposition, that human nature and personality are devel-
opmental concepts, functions of the process of evaluation. Consider the
pathological cases rendered by Rogers. As Dewey rhetorically asks, "What
are [these] .. .pathological phenomena but evidences that the self loses
integration within itself when it loses integration with the medium in
which it lives ." 33 Hence, we cannot really speak of "within" unless we
cite "without," and what would appear to be significant about the self is
not the bifurcation of the two, as we certainly do for linguistic purposes,
but discriminations of the total environment in which choices and actions
are manifested.
The self, then, is a developmental and environmental concept. When
the self is conceived developmentally
,
the pathological is registered in
arrested or restricted discrimination and deliberation, rather than in
aberations of an inner core, and the unity and integrity of the self, which
the positing of an inner core is alleged to preserve, is really manifested
in a person’s choices and actions, in what a person decides to become.
Dewey assesses the role of deliberation and choice in the determination of
the self:
In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives
a lasting set to his own being. Consequently, it is proper
to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is
in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going
to be. Superficially, the deliberation which terminates in
choice is concerned with weighing the values of particular
ends. Below the surface, it is a process of discovering what
sort of being a person most wants to become.
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When the self is conceived environmentally, the emphasis is shifted to the
materials of deliberation and choice. The putative fact here is a social
environment, and deliberation and choice will therefore be marked by con-
cerns of associated life:
The stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by
us. It comes to us from others, by education, tradition
and the suggestion of the environment. Our intelligence
is bound up, so far as its materials are concerned, with
the community life of which we are a part. We know what
it communicates to us, and know according to habits it
forms in us.^
In view of this developmental and environmental concept of the self,
we would appear to have grounds for the concept of democracy as a community
of shared common interests, and that, since human nature manifests no neces-
sarily incorrigible aspects, we have in democracy thus construed a principle
of utmost importance for moral education. If we cannot feasibly understand
the individual except in terms of development within a social environment,
moral education would stand to profit enormously from this disclosure.
Morality and community would be coextensive. However, the immediate ob-
jection will be leveled that the fact of an individual developing in a social
environment does not commit us to the normative acceptance of a community
of shared common interests. Leaving aside the possibility that no fact or
set of facts would have relevance for normative acceptance, a possibility
it is now hoped will be deemed untenable, it could still be argued that the
fact is compatible with the antithetical moral view. It might be argued
that rather than a community of shared common interests, the fact might
just as well suggest the ruthless pursuit of self-interest, suggest the
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vision of competing factions striving for ascendancy, call out the moral
edict that might makes right. One might conclude that intelligent judg-
ment ought to accord with the pursuit of self-interest regardless of the
consequences for others. Certainly moral education will be concerned with
social verities, with manipulative techniques and sophistic maxims on how
to cope and succeed. This argument is certainly captious, but I think, in
view of arguments already tendered, that it must fail. An intelligent
judgment, as we have seen, and in the words of Dewey, "lies in the quality
and degree of the preceptions of ties and interdependencies; in the use to
which they are put ." 36 It follows that the normative justification of
democracy as a community of shared common interests is a matter of intelli-
gent judgment. Moreover, we have argued that a moral view is justified
in proportion to some benefit or goodness thought to be derived from act-
ing according to the view. The justification, in other words, rests in
the fact, if it is a fact, that individuals do cite and d<D receive benefit
and goodness as a concequence of conjoint effort. Accordingly, we have
Dewey's estimation of the community of shared common interests:
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences
are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take
part in it, and where the realization of the good is such
as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it
in being just because it is a good shared by all, there
is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a
communal life, in all its implications constitutes the
idea of democracy
.
3/
If Dewey is correct, it would appear that self-interest will not
suffice as the moral view we require, for it will be found that a person s
interests are integrally woven into considerations of cooperation.
The
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naturalist justification of the normative view of democracy as a community
of shared common interests is funded by the argument that all judgments
have the same logical status; all are claims regarding facts, interdepen-
dencies, relations and consequences. In like manner, self-interest is
justified as a moral position to the extent that certain relations and
consequences, etc., are considered, insofar as benefit and goodness are
cited. Clearly there are grounds for deciding between the two positions. It
is just as clear that the perspicacity displayed in judgment tells us that
unbridled self-interest has very little independent meaning; for when it
is carried to its logical consequence, judgment informs us that self-
interest can only be fully understood in terms of a wider communal context.
But since the two positions are susceptible to objective analysis and com-
parison, we need to find some factor, some benefit or goodness to be de-
rived from the one but attenuated or absent in the other. If this addi-
tional factor can be brought to surface, we will have strong justification
for our construal of democracy, and the basis for a strong argument against
the prevailing subjectivity in moral education; education in general and
moral education in particular will be shown to prosper best as a communal
enterprise, because some desirable factor will have been realized in com-
munal association. It seems to me that this additional increment of bene-
fit or goodness lies in what we have consistently held regarding freedom,
viz., that democracy affords us the power to do—subjectivity and self-
interest, in their isolation, pale in comparison. Therefore, the second
justification for our construal of democracy and its relation to moral edu-
cation rests in its capacity to generate freedom, the power to do
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Democracy conceived as a community of shared common interests is
partially justified by the fact that human nature is explicable only in
terms of a social environment. If it were possible to defend a concept of
self in terms of inherent characteristics alone, it might make some sense
to speak of freedom as unique and personal, as the belief that men are
free so far as their thoughts are free. But a self bound to a social en-
vironment casts the question of freedom anew, in terms of expression and
action. No longer can it be understood in isolation, for account must be
taken of the other, the connection of one's desires, hopes and fears, goals
and needs with the wider implications of a social context. Hence, in ad-
dition to its justification in light of a social self, i.e., the fact of
an individual developing in a social environment, democracy conceived as
a community of shared common interests is further justified because it is
capable of releasing and expressing the power gained through conjoint ef-
fort. Institutions arise in response to human needs and desires, and the
ensuing reciprocity between agent and society constitutes a new fact, a
further testimony of how democratic principles might be embodied in choice
and action. Nevertheless, an argument might be advanced that a social
self, as such, is subject to the unfreedom resulting from ignorance and
conflicts of interest, and since this has so often been the case histori-
cally, self-interest and moral subjectivity gain credibility as plausible
alternatives. Since the fact of social relationships implies nothing
additional, one must turn to his own devices, to means ensuring the satis-
faction of urgent needs and desires; in the face of impelling demands, the
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agent must devise strategies aimed at gratification, choice and action
weighed according to opportunism, immediacy and propinquity.
I think this argument fails on at least two counts. In the first
place, needs and desires are identified and modified in consequence of
conjoint effort. For instance, using Dewey's example, "a physician or
engineer is free in his thought and action in the degree in which he knows
what he deals with. Possibly we find here the key to any freedom."^ And
we might add that freedom of thought and action depend on the existence
of genuine alternatives, many of which will only be generated through con-
joint enterprise; one is not a physician, engineer, carpenter or teacher
in vacuo . Obviously the only way that one can appreciate or disavow al-
ternatives generated through conjoint effort is by being exposed to them.
Hence, conjoint effort may open avenues of expression precluded the agent
chained to a limited repertoire of demands. In the second place, conjoint
effort allows for meeting new and unforeseen events and problems. Changes
in the natural environment, political and technological innovation call
for the efforts and intelligence of the community. The fact of a social
environment suggests the inestimable power of collective intelligence in
coping with environmental problems, assessing political processes, main-
taining order and distributing justice. "Law, government, institutions,
all social arrangements," says Dewey, "must be informed with a rationality
that corresponds to the order of the whole,... to the end that power of
u 39
unimpeded action can be found anywhere.
Therefore, though a case can be made for unlicensed self-interest and
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moral subjectivity, there is abundant and compelling evidence indicating
the value of cooperation and the rewards to be won through communal ex-
perience and intelligence. The agent begins to realize that it is the
quality of judgment, the extent of connections and relations perceived,
which best accords with the satisfaction of needs, desires and goals. The
benefit and good derived from conjoint effort outmatches that of individual
initiative blinded to possibilities originating in the public domain. This
means that intelligent and informed judgment is valued in and for itself,
and needs, desires and goals are colored and altered as a result. The
agent learns that freedom is not an original or personal possession, exist-
ing logically prior to modes of association, but is actually the power to
be derived from those associations. The agent learns that he has a vested
interest in what transpires in the world around him; since his own best
interests are a complement of intelligent judgment, he now acknowledges
his place within the community. Above, we noted Reiman’s indictment of
moral autonomy as an a priori possession, its fallibility and impotence,
and now we can fully appreciate that the concrete fact of freedom is the
fact of power as it exists in human communities. Democracy, as a community
of shared common interests, is thus an ideal, but not an ideal dissevered
from empirical expression; rather, the ideal is embodied in the actual
choices and actions of men, reinforced and justified by the consequences.
It follows that education, as sanctioned by society, will reflect this
ideal, and that moral education in particular will be concerned with the
production of the free agent who actively enters into the life of the
community
.
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The ramifications for moral education of democracy thus construed
are dramatic and immediate. No longer is there reason to condone moral
subjectivity and asocial behavior in the name of individualism. We have
argued that the case for subjectivity, reflected in Atkinson's skeptical
conclusion that any moral position and its opposite can be maintained,
fails because there are criteria by virtue of which we can adjudicate
conflicting moral positions. Because criteria can be adduced, the natur-
alist maintains, as opposed to moral subjectivity, that there can be a
normative theory of moral education and that the teacher-student relation
remains viable. That is to say, we have argued at length that the primary
case of morality lies in the agent's identification of the content of
morality, the benefit and goodness attendant on choice and action, which
in turn implies that the agent has identified relevant relations, bearings
and consequences. Since there are intersubjective criteria, moral educa-
tion has firm grounding in experience, and the teacher-student relation
is vouchsafed in matters of evaluation and morality. Moral educators,
seduced by the is /ought distinction, will discover mitigation in the know-
ledge that the distinction cannot be supported on either logical or ex-
periential grounds--that ultimately the distinction collapses and the
burden of morality is envisaged to lie in the quality of judgment, in the
connections perceived and put to work in the student's experience. More-
over, we have argued that freedom, the necessary condition of any moral
theory, cannot be divorced from considerations of a social context, and
that consequently self-interest is basically a vacuous concept, unless
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interests and desires are referred to this wider context of concern. Here
the naturalist records the fact of human nature and the fact of power to
do. It follows that only a naturalist position affords the full measure of
freedom and is therefore the adequate and complete theory required for moral
education. Anti-naturalists, in their attempt to identify morality in the
antecedent, in independent principles, denigrate or cloud descriptive
material and thereby compromise freedom; they are unable to account for the
liberation of power through critical deliberation, the real mark of the
moral agent. However, the naturalist does account for freedom—by adducing
a social concept of human nature and by identifying the locus of freedom
in the conjoint efforts of men to solve their problems. A naturalist theory
of moral education will therefore be geared to a social end, and as Dewey
says, "it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him
such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only
adapt himself to the changes which are going on, but have power to shape
and direct those changes ." 40 And the "unifying principle" which will guide
the pupil in shaping and directing changes is the "consciousness of his
social environment, [which] confers upon him the ability to interpret his
own powers from the standpoint of their possibilities in social use ."
4
'
1
The name we have given this unifying principle is democracy.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the school only exists be-
cause it is sanctioned by society, and that the democratic society, the
community of shared common interests, has a right in demanding that the
school abet a social ideal. Therefore, much of current permissiveness,
excused under such rubrics as "creativity" and "individuality" should
be
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held suspect. If our arguments are sound, these terms are mistakenly
taken to denote original possessions, whereas they are really derivative
concepts whose concrete expression is registered in the child's ability
to cope with problems in a social environment. Consequently, our arguments
suggest that the school has a fundamental moral responsibility or aim, one
which, all too often, has been lost in the welter of proposals regarding
the "free child":
The moral responsibility of the school, and of those
who conduct it, is to society. The school is funda-
mentally an institution erected by society to do a
certain specific work— to exercise a certain specific
function in maintaining the life and advancing the
welfare of society. The educational system which does
not recognize this fact as entailing upon it an ethi-
cal responsibility is derelict and a defaulter . 42
This moral responsibility of the school implies that education is a function
of social institutions whose primary aim is the development of quality
judgments. To the extent that genuine education is liberating— that pupils
perceive relevant relations, interdependencies and the consequences of
their choice and action—there will be quality judgments; creativity and
individuality will be manifested. It follows that education and moral edu-
cation are coextensive, both being concerned with the quality of judgment;
although, to be sure, it does not mean that every aim or study must accom-
modate a moral conclusion. But it does mean that, since judgments cannot
be distinguished on the basis of logical kind, there will be no logical
distinction between educational aims and moral aims. In this sense edu-
cation and morality are coextensive. Our argument has been that
democratic
principles, embodied in choice and action, best guarantee the
generation of
quality judgments and the liberation of moral education.
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